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THE AIM OF BELIEVERS

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RESUMEN

En esta tesis se analizan las aproximaciones doxásticas y pragmáticas al objetivo de la creencia -la creencia aspira a la verdad-, entendida como actitud proposicional y en ocasiones como estado mental, para finalmente defender la existencia de un vínculo constitutivo entre la creencia y el concepto de verdad: dado un agente S y una proposición p , S cree que p si y solo si S considera que p es verdad. Posteriormente se aplica esta aproximación doxástica de la creencia, una aproximación pragmática amplia y una aproximación mixta al fenómeno de la 'ignorancia pluralista'.

Para ello, y tras los agradecimientos y la introducción general pertinentes, en un primer capítulo se introducen las principales características y propiedades que se suelen adscribir a la creencia. En un segundo capítulo, se estudian aquellos aspectos de otros conceptos que son útiles, y en muchas ocasiones necesarios, para poder profundizar en el análisis del objetivo de la creencia. Posteriormente, en el tercer capítulo se analizan con detenimiento las propuestas doxásticas normativas sobre el objetivo de la creencia, mientras que en el cuarto capítulo se hace lo propio con las principales propuestas pragmáticas sobre la creencia, dentro del marco ofrecido en la investigación. En el capítulo quinto, se profundiza sobre la idea de la existencia de una relación básica y constitutiva entre creencia y verdad fundamentada en la actitud del creyente, y se establecen posibles críticas e ideas similares en otros autores. En el capítulo sexto, se aplica el análisis previo al fenómeno de la ignorancia pluralista -desde la postura doxástica defendida, desde una postura pragmática amplia y desde una postura mixta-, entendida como sistema de creencias y acciones enfrentadas. Finalmente, se incorpora un anexo con los casos estudiados y la bibliografía con las obras utilizadas en la tesis.

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INTRODUCTION

The first of these features is something that can be roughly summarised as this: beliefs aim at truth (Williams, 1973, 136)

Williams' popular sentence about belief and its aim of truth is found in the chapter "9. Deciding to Believe" of his book *The Problems of the Self* (1973). Departing from these statement and from the issues addressed in this seminal book, many publications have recently emerged. What does it really mean to say that "belief aims at truth"? Is it really a correct statement? Can it be interpreted in a normative way? How can pragmatic accounts deal with this epistemic treatment of belief? These issues will guide the following dissertation.

But Williams (1973) not only establishes this feature about belief, but he also considers other four features. The second one is related to assertion,

the most straightforward way of expressing my belief that *p*, is to make a certain assertion (...) the assertion that *p*, not the assertion 'I believe that *p*' (Williams, 1973, 137).

Williams (1973) tinges that even if the agent cannot make assertions -i.e. an animal-, we can ascribe the concept of belief to this agent even when such concept of belief is impoverished and conventional. Nevertheless, authors who study both belief and assertion usually relate both concepts.

The third feature of belief that Williams (1973) mentions also relates to

assertion,

the assertion of p is neither a necessary nor, and this is the point I want to emphasise, a sufficient condition of having the believe that p (140).

In other words, it is possible for an agent to believe p and not to assert p and it is possible for an agent to assert p and not to believe p . Actually, it is possible for an agent to believe p and to assert $\neg p$ and it is possible for an agent to assert p and to believe $\neg p$. Even when assertions express beliefs, assertions may represent or misrepresent beliefs. Furthermore, assertions in some way connect beliefs with decision -to say or not what is believed. And something similar happens with acceptances. The analysis of assertions and the analysis of the differences and similarities between acceptances, assertions and assumptions, on the one hand, and beliefs, on the other hand, constitute some of the hotspots of the current dissertation.

The fourth feature of belief stated by Williams (1973) relates to the reasons for belief emergence,

the content of a belief can be probabilified or supported by certain evidential propositions (141).

Beliefs can be based upon evidence (144).

Williams (1973) states that there must be a rational connection between the content of a belief and its evidence, and such rational connection is in tune with a causal connection between beliefs -i.e. the rational connection ' p because q ' is in tune with the causal connection between 'the agent S believes p because S believes q '. Apart from this kind of evidence, some empirical beliefs are based on direct and basic perceptual

evidence. The need of evidence in order to form beliefs and the possibility of other -conative- features influencing belief emergence are hotspots of the current dissertation.

The fifth and last feature of belief that Williams (1973) mentions refers to the nature of belief,

belief is in many ways an explanatory notion; we can, in particular, explain what a man does by saying what he believes (...). The trio: project, belief and action, go together (144).

In this sense, how belief relates to further agential action, and specifically, how it provides doxastic reasons for further action and how other non-doxastic reasons may influence further action are also key points of the current dissertation.

Apart from these five “basic” or “defining” features of belief, Williams (1973) deals with other related concepts or features of belief. About knowledge, he establishes that

the point is that a machine to which we could properly ascribe knowledge could be a lot more primitive than one to which we properly ascribed beliefs.

This goes against what is a rather deep prejudice in philosophy, that knowledge must be at least as grand as belief, that what knowledge is, is belief plus quite a lot; in particular, belief together with truth and good reasons (Williams, 1973, 146).

Although knowledge is not a main topic of the current dissertation, I will deal with it and its links with belief in order to have a better understanding of belief.

Williams, in his seminal publication (1973), also explains that the agent cannot falsely believe something taken to be true, that belief is not voluntary -only assertions about the content of beliefs are voluntary- and that belief is passive (Williams, 1973, 148-9).

Interestingly, Williams (1973) finishes his chapter about belief considering the possibility of false but useful beliefs,

Suppose a man's son has apparently been killed in an accident. It is not absolutely certain he has, but there is very strong evidence that his son was drowned at sea. This man very much wants to believe that his son is alive. Somebody might say: If he wants to believe that his son is alive and this hypnotist can bring it about that he believes that his son is alive, then why should he not adopt the conscious project of going to the hypnotist and getting the hypnotist to make him believe this; then he will have got what he wants (...) The point is, though even if [his] son isn't alive, [the man] wants, [the man] needs to believe that he is, because [the man is] so intolerably miserably knowing that he isn't (149-50).

The content of such belief is clearly false but the attitude of believing such false belief is useful for his bearer. This line of cases, exhibited in different wishful thinking examples, will constitute one of the main lines of argumentation and analysis during the whole dissertation, as they open the door to non-cognitive reasons for belief emergence and evaluation.

But coming back to the first feature of belief, the main one I am dealing with, what does “beliefs aim at truth” mean? Williams (1973) establishes that he has in mind three different things (137):

- (i) truth and falsehood are a dimension of an assessment of beliefs as opposed to many other psychological states or dispositions.
- (ii) to believe so and so is one and the same as to believe that that thing is true.
- (iii) to say 'I believe that *p*' itself carries, in general, a claim that *p* is true.

First, it makes sense to establish that a belief is true or false, while it does not make any sense that a habit is true or false. But, as I will show, doxastic dimensions for evaluation are not exclusive of beliefs -i.e. they also appear in guesses.

Second, if an agent believes p , then the agent believes p to be true. And if the agent believes p to be true, then she believes p .

Third is about assertions: if the agent asserts her belief p , *in general*, she asserts that p is true even if it is not and she does not realize. And there is no contradiction about an agent asserting and believing p while p is false. In Williams' (1973) words,

Thus, I can, without any paradox at all, say 'Jones believes that p but p is false'; it is only in the first person, when I say 'I believe that p but p is false', that the paradox arises.

I consider that the paradox arises not only in the first person, but always the believer and the agent who is considering the veracity or the falsity of the believed proposition coincides. In other words, I consider that the paradox is as follows: for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p but S considers p to be false. That is in line with the idea I defend about a basic constitutive relationship between belief and truth based on the attitude of the believer: believers consider their beliefs to be true. In an analytical formulation,

For an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

Starting from the seminal Williams' (1973) publication many analysis of belief and its aim have recently appeared. They not only address the nature of such aim in terms of the three things Williams' (1973) had in mind, but they also relate it to other characteristics of belief -many of them already mentioned by William's (1973) in the other four features of belief he considered-, to different pragmatic considerations, to the existence of a universal norm that guides believers while believing and to the existence

of a doxastic value of belief that may be accompanied by other non-doxastic values. The main publications that I have worked with are the book edited by Timothy Chan, *The Aim of Belief* (2013), the book edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, *Epistemic Norms. New Essays of Action, Belief, and Assertion* (2014), the special issue of the journal *Teorema*, *The Aim of Belief* (Zalabardo, 2013) and Nicholas Unwin's book *Aiming at Truth* (2007). For the analysis and study of pluralistic ignorance (chapter 6) I have work with Cristina Bicchieri's (2006) book *The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms*, with Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin and Southwood's (2013) book *Explaining Norms* and with the very suggesting paper "On the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance" written by Bjerring, Hansen and Perdersen (2014). Apart from these publications, I have worked with a great amount of other suggesting and recent publications, specially different papers of the same authors that have published in the previous special issues or books.

In the first chapter I deal with the main features of belief. Specifically, in section 1.1 I explain that beliefs are involuntary -i.e. agents cannot directly decide at will what to believe-, that they are automatic or passive -i.e. beliefs directly come to believers' mind- and that they are context-independent -i.e. beliefs remain in different context unless new evidence is provided. Then, in section 1.2 I analyse a very suggesting property of belief, transparency, which is usually explained as follows: if an agent asks herself whether to belief p , she is automatically asking herself whether p is true. In section 1.3 I deal with another suggesting topic, reasons to believe. More specifically, I analyse the possibility of having beliefs formed on the basis of no evidence. I dedicate two subsections to the defence of evidentialism made by Adler and Hicks and the possibility of doxastic non-evidential and voluntary reasons to believe argued by

Reisner. Then, in section 1.4 I introduce blindspot cases or Moorean beliefs of the type 'S believes (p but nobody believes p)'. Blindspot cases continuously appear in the analysis of the different normative accounts of belief. Section 1.5 is dedicated to rationality, how it is applied to beliefs and how it establishes a specific normativity for beliefs, something that sometimes can be problematic -do rational beliefs always aim at truth? And pretty similar to the nature of rationality on beliefs, I deal with the nature of justification of beliefs in section 1.6 -do justified beliefs always aim at truth? Furthermore, justification is a fundamental concept in order to deal with knowledge and its relationship with belief (see section 2.1). Finally, I add a subsection related to justification in which I analyse three different arguments for beliefs' justification: probabilism, blamelessness and modal conditions based on implication.

Then, in chapter 2 I introduce some concepts that intimately relate to belief. First of all, in section 2.1 I introduce the concept of knowledge, its relationship with justification and I also show a possible and suggesting treatment of belief and its aim: beliefs aim at knowledge and not at truth. In section 2.2 I explain a mental state or propositional attitude different to belief but that also seems to aim at truth: guess. Furthermore, guesses also relate to some of the characterizations of knowledge previously shown in section 2.1. In section 2.3 I deal with assertions, assumptions and acceptances and how they relate to belief. The analysis of these other propositional attitudes, mental states and actions permits to dig deeper into the involuntariness, passiveness and context-independency properties of belief shown in section 1.1. In section 2.4 I explain desire as a mainly conative propositional attitude or mental state, in contrast to belief that is commonly considered a cognitive propositional attitude or mental state. Nevertheless, some cases of belief seem to be influenced by conative

considerations and sometimes it is hard to establish a cognitive nature in them. That is what wishful thinking cases show. I explain these cases -some of the most important ones in the dissertation- in section 2.6. In section 2.7 I explain another possible mental state or propositional attitude that is very similar to belief but that seems not to be under the doxastic pressure of the latter: *schmelief*. These possible cases are commonly referred in the current epistemic literature. Then, in section 2.8 I introduce a functionalist account of belief that is different from the normative approaches explained in chapter 3 and from the teleologist and pragmatic approaches explained in chapter 4. And finally, in section 2.9 I advance the idea of a constitutive relationship between belief and truth I defend: believers consider their beliefs to be true.

In chapter 3 I deal with the normative accounts of the aim of belief. First of all, in section 3.1 I introduce the possibility of degrees of belief, as it is an important issue for the debate on the doxastic normativity of belief. Then, in section 3.2 I explain 'the correctness norm of belief', which is taken to be the most fundamental norm of belief: a belief p is correct if and only if p is true. In chapter 3.3 I deal with an evidentialist norm of belief that relates to the reasons for belief formation: if agents (should) believe p , then there is (enough) evidence for p . In section 3.4 I analyse 'the ought norm of belief' one of the main proposals for a norm on beliefs: agents ought to believe p if and only if p is true. In section 3.5 I analyse another norm specially defended by Daniel Whiting, 'the may norm of belief': agents may believe p if and only if p is true. This norm tries to solve the 'omniscience problem' of the previous 'ought norm of belief'. In section 3.6 I deal with a normative proposal defended by Paul Horwich that I call 'the ought to want norm of belief': agents ought to want their beliefs to be true. In order to defend this proposal, the verb *want* must be understood in an epistemic sense. Then, in section 3.7 I

explore the possibility of having a norm on beliefs based on doxastic values -this proposal relates to the teleological accounts (see section 4.2)- and in section 3.8 I explore the possibility of establishing a normativity on beliefs based on epistemic virtues. Finally, in section 3.9 I introduce the debate about the nature of normativity and the differences between what are commonly called evaluative norms and constitutive norms, in order to defend in section 3.10 the constitutive relationship between belief and truth I previously advanced in section 2.9. I defend it in the following manner: for an agent S and a belief p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

In chapter 4 I analyse the main pragmatic positions according to the current theoretical framework. Some of them directly points at the aim of belief while others affect the action developed after believing. Furthermore, I show how other propositional attitudes or mental states related to belief can accommodate pragmatism. More specifically, in section 4.1 I explain the no-guidance argument to refuse normativity on beliefs: different norm proposals do not apply to beliefs or, if they really do, these proposals are not really normative as they do not guide nor prescribe believers but just define what a belief is. In section 4.2 I analyse the teleological accounts of belief that describe its relationship with truth according to values and not according to norms. The possibility of having different values on belief opens the door to pragmatic positions. I deep into issue in subsection 4.2.1 and subsection 4.2.2. Another possibility is to accommodate truth to other underlying values, like moral, personal or aesthetic ones. I discuss this option in section 4.3. Then, in section 4.4 I explore the possibility of belief aiming at truth, being truth a practical reason for further action, a thesis I will also consider in chapter 6 when talking about pluralistic ignorance and its study in terms of beliefs. Quite similar to this idea, in section 4.5 belief can be considered a mechanism

for a doxastic regulation of emotions: belief aims at truth and in that way it provides a regulation of believer's emotions. Then, in section 4.6 I explore assertions, its nature and how they can be motivated by practical reasons, to finally relate these issues to the nature of belief. Similarly, in section 4.7 I explore acceptances and the revisionist possibility of belief replacement by some kind of acceptance. In section 4.8 I take Reisner's idea of doxastic voluntarism (see section 1.3.2) to see how it can evolve into a defence of pragmatic beliefs in some specific cases. Finally, I take into consideration robust pragmatism defended by Susanna Rinard who, at the same time, offers a useful terminological clarification.

In chapter 5 I start summarising the thesis previously shown in section 2.9 and section 3.10: for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true. Then, in section 5.1 I discuss to what extent such thesis can be considered a normative one. Specifically, in subsection 5.1.1 I apply the no-guidance argument (see section 4.1) to this proposal. In section 5.2 I relate this account to the ideas of different philosophers. More accurately, in subsection 5.2.1 I relate this proposal to the regulation of beliefs via transparency -if an agent asks herself whether to believe p , she is automatically asking herself whether p is true- that some authors consider. In subsection 5.2.2 I relate Papineau's defence of values on belief -as a mechanism motivated by biological design- to the doxastic link of belief I consider. And in subsection 5.2.3 I take into account Wedgwood's affirmation that agents cannot *falsely* believe any proposition. That is similar to state that agents only can *truly* believe propositions, something that is very similar to my consideration. In subsection 5.2.3 I relate the functionalist account of belief discussed in section 2.8 to the constitutive relationship between belief and truth I defend. Then, in subsection 5.2.4 I deal with the differences between intensional and

extensional readings of 'belief aiming at truth' and I relate the intensional one to the proposal.

In chapter 6, I analyse pluralistic ignorance phenomena in terms of beliefs. Even when this phenomenon has commonly been described according to social norms, I take Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen's (2014) treatment in terms of beliefs:

“Pluralistic ignorance” refers to a situation in where the individual members of a group

- (i) all privately believe some proposition p ;
- (ii) all believe that everyone else believes $\neg p$;
- (iii) all act contrary to their private belief that p (i.e. act as if they believe $\neg p$); and where
- (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their private beliefs about p (2458)

More specifically, in section 6.1 I introduce this phenomenon while in section 6.2 I analyse the previous definition. Then, in section 6.3 I sum up the three different belief accounts I will apply to the phenomenon: an epistemic one -agents consider their beliefs to be true- in subsection 6.3.1, a pragmatic one -beliefs are considered to be practical- in subsection 6.3.2 and a mixed position -beliefs aims at truth, truth is practical, so belief aims at pragmatic considerations (see section 4.4 and section 4.5)- in subsection 6.3.3. In section 6.4 I apply these different accounts to pluralistic ignorance phenomena: the epistemic account in subsection 6.4.1, the pragmatic account in subsection 6.4.2 and the mixed account in subsection 6.4.3. Finally, in section 6.5 I sum up the conclusions about each account and I defend that pluralistic ignorance, understood as a system of confronted beliefs resulting in different actions, is useful to deal with some of the hotspots issues and debates on belief. I also defend that the epistemic research on belief can be applied to pluralistic ignorance phenomena in order to understand and manage them.

Finally, I add an annex with the main cases exhibited and analysed during the dissertation. In total these are 28 cases in which reasons to believe, final beliefs and actions developed after believing vary. They also show the differences between belief and other mental states or propositional attitudes. At the end of the analyses of each case I apply the proposal of a basic constitutive relationship between belief and truth:

For an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

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1. INTRODUCING BELIEF

The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (COED) states that *belief* is:

1. An acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof: *his **belief in** extraterrestrial life.*
 - 1.1. Something one accepts as true or real; a firmly held opinion: *we're prepared to fight for our **beliefs.***
 - 1.2. A religious conviction: *Christian **beliefs***
2. (**belief in**) Trust, faith, or confidence in (someone or something): *a belief in democratic politics* (Belief, 2016)

This linguistic characterization of belief introduces some of the basic features and concepts related to belief -acceptance, proof, trust, faith, conviction, opinion, a specially truth- but it is not enough for epistemic and philosophical purposes.

As I advance in the general introduction, I analyse the nature of belief in terms of doxastic and pragmatic accounts, to finally defend that there is always a constitutive link between belief and truth based on the believer's attitude: the believer always considers her belief to be true -in a more analytic fashion, the agent *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. I study the normative approaches to believe in chapter 3 and I study some of the main pragmatic approaches to belief -in the current framework- in chapter 4. Then I compare other positions similar to my thesis in chapter 5.

But before doing that, in this introductory chapter I dig into the main features of belief. First, it is said that belief is *involuntary*, *automatic* and *context-independent*. I analyse these features in section 1.1. In section 1.2 I analyse one of the main features of belief together with those introduced in section 1.1: *transparency* -i.e. the fact that when

an agent asks herself if she believes p , she automatically asks herself if p is true. Transparency works as an argument for some doxastic normativist accounts of belief (see section 5.2.1). I pay attention to the treatment of transparency proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2013b) who defends that deliberation about belief may be addressed in non-epistemic forms, but deliberation about propositions in order to form or to adopt beliefs is epistemically addressed and such deliberation about belief formation or adoption is developed according to what the agents take to be relevant for the truth of the belief. Section 1.3 is about reasons to form beliefs and I classify them in two main categories: *evidential and non-evidential reasons*. Evidential reasons are usually related to doxastic accounts of belief -mainly the normative ones- while non-evidential reasons are usually related to pragmatic accounts of belief. Many times this dichotomy has been put in terms of evidential vs. pragmatic reasons to believe, but as Rinard (2015) points out, many times evidential reasons to believe are also pragmatic reasons. That is why I prefer to talk of *evidential and non-evidential reasons* to believe. In section 1.3.1 I analyse Adler and Hicks' (2013) defence of evidentialism and in section 1.3.2 I analyse Reisner's (2013) defence of non-evidential reasons to believe and voluntarism about belief in some particular cases. Section 1.4 refers to *blindspot* or *Moorean cases* -e.g. it is raining but I do not believe it is raining. Section 1.5 digs into *rationality* and its treatments on belief: as a means to get the goal of truth establishing their own norms or as a way of evaluating if belief's aim -but not the final doxastic result- is correct. *Rationality* is one of the most important concepts related to belief, specifically for doxastic normative approaches (see chapter 3). Then, I introduce *justification* and a possible *justification aim of belief* in section 1.6. *Justification* is often presented as a means to obtain truth or as a consequence of the doxastic aim of belief, so it may

present an instrumental normative similar to rationality (section 1.5)¹. More specifically, in section 1.6.1 I analyse different *arguments for the justification accounts*: the probabilist argument, the blamelessness argument and modal conditions. I finally take into consideration the defence of justification done by Steglich-Petersen (2013a) that admits the possibility of justified false beliefs.

1.1. BELIEFS ARE INVOLUNTARY, AUTOMATIC AND CONTEXT-INDEPENDENT

The vast majority of authors assume three main characteristics of belief: beliefs are involuntary, automatic and context-independent (Unwin, 2007; Wilkinson, 2013, 111-113)². These features make differences between belief and other propositional attitudes like acceptances and assumptions (see section 2.3, section 4.6 and section 4.7).

First, beliefs are involuntary, they cannot be developed at will. If an agent could believe p at will she could adopt an attitude towards p regardless of the truth of p , and this would not be compatible with belief aiming at truth (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b, 140; Unwin, 2007, 120, both based on Williams, 1973, 148). Involuntariness of belief does not allow to develop conscious false beliefs nor to give away or lose some beliefs. Let's consider the following case:

(The earning money case) Suppose that one knows that if one were to believe that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money (...) since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing (Whiting, 2014, 220).

1 When I introduce *justification* I consider authors that relate it to truth in terms of the framework I am following. In 6, when analyzing *pluralistic ignorance* in terms of 'belief', I also introduce the pragmatic position of Richard Rorty who talks of justification without truth.

2 Wilkinson (2013) prefers to talk of beliefs being passive instead of automatic, and beliefs being scenario-independent instead of context-independent (111-3).

The agent cannot voluntarily develop the belief that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head even when she would receive a great amount of money. Voluntary behaviour is responsive to practical reasons, while involuntary behaviour may not be. All agents can do is to bring about the appropriate circumstances for the beliefs to arise affecting their own belief forming dispositions or affecting the available evidence (see Turp, 2013, 95). All agents can do to believe a particular proposition is to make it true³. In Wilkinson's (2013) words, "I can voluntarily bring about the belief that my left hand is raised, but only by raising my left hand (...) The belief itself wasn't voluntary: the action was" (111). Similarly, Unwin (2007) states that "I might just choose to immerse myself in evidence in favour of the claim and ignore evidence against it" (118).

Second, beliefs are automatic or passive. Beliefs are not actions that agents *do*, but they are propositional attitudes or states that *happen* to agents. But this is not incompatible with agents bringing about the appropriate circumstances for specific beliefs to arise as said before -e.g. determining the evidence (Wilkinson, 2013, 111-3).

Let's consider the following case:

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes his son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

It is not possible for Kate to develop the specific belief that her son is innocent voluntarily and actively, but she ignores the reliable evidence and she focuses on the

3 "to use an analogy, I can't directly control my cholesterol, but I can aim at lowering my cholesterol indirectly by observing good epistemic practice, by not, for example, interpreting evidence in a biased way (...) when we say that belief aims at truth, we mean truth as far as the subject is concerned. When we say that it is transparent, directed at the world, at reality, we mean the world, reality, as far as the subject is concerned. To use Ramsey's metaphor, we want to know what the subject's map is like. An inaccurate map, even a systematically inaccurate one, may spell bad news for the individual who uses it, but it is still a map" (Wilkinson, 2013, 113-4).

facts and evidence that support her belief about the innocence of her -i.e. she reminds that her son was a lovely kid. Her desire to consider that her son is innocent causes her to interpret the evidence in a biased manner (see section 1.3).

Third, beliefs are context-independent (Unwin, 2007, 108-17). Different contexts are different practical-settings with no change in evidence. Agents cannot change beliefs in terms of the context if it does not provide new evidence, something that actually happens in other propositional attitudes like assertions, acceptances or assumptions (see section 2.3). Let's consider the following case:

(The lawyer case) A lawyer believes that her client is guilty. And she believes so no matter the context: with her partner, her friends and even during the trial. She does it automatically and involuntarily. Nevertheless, during the trial she may assert, accept and assume that her client is innocent in order to obtain the best possible verdict.

Beliefs are different than assertions, acceptances or assumptions because beliefs are context-independent while assertions, acceptances or assumptions may not be. Furthermore, assertions, acceptances and assumptions can be voluntarily and actively adopted or modified without change in evidence (see section 1.3 and section 2.3).

1.2. TRANSPARENCY OF BELIEF

(Transparency) If an agent asks herself whether to believe p , she is automatically asking herself if p is true.

All beliefs have in common the transparency property. There may be different reasons to believe: some of them are epistemic while others may not (see section 1.3). Some beliefs are true and other beliefs are false. Different beliefs may present higher or

lower degree for the agents (see section 3.1). But if the believer asks herself whether to believe p , she is automatically asking herself whether p is true. Transparency is automatic, direct and non-inferential.

The transparency condition of belief relates to the regulation produced by doxastic norms of beliefs -agents develop their beliefs in terms of truth-, and in that way, transparency can provide an argument for normative accounts of belief (see chapter 3 and section 5.2.1). Transparency also relates to the constitutive link between belief and truth I am considering: once an agent believes something, she considers it to be true (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5). According to this regulatory function, some philosophers consider transparency as a psychological fact (Engel, 2013a).

In a similar way, Adler and Hicks (2013) defend that beliefs are under a doxastic constitutive but that does not imply that they are under a prescriptive norm. This constitutive normativity “is reflected in the observation that you can be asked a justification-seeking 'Why'-question for what you believe” (144). So, the constitutive normativity of belief is reflected in transparency. More accurately, transparency relates to the 'Do you believe'-question -Do you take p to be true?-, and the further 'Why'-question -Why do you take p to be true?- that relates beliefs to their causes is a derivative one. These authors add that possible 'schmelievers' (see section 2.7) cannot correctly face the 'why'-question: if they could, schmeliefs would be just beliefs. Papineau (2013) replies that such a 'why'-question is optional.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013), philosophers who criticize the normative approaches, considers that normativist philosophers use the transparency phenomenon to justify their accounts as follows:

Since it is part of the very concept of belief that only considerations relevant to determining whether p is true can settle the question whether to believe that p , there can be no pragmatic reasons for belief, which are not relevant to the question whether p is true (102).

However, transparency -the fact that when an agent asks herself if she believes p she automatically asks herself if p is true- does not imply that reasons to believe should be always epistemic reasons. Let's consider the following case:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

If Paul ask himself whether to believe that Olga loves him too, he is directly asking himself whether Olga loves him too. But that does not imply that no pragmatic reasons come into play when developing his belief and when justifying it. In fact, regardless of Paul took some evidence or not to develop his belief, motivational non-evidential reasons influence his belief formation (see section 1.3).

Non-normativist philosophers may accept transparency but they may defend that it does not imply any norm for believing (see Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a). In a similar manner, Steglich-Petersen (2013b) criticizes that normativists explain transparency in terms of being a feature of deliberation framed by the concept of belief and he offers a different approach⁴. This author (2013b) starts considering that normativist philosophers

4 “The false presupposition is that transparency must be explained in terms of being a feature of a kind of deliberation that is framed in terms of the concept of belief, i.e. that it is our understanding of the concept of belief that moves us to settle deliberation over belief in terms of truth. Once we do away with this presupposition, transparency can be explained in more straightforward way, which doesn't rely on beliefs aiming at truth in an implausibly strong sense” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 61-2).

try to explain doxastic norms according to the importance of beliefs being true, giving up alternative considerations when evaluating beliefs (pleasantness, usefulness). For normativists only truth, doxastic justification and doxastic rationality are relevant to analyse belief formation and to evaluate beliefs (see chapter 3, section 1.5 and section 1.6). But in many cases there seems to be other non-truth tracking processes responsible for belief formation and there are non-doxastic criteria for evaluating beliefs, like in *the love case*⁵. Facing these cases, transparency -the fact that when agents deliberate whether to believe p , they directly deliberate whether p is true- offers an argument for a privileged role of truth in evaluating beliefs. However, transparency still allows for non-doxastic ways of belief formation and regulation. In Steglich-Petersen's (2013b) words: "Why should the sensitivity to truth in deliberation over belief not be of the weaker kind exhibited by belief formation in other contexts?" (63). Normativists reply with an essential doxastic norm of belief correctness: belief are correct if and only if beliefs are true. Steglich-Petersen (2013a) considers that normativists really argumentation is the following: once agents deliberate whether p is true *and the very concept of belief frames the deliberation*, then believers are motivated by the norm of belief correctness. Then, Steglich-Petersen (2013b) argues that it is not necessary to accept that the concept of belief frames the deliberation about transparency. Actually, for this author it is possible that the deliberation about believing p drives the believer to ask herself questions other than the doxastic one⁶. Steglich-Petersen (2013b) illustrates this idea with *the Bob's*

5 "Many genuine beliefs are the result, not of impartial truth tracking, but of wishful thinking or deeply entrenched biases designed to result in advantages not always afforded by a strict concern for believing the truth -a badly formed and epistemically irresponsible belief can still be a belief" (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 62).

6 "I find in entirely possible when asking myself whether to adopt some belief, to consider, for example, whether adopting that belief would be unpleasant, what it would do to my self-esteem, and other such truth-irrelevant concerns. I also find entirely possible to regard such considerations as relevant to whether it, on the whole, would be a good idea for me adopt the relevant belief" (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 65).

deliberation case:

(*Bob's deliberation case*) Bob is pondering the finitude of life. He entertains the dreadful thought that it may well be all over much sooner than he cares to think about. Being a philosophical sort of guy, he asks himself if it, all things considered, might be a good idea to adopt belief in an afterlife, despite the lack of evidence (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 71).

Bob may deliberate about believing in life after death, and she may come to think that it is better to believe in life after death regardless of the evidence and the veracity of the proposition -there is life after death. So Bob deliberates about believing p but that deliberation does not drive the agent to consider if p is true, being p 'life after death'. However, these deliberations cannot directly issue a belief: agents may consider if it is better or worse to believe in life after death, but that will not result in any belief. So,

a more accurate statement of transparency should not focus on the impossibility of certain transitions in deliberation from one question to another, or even on the impossibility of attaching normative importance to the answer one gives to such questions, but on the impossibility of certain kinds of deliberations to result directly in belief (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 65).

Deliberation about beliefs does not imply deliberation about the truth of those beliefs, so deliberation about beliefs does not imply transparency. But deliberation about beliefs *in order to adopt or to form these beliefs* imply deliberation about the truth of those beliefs, so deliberation about beliefs *in order to adopt or form these beliefs* imply transparency.

The explanation of transparency also has to deal with the fact that belief adoption or formation may be motivated by considerations that are not relevant to the

truth of these beliefs:

[C] The explanation of transparency must be compatible with the fact that, subconsciously, one can be caused to form a belief as to whether p on the basis of considerations that are not relevant to the truth of p (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 66).

Steglich-Petersen (2013b) replies that the agent adopts or forms her beliefs on the basis of considerations that she *takes* to be relevant to the truth of her belief, even if these considerations turn out to be weak or false⁷.

Considering these two objections to the traditional definition of transparency -if an agent asks herself whether to believe p , she asks herself if p is true-, that is, (i) that agents when deliberating about beliefs do not necessary need to deliberate about the truth of the propositions believed and (ii) that the considerations that are relevant to the formation or adoption of beliefs need not to be relevant to the truth of propositions believed, Steglich-Petersen (2013b) establishes the following definition of transparency [T]:

[T] One can consciously decide [whether to believe that p] in a way that issues directly in forming a belief as to whether p , only on the basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to [whether p is true] (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 66).

Then, Steglich-Petersen (2013b) introduces a very similar principle, that he calls 'transparency* [T*]'. This principle assumes [C*] correlative to [C]:

[T*] One can consciously decide the question [whether p is true] in a way that issues directly in forming a belief as to whether p , only on the basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to [whether p is true] (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 67).

7 “what matters for transparency is that I *regard* certain considerations as relevant to the truth of the relevant proposition, not that they in fact are relevant” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 66).

[C*] The explanation of transparency* must be compatible with the fact that, subconsciously, one can be caused to decide whether p is true on the basis of considerations that are not relevant to the truth of p (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 67).

The agent's decisions in these two principles are different: whether to believe that p or whether p is true. But they both result 'in forming a belief as to whether p ' and they solve the two problems of the traditional definition of transparency showed above. [T] is framed by the concept of belief and [T*] is not, and Steglich-Petersen (2013b) tries to explain [T*] without invoking the concept of belief to latter explore if the explanation given can be applied to explain [T]. More accurately, Steglich-Petersen (2013b) explains [T*] as a specific instance of the following general principle of aim-directed activities [G]:

[G] It is not possible to \emptyset with an aim A while being aware that \emptyset -ing will not further A (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 68).

Applying this principle to [T*], the agent who decides whether p is true is aware that his considerations are relevant to the truth of p . The considerations may be irrelevant, but the agent takes them to be relevant, solving [C*] and [T*]. It is immediately obvious that [T*] is an instance of [G]:

transparency* concerns a relation between deciding whether p is true, and being moved to settle this question on the basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to settling that very question (i.e. whether p is true), thus making it immediately obvious how it is an instance of [G] (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 69).

But the same cannot be applied to transparency [T]. Transparency [T] concerns a

relation between deciding whether to believe p and the considerations that the agent takes to be relevant to settling whether p is true -not whether to believe that p . So it is not immediately obvious that [T] is an instance of [G]. It is not immediately obvious that the question 'whether to believe p ' directly refers to 'whether p is true', as illustrated above with *the Bob's deliberation case*. In Steglich-Petersen's (2013b) words:

Why should the deliberative question of whether to believe that p sometimes give way to the question whether p in an *immediate* way, if it is neither impossible nor particularly rare that we move in our deliberation to a question other than that of truth? (70).

A possible answer is that there can be different questions in the agents' minds when asking 'whether to believe p '. If so, 'paradigmatic' cases of transparency immediately move from the deliberative question 'whether to believe p ' to 'whether p is true'. In other words, 'paradigmatic cases' of transparency coincide with transparency*. The cases in which agents ask themselves 'whether to believe p ' without asking themselves 'whether p is true' -e.g. the agent who deliberates about believing in life after death- are not paradigmatic cases of transparency.

For Steglich-Petersen (2013b), paradigmatic cases of transparency -cases of transparency*- are not framed in terms of belief, but just in terms of the truth of the particular statement. The term belief is many times used to *express* the question about the truth of the particular statement or the doxastic trustworthiness of the person who states the particular statement. Belief is not necessary to explain transparency:

[w]hen cases of deliberation phrased in terms of 'belief' exhibit transparency, the relevant deliberative question is best interpreted directly in terms of truth. By contrast, cases of deliberation phrased in terms of 'belief', in which the concept of belief genuinely does play a role in shaping the deliberation, do not seem to exhibit transparency. This suggests that cases of transparency

should be understood as cases of transparency*. But in that case, the explanation in terms of [G] applies (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b, 72).

Finally, Wilkinson (2013) identifies the popular statement 'belief aims at truth' with the transparency of belief -if an agent asks herself whether to belief p , she is automatically asking herself if p is true. Actually, according to Wilkinson (2013) to consider that belief is transparent is a 'less metaphorical' and 'less ambiguous' way of dealing with belief and its goal of truth, and it avoids misunderstandings. For instance, to say that 'believers aims at truth' can be understood as if the believer tries to have true beliefs, but as beliefs are automatic this interpretation may seem strange (see section 1.1)⁸.

1.3. REASONS FOR BELIEF: EVIDENTIALISM AND NON-EVIDENTIALISM

Evidentialism is the thesis that belief needs evidence as its reason. Generally, normativits positions about belief relate to evidentialism. In that way, the purpose of belief is to reflect reality, beliefs aim at truth because they are based on evidence (Whiting, 2014; Adler & Hicks, 2013), and the norms of the rationality of belief (see section 1.5) are norms for evidence (Owens, 2003, 285).

(*Hugo's pig case*) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Evidentialism considers that evidence is the reason for beliefs. The agents create

8 “The believer can't aim at anything in believing, or at least not *directly*. Perhaps what is meant is something more *regulative*. So, to use an analogy, I can't directly control my cholesterol, but I can aim at lowering my cholesterol indirectly by observing good epistemic practice, by not, for example, interpreting evidence in a biased way” (Wilkinson, 2013, 113).

beliefs because they receive evidential in-puts. Hugo believes he sees a pig because he has straight evidence to belief so. Nevertheless, some beliefs are developed out of straight empirical evidential in-puts:

(The teacher case) Tom is at class of physics. His teacher tells him and the rest of pupils that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe. So he believes that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe.

In this case, Tom and the rest of pupils do not have any perceptual evidence to create their beliefs. But they trust their teacher and they finally believe what the teacher says. Although there is no direct perceptual evidence, evidentialist philosophers may establish that Tom and the rest of pupils have evidence enough to develop their beliefs (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 161).

Agents deal with different kinds of evidence: the one given by perceptual in-puts, the one given by expertise and trustworthiness, the one given by social conditioning, the one given by previous personal experiences, etc. Even admitting a broader scope of evidence, the evidentialist has to deal with other complex cases, like wishful thinking ones (see section 2.5):

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

The evidentialist has several options. She can say that Paul's state is not belief, but just something like 'stubborn conviction' or *schmelief* (see section 2.7), a state similar to belief but “governed by other aims, such as comfort and pleasantness” (Engel, 2013b). But to consider that Paul's state is not a belief is not a plausible option: most

people agree that Paul's state is a belief, even being a false one. A more plausible way of dealing with these cases from an evidentialist approach is to consider that Paul has much available evidence and that he took the one that favours his belief. For instance, Paul saw Olga touching her hair when she saw him some days ago. Sometimes, the agent -Paul- may create his own evidence to justify his belief, as a matter of faith.

The non-evidentialist philosopher may state that Paul develops his beliefs due to non-evidential reasons, like pragmatic emotional ones: Paul believes that Olga loves him too because that makes him feel better and motivates him to carry on.

Some evidentialists may admit that there is something pragmatic or motivational that affects belief emergence. That explains why Paul chooses weak and poor evidence rather than more reliable evidence, like the good friends testimonies -trustworthiness evidence- or seeing Olga meeting another guy -direct perceptual evidence. But what Paul finally chooses to develop and maintain his belief is evidence⁹. The evidentialist may also reply the non-evidentialist with other cases:

(The earning money case) Suppose that one knows that if one were to believe that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money (...) since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing (Whiting, 2014, 220)

The agent cannot believe at will. Belief is said to be transparent -if the agent asks himself if he believes p , then he is directly asking himself if p is true- automatic and involuntary (see section 1.1 and section 1.2). Psychological facts do not allow to create the beliefs we want to have, but they adjust to evidence. But the non-evidentialist

9 “even in the case of self-deceptive or irrational belief the norm operates. But this is because it is regulated through the *evidence* that one has about one's belief, and this evidence can vary largely from thinker to thinker, and from circumstance to circumstance” (Engel, 2013a, 59).

has also a reply:

(The Jimmy's lottery case) Jimmy decides to play the lottery. The probability of winning the lottery is 0.0001, but he believes that today he is going to win the lottery. Intuition or something like that tells him it. He believes he is going to win the lottery today¹⁰.

The non-evidentialist shows that the evidence of winning the lottery is very small, as small as its probability. Nevertheless, Jimmy really considers true that he is going to win the lottery. This case is quite similar to *the love case*. The difference with that case is that here the evidence is probabilistic and measured (see section 1.6 and specially 1.6.1): 0.01%. The evidentialist may answer that, even if the probability is small, it exists. The problem arises if Jimmy plays the lottery without any opportunity to win, that is, by buying a number that is not inside the lottery machine. In such case, there is not evidence.

Jimmy may assume that the probability of winning the lottery is very small. He plays because he just “want to try”. But this is not the case: Jimmy is convinced that today is his special day for wining the lottery. If Jimmy just “want to try”, his commitment to truth nor the practical is very low, and his state is more likely to be a guess (Owens, 2003; Gibbons, 2014) or the believe that 'he has probability of 0.0001 of wining the lottery'.

It should be noted that many times the debate about the reasons of beliefs has been put in terms of evidentialism versus pragmatism¹¹. However, I prefer to talk of evidentialism versus non-evidentialism. This is so because many times beliefs clearly based on evidence are also practical, and many times practical beliefs are based on

10 Similar cases of 'motivational pragmatism' beliefs are shown by Rinar (2015, 210-1).

11 “Evidentialism and pragmatism simply seem to have different philosophical conceptions of what could count as a legitimate reason for belief” (Shah, 2011, 94).

evidence. To talk of evidentialism versus non-evidentialism is more accurate to address the debate¹². It might be practical for Hugo to believe that he sees a pig in order to hunt it if he is hungry and he is lost in the forest, and it is practical for Tom to believe that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe in order to pass the exam. Evidentialism sometimes implies pragmatism, non-evidentialism sometimes also implies pragmatism. Similarly, evidence sometimes is not practical:

(The hated terrorist son case A) Kate is terminally ill. His son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that his son is a hated terrorist.

It is difficult to consider that it is practical for Kate to believe that her son is a hated terrorist. She believes so because she has enough reliable evidence. Maybe *in the long run* (Haack, 1996, ϕ 10; Unwin, 2007, 178) it is practical for her to believe the truth, but there is no long run in this case as Kate is terminally ill.

Also, motivational reasons may not be practical:

(The cake case) Andrew loves cakes, but his diet does not allow him to eat cakes. But he believes that just one small piece per week will not be a problem (although it actually is, because that outweighs any gain of the diet).

Similar to wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5), the evidence to believe that a small piece of cake per week will not be a problem is weak or poor -maybe Andrew's consider what he watched on TV several years ago or what his neighbour told him. The

12 “In most ordinary cases, evidence in favour of p constitutes a pragmatic reason to believe it. Typically, evidence that the store is closed now is a pragmatic consideration in favour of believing it, as one would (typically) be inconvenienced by having false beliefs about the store's house. Evidence that one's spouse has pneumonia is (typically) a pragmatic reason to believe it, as one will (ordinarily) be better suited to care for them if one has true beliefs about the nature of their illness” (Rinard, 2015, 219).

non-evidentialist may say that there is no evidence at all. But here, it is difficult to defend that there is a pragmatic outcome when believing that a small piece of cake will not be a problem. Maybe in the moment it is practical to satisfy the greed, but in the long run (Haack, 1996, ϕ 10; Unwin, 2007, 178) what is practical is to avoid eating cakes.

Engel (2013b) also points that evidence may work as a reason for belief suspension:

(The skin cancer case) For instance one might want to defer judgment as to a condition of one's health (say that one has a skin cancer) by waiting for the results of a particular medical examination. In such cases of withholding or of suspension of judgment, the reason to believe (rather: to withhold or to suspend judgment) are attitude or state-given, but they are clearly of the right kind (26).

In these cases, evidence is still an epistemic reason: “the patient withholds his judgment about his potential illness awaiting more evidence: he suspends judgment because he lacks evidence, for an evidential, and not for a pragmatic reason” (Engel, 2013b, 27).

1.3.1. ADLER AND HICKS' (2013) DEFENCE OF EVIDENTIALISM

Adler and Hicks (2013) defend evidentialism and refuse non-evidentialist arguments. They establish that agents “cannot in full awareness belief that p and believe that the reasons [agents] possess are insufficient to establish that p ” (143) and then they argue that non-evidential reasons to belief do not pass this test. Non-evidential reasons are insufficient to establish a belief. The justification of beliefs (see section 1.6) for the

non-evidentialist is based on agent's personal importance of facts or agent's special insights or experience. Adler and Hicks (2013) call this form of justification 'rationale': rationales do not derive from truth while evidence does, rationales are directed to the believer while evidence is directed to the proposition believed. For instance, wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5) would find rationale non-evidential justification:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

Non-evidentialist philosophers may consider that Paul justifies his belief about the requited love in terms of his biased insights. This justification (see section 1.6) does not derive from the truth of the proposition believed -Olga loves Paul- but it is directed to Paul as the bearer of the belief. Adler and Hicks (2013) refuse this analysis: it is evidence and not rationales that justify beliefs. If Paul develops his belief about the requited love, it is because there is some -weak, poor or even false- present evidence¹³. This evidence enhances Paul to establish a commitment to the false belief that restricts the correct evidence (see below) given by his friends testimonies and by what he directly sees -Olga dating another guy.

Adler and Hicks (2013) also make a distinction between “constitutive reasons to believe” and “extrinsic reasons for believing” (141). Let's consider the following case:

(The earning money case) Suppose that one knows that if one were to believe that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money

13 “Thus, 'risky' nomological inference cannot be backed by a (non-evidential) rationale (...) If such inferences are acceptable, they are acceptable on the basis of evidence for them, and nothing more” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 151-2).

(...) since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing (Whiting, 2014, 220)¹⁴

Receiving a financial reward is an “extrinsic reason for believing”, but the only “constitutive reason to believe” would be an evidence that David Cameron's doctor uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head. As there is not such an evidence, the belief cannot emerge. Only constitutive reasons to believe can form beliefs.

These authors also relate the 'evidentialism versus non-evidentialism debate' to the degrees of belief (see section 3.1). For the evidentialist, to believe p is to fully believe p with probability 1, without any qualification to degrees of belief. Non-evidentialist philosophers may state that to believe p is to believe p with a high level of confidence but at the same time the believer may admit that there can be mistakes. This substitution provides a foothold for a form of contextualism that can provide arguments for non-evidential reasons to belief (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 148): there is a gap between an assured belief and a likely belief, and the non-evidentialist tries to fill it with non-evidential reasons, i.e. an agent S has evidence to believe p to a 0.93 of probability, but she completely believes p -with a probability of 1- because non-evidential reasons filled the 0.07 gap. However, for Adler and Hicks (2013), if an agent S bears a belief p with a high probability but not the highest probability of 1, then the agent just believes p to the correspondence degree: “Rather than believing or saying that 'John is in Paris' you can believe or say 'John is very probably in Paris', when the evidence is very positive, but inconclusive” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 148). In cases like wishful thinking (see section 2.5), agents may fully believe their beliefs -agents assign probability 1 to their beliefs-

14 Adler and Hicks (2013) analyse a similar case: an adaptation of William Styron's *Sophie's Choice*, inspired by Kafka's (1983) Toxin Puzzle. In order to maintain some homogeneity in the cases I use during the dissertation, I refer to 'The earning money case' exhibited by Whiting (2014).

even though the evidence is weak or poor¹⁵. Let's consider *the love case*:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

Paul fully believes that Olga loves him too: it is not the case that he considers a high probability about the requited love, but Paul assigns probability 1 to his belief though the belief is externally false. But Paul considers it to be true and so he assigns it a probability 1. In terms of Adler and Hicks analysis, Paul made a risky inference -“from the slight touch of your date's hand on yours to the fact that she reciprocates your romantic interest” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 149)-, but precisely to understand inferences as risky is to understand that their conclusions have a probability of 1. The key with these cases is to understand that “[p]robability 1 marks knowledge, not certainty” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 149).

Adler and Hicks (2013) also focus on other cases in which the agent seems to avoid reliable evidence to form her beliefs:

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes his son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist¹⁶.

Pragmatists (see chapter 4) would say that the costs of the true belief outweigh the benefits, and as a result, the true belief -the son is a hated terrorist- is not formed.

15 “To understand these inferences as risky, though is to understand them as assigning probability 1 to their conclusions” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 149).

16 The case Adler and Hicks (2013) show is very similar. It is taken from Nozick (1993). In order to maintain some homogeneity in the cases I exhibit during the dissertation, I refer to *Kate's hated terrorist son case B*.

Instead, Kate forms the false belief that her son is innocent. Adler and Hicks (2013) reply that beliefs are transparent (see section 1.2), so when Kate asks herself if she really believes that her son is innocent, she is directly asking herself if her son is innocent. And to answer this question, Kate needs evidence. The available evidence shows that her son is guilty, so the only way to develop the false belief is to mistrust or to forget that evidence via distraction or self-deception. Only if Kate had evidence to believe that her son is innocent, she would not need distraction or self-deception. Non-evidentialist philosophers find an argument in the fact that agents -Kate in this case- can form beliefs in terms of self-deception.

Adler and Hicks (2013) reply that there is not a full awareness of the evidential basis in these beliefs motivated by self-deception: if there were such a basis, it would not be possible to form those beliefs. When dealing with these beliefs, the agent avoids the reliable evidence to form the correct beliefs via self-deception. And self-deception is explained in terms of commitment:

the main point of commitment is for one's earlier self to bind one's later self, since one's earlier self anticipates contrary reasons or evidence (...) We conjecture that, oftentimes, non-evidential reasons to believe are better cast as reasons to adopt the corresponding commitments, which are explicitly undertaken to resist doubts and what would otherwise be rational counter-considerations and counter-evidence (...) commitment can induce full belief, for instance, by limiting the sort of evidence (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 164).

In other words, commitment restricts evidential considerations to form beliefs. And Kate is committed to her son's innocence.

Another non-evidentialist strategy is based on the existence of basic beliefs determined by the agent's environment that cannot be explained in terms of evidence

(e.g. religious, political or social beliefs given by the very early environment)¹⁷. Furthermore, these basic beliefs determine and justify the rest of beliefs blocking a regress argument¹⁸. There are two hot spots about basic beliefs. First, the existence of non-evidential basic beliefs. Second, -if the answer to the first question is positive- if the agent can voluntarily choose her basic beliefs (see section 1.1). If so, non-evidential considerations would determine these basic beliefs. Adler and Hicks (2013, 159-60) reply that beliefs are not always inherited and they are developed in terms of reasoned argumentation: that is what explain the emergence of new trends and their correspondent beliefs (e.g. vegetarianism, subcultures). About basic beliefs, Adler and Hicks (2013) state that they work as hypotheses to be confirmed or refused, so they are under the norms of belief. The success of the practices motivated by basic beliefs works as a confirmation of these basic beliefs. So, for Adler and Hicks (2013) it turns out that these beliefs are not so basic.

Another related issue mentioned by Adler and Hicks (2013) is that once the belief is formed, then the believer may abandon the evidence that she used to develop it (150) -e.g. to economize cognitive resources. In some cases, however, there can be reasons to hold the evidence, but the causes to maintain the evidence in the agent's mind “are strictly different to the role reasons play in producing the belief” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 150). These authors also admit that pragmatic reasons may come into play while inquiring -e.g. the expected outcome of the inquiry may determine how many resources

17 “We all group up in communities that cannot help but have a deep influence on our important, controversial, or prominent beliefs, unlike, say, our simple perceptual ones. We would not have these beliefs, if we grew up in neighboring communities. Nothing in acknowledging this fact of powerful non-epistemic influences of social development and local culture conflicts with evidentialism *per se*, but only with how realistic its demands are” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 159).

18 “Whatever beliefs are chosen, the crucial claim for our purposes is that there must be (to block the regress argument) beliefs that justify others but are not themselves justified (...) These are automatically justified by our natural, limited, human condition and practices” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 160).

the agent uses while inquiring, prudential considerations may also determine inquiry-, but these reasons “say nothing about how [the inquirer] ought to *believe*” (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 155; italics added). Nevertheless, inquiries and beliefs should not be confused: inquiries are practical while beliefs are theoretical, inquiries aim at the optimal outcome under their circumstances and beliefs aim at correctness based on truth (see section 3.2).

In general, non-evidential reasons to believe break the doxastic aim of belief as they allow to consider the formation of beliefs that do not aim at truth. Even more, non-evidentialist philosophers open the door to doxastic voluntarism: that is, they allow to consider that agents may voluntarily develop their beliefs (see section 1.1). That would reduce evidentialism to an ethical thesis. Adler and Hicks (2013) refuse non-evidentialism and they also reply that non-evidentialism just focus on some particular cases like wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5) while it accepts evidentialism for the vast majority of beliefs (164).

1.3.2. REISNER'S (2013) DOXASTIC NON-EVIDENTIAL REASONS TO BELIEF AND DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM TO FORM BELIEFS

Reisner (2013) considers that non-evidential reasons may determine some beliefs. Moreover, in some contexts agents may voluntarily choose their beliefs (see section 1.1). He argues that non-evidentialism and a limited doxastic voluntarism can accommodate the doxastic aim of belief and normative approaches to belief. In other words, it is not necessary to adopt an evidentialist position to defend doxastic normativity in beliefs: evidence is not the only reason for a belief to aim at truth¹⁹. To

19 “Evidence does not exhaust the ways in which the aim of belief might set truth-tracking belief norms” (Reisner, 2013, 174).

defend his ideas, he focuses on two different cases or games: *the numbers game with a single fixed point* and *the numbers game with multiple fixed points* (Reisner, 2013, 169).

(The numbers game with a single fixed point case) Alice is attached to a mind-reading machine with a screen. Alice is asked to predict what number will appear on the screen. She believes that n will appear. But the number that appears on the screen is $n/2 + 1$. In the case Alice has no beliefs about which number will appear, the number 16 appears.

(The numbers game with multiple fixed points case) The case is very similar to the single fixed point case. If $n > 0$, the formula is still $n/2 + 1$. But if $n < 0$, the formula is now $n/2 - 1$.

In *the numbers game with a single fixed point case*, the only belief that turns out to be true -the single fixed point- is 2. In *the numbers game with multiple fixed point case*, there are two beliefs that turn out to be true -there are two fixed points: 2 and -2.

There is not any simple evidence to develop the beliefs. In the *the single fixed point case*, it can be said that if Alice is “sensitive to a complex kind of evidence, then she can form her belief based on evidence” (Reisner, 2013, 171). Reisner (2013) defines “simple probabilistic view about evidence” and “complex kind of evidence” in this way:

Alice will not have evidence on a simple probabilistic view about evidence: p is evidence for q just in case the probability of q given p is higher than the probability of q given not p . Perhaps some more sophisticated account of evidence would allow for the following: p is evidence for q if p entails that any belief but q will be false and that q would be true. On this view, p would be the facts (or Alice's knowledge) about the numbers game; q would be that the number will be 2 (170).

Anyway, for Reisner (2013) this complex kind of evidence does not work for *the multiple fixed-point numbers case*:

The sophisticated account of evidence does not even yield that one has evidence that the number will be either 2 or -2. Alice's beliefs will be false unless she believes that it will be 2 or believes that it will be -2. Holding in place the supposition that she has no brute dispositions to believe one way or the other, or brute dispositions to believe that she will believe one way or the other, Alice cannot have evidence for any belief in the multiple fixed-point numbers game (171).

However, if p is considered to be 'the knowledge about the numbers game', then q can be considered both 2 and -2 in *the multiple fixed-point numbers case* and in that way the 'complex evidence' definition of Reisner (2013) could be applied to *the multiple fixed-point case* -i.e. the knowledge of the game given by different trials can be evidence for the whole range of solutions (2 and -2) at the same time and the subject does not need to choose but to consider both simultaneously. But this is too demanding: Alicia does not have to believe both 2 and -2, she only needs to believe either 2 or -2 to have the correct believe.

It should be noted that if we consider the 'simple probabilistic view about evidence', this definition of evidence may accommodate numbers game with both a single and multiple points: 'knowledge about the numbers game' is evidence for 2 (2 and -2, in *the multiple fixed points case*) because the probability of 2 (2 and -2, in *the multiple fixed points case*) given this 'knowledge about the numbers game' is higher -in fact, it is a probability of 1- than the probability of 2 (2 and -2, in *the multiple fixed points case*) given 'no knowledge about the numbers game' -it is a very low ϵ probability. An evidentialist may state that both *the single fixed point case* and *the multiple fixed point case* do present evidence -knowledge of how the numbers games work after some trials-, even if evidence is understood in a simple sense. As this comment does not make a big difference in Reisner's (2013) argument, I let this criticism aside.

Reisner (2013) also analyse *stable beliefs* as beliefs that can be formed according to stability and not in evidential terms. But he finally refuses that idea, stating that “the fact that a belief would be stable is unlikely to have non-derivative reason-giving force. Cases in which being a stable belief provides a reason are cases in which there is already some other more basic reason-giving considerations” (Reisner, 2013, 172-3). Stability is not a basic reason to develop beliefs.

From *the single fixed point numbers case* previously shown, Reisner (2013) establishes the following 'normative knowledge principle':

(Normative knowledge principle) Fact f is a reason for agent a to believe b if f makes it the case that a knows that if a believes b , then a 's believing b will cause b to be true (175).

This normative knowledge principle is consistent with the doxastic aim of belief and belief norms (see chapter 3). Moreover, for Reisner (2013) it supposes the falsehood of strict evidentialism: f is a non-evidential reason to believe b , the belief b aims at truth and it is subject to norms of belief in the same way as evidential beliefs. But for Reisner (2013) this normative knowledge principle is only relevant when evidential reasons are not available (179). Furthermore, this normative knowledge principle does not accommodate *the multiple fixed point numbers case*, as it provides reasons of equal strength for both 2 and -2 (see below).

Apart from the 'normative knowledge principle', Reisner (2013) considers a 'reasons principle':

Under normal circumstances, agents involuntarily form beliefs in response to what they take to be their epistemic reasons (176).

He stresses that the reasons to believe need not to be taken via reflective or conscious processes, and that 'epistemic reasons' refer to reasons that are truth-concerned, even if they are non-evidential -as he considers in the 'normative knowledge principle'. In other words, there can be evidential and non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe.

These principles of 'reasons' and 'normative knowledge' do not offer the agent any skill to discriminate between 2 and -2 in *the multiple fixed points numbers case*. Reisner (2013) argues that “if doxastic voluntarism is possible (...) it looks like the right cognitive capacity for this job” (178). And similar to epistemic non-evidential reasons to believe like the given in the 'normative knowledge principle', doxastic voluntarism is not at odds with the doxastic aim of belief and the doxastic norms of belief: both 2 and -2 are true beliefs under the norms of belief.

From this analysis, Reisner (2013) offers the following account that accommodates non-evidentialism and doxastic voluntarism with the doxastic aim of belief and the norms of belief settled by this doxastic aim:

Voluntarism: An agent can choose her belief just in case three conditions are met:
(i) Evidence does not issue a relevant requirement (either for a belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgement)
(ii) The agent knows that her having the belief will cause the belief to be true.
(iii) *Normative knowledge* does not issue a reason for just a single belief (179).

The key to understand this 'weak voluntarism' is that the agent can only choose a belief that she knows it is true among some other true beliefs. Voluntarism does not relate to a 'faith voluntarism' but to a 'knowledge voluntarism' when several true beliefs are available. This underdetermination between true beliefs is “the death of involuntary

belief forming mechanisms” (Reisner, 2013, 172; see also 179).

Finally, Reisner (2013) defends that this doxastic voluntarism opens the door to pragmatic considerations when developing beliefs (see chapter 4). If in *the multiple fixed points numbers game* Alice would get a prize for believing that the number will appear on the screen is -2, there is a pragmatic reason for Alice to choose to believe -2 instead of 2. And this pragmatic encroachment is consistent with the epistemic reasons for her belief, the doxastic aim of her belief and the norms to develop her belief. Pragmatic considerations to choose -2 does not suppose any doxastic cost.

1.4. BLINDSPOT CASES AND MOOREAN BELIEFS

A blindspot case or a Moorean belief is a proposition of the form '*p* and nobody believes that *p*'. A popular example is the following:

It is raining and nobody believes it is raining.

These cases are possible, but any agent cannot believe them: if an agent *S* believes that 'it is raining and nobody believes it is raining', then she believes that (a) it is raining and that (b) nobody believes it is raining. But if she believes (a), automatically she stops believing (b), as there is at least one person -the agent herself- who believes that it is raining.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) use blindspots to refuse normative accounts of beliefs. First, let's consider an *ought norm* on beliefs (see section 3.4):

If an agent considers p ²⁰, then: if p is true, the agent ought to (believe that p) and if p is false, the agent ought not to (believe that p) (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 108).

The *ought norm* thus stated cannot accommodate blindspot cases. Consider that 'it is raining but nobody believes it is raining' is true. Then, the agent ought to (believe that 'it is raining but nobody believes it is raining'). If so, the agent ought to (believe that 'it is raining') and she ought to (believe that 'nobody believes that it is raining'). But if the agent believes that 'it is raining', she cannot believe that 'nobody believes that it is raining', and as a result, she cannot believe the blindspot proposition 'it is raining and nobody believe that it is raining': if it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining', the agent ought not to believe it. If she does, the proposition 'it is raining and nobody believes it is raining' turns out to be false.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) show that the problem relies on a violation of the principle 'ought' implies 'can satisfy', and they offer a possible reformulation of *the ought norm* to accommodate blindspot cases (see section 3.4):

If an agent considers p , and p is *truly believable*, then: if p is true, the agent ought to (believe that p) and if p is false, the agent ought not to (believe that p)
 (...)
 If an agent considers p , and p is not truly believable, then the agent ought not to (believe that p). (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 110).

As blindspot cases are not truly believable propositions, this formulation seems to solve the problem. But blindspot cases are the conjunction of truly believable propositions. An agent cannot believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining', but she can believe both that 'it is raining' and 'nobody believes that it is

20 The premise of an agent *considering* p is taken to solve the omniscient problem presented by the norm ' p is true if and only if the agent ought to (believe that p)'. The reformulation also states what the agent 'ought not' to believe: the initial norm just said that 'if p is false, it is not the case that the agent ought to (believe that p)'. For more details, see section 3.4.

raining'. If 'it is raining' is true, then the agent ought to believe that 'it is raining'. If 'nobody believes that it is raining' is true, then the agent ought to believe that 'nobody believes that it is raining'. Thus stated, blindspot cases violate the agglomeration principle: 'if an agent ought to (believe that p) and she ought to (believe that q), then she ought to (believe that $p \ \& \ q$)', and if belief's content is normative, it is plausible to state that this agglomeration principle based on the conjunction rule is also a norm of belief (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 111-2). Wedgwood (2013) replies that

we should never have expected the permissibility-operator to agglomerate. It is permissible for Buridan's Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Left, and it is also permissible for the Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Right, but it is *not* permissible for the Ass both to go to the Left and to go to the Right (135).

The 'permissibility logic' does not assume an agglomeration principle, being similar to the 'possibility logic': it is possible to p , it is possible to q , but that does not imply that it is possible to ($p \ \& \ q$). Wedgwood (2013) also refuses that the 'permissibility logic' thus stated is different of a particular 'permissibility of beliefs logic' (135-6). Specifically on blindspots, Wedgwood (2013) establishes that in some contexts the agent ought to or may believe 'I do not believe that p ' while in other contexts she ought to or may believe that p and she ought not to believe 'I do not believe that p ' (138). For Wedgwood (2013) belief is normative and there are norms of belief that guide and prescribe beliefs -the *ex ante* prospective ones-, but their application depends on the context: the propositions considered and the 'ought' norm of beliefs about them are context dependent²¹. The *ex ante* prospective normativity of belief is context

21 "In this context, if one makes a judgment (about what one ought to believe) involving *that* precise concept, it will be that judgement that will guide one's thinking (...) the propositions that are in question are precisely the propositions that one has considered in that context" (Wedgwood, 2013, 138). See also section 1.1.

dependent, and as a result it is not necessary for this normativity to include an agglomeration principle.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) makes a similar criticism in an alternative *may norm* or permission norm on beliefs (see section 3.5):

If an agent considers p , then the agent is permitted to (believe that p) if and only if p is true.

As it happened with *the ought norm*, if it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining', then the agent may believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining', but in that way the agent comes to believe that 'it is raining' and the initial blindspot turns out to be false: if it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes it is raining', (i) the agent is permitted to believe that 'it is raining' and (ii) she is also permitted to believe that 'nobody believes it is raining' which is a contradiction of (i). So the agent is *not permitted* to believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining'. If she does, then the blindspot would be false. Similar to *the ought norm*, a possible reformulation of *the may norm* to solve blindspot cases can be stated:

If an agent considers p and p is *truly believable*, the agent is permitted to (believe that p) if and only if p is true.
 (...)
 If an agent considers p , and p is not truly believable, then the agent ought not to (believe that p).

Under *the may norm*, the agent is permitted to believe that 'it is raining' and to believe that 'nobody believes that it is raining'. But she is not permitted to believe the conjunction of both -'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining'- as it is not truly believable. As it happened with *the ought norm*, the agglomeration norm based on a

plausible conjunction rule for beliefs cannot be applied. And Wedgwood (2013) replies with the same argument: it is not necessary for a *may norm* on beliefs to accommodate the agglomeration principle based on an agglomeration norm (see above in this section).

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) also consider a truth-norm based on a doxastic value maximization on beliefs: (see section 3.7):

You ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p if and only if you consider p and you Dp in all of the highest-ranked doxastic possibilities (relative to your considered propositions).
 You are permitted to have doxastic attitude D towards p if and only if you consider p and you Dp in some of the highest-ranked doxastic possibilities (relative to your considered propositions) (115).

This norm based on values can accommodate blindspot cases, but in these cases agents ought to disbelieve blindspots or they ought to suspend beliefs about them. That means that there may be true propositions that are impermissible to believe or that agents sometimes ought to believe falsely. In the latter case, what is false would not always be incorrect, so the norm based on doxastic values is not fundamental: “If false beliefs are incorrect, then the theory entails that I ought to have an incorrect belief. If ‘incorrect’ entailed ‘impermissible’, we would have the absurdity that it can both be obligatory and impermissible to believe p at t ” (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 117). A truth-norm based on doxastic values can accommodate blindspot cases, but it is not explanatorily fundamental and it is counter-intuitive. Furthermore, it does not explain a commitment to evidentialism (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 118; see section 1.3).

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) also explore a doxastic norm of belief based on an identification between correctness and goodness (see section 3.7):

Your believing that p is good if and only if p is true.
 Your believing that p is bad if and only if p is false (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 119).

Again, if p is a blindspot case and it is true, believing that p -it is raining and nobody believes it is raining- is good. But doing so, p turns out to be false. If p is false, then believing that p is bad. The initial good states of affairs finally play the role of bad states of affairs: obtaining p makes the world worse. Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) offer a possible reformulation:

Your belief that p being true is good (equivalently, the state of affairs that S believes p and p is good).
 Your belief that p being false is bad (equivalently, the state of affairs that S believes p and $\neg p$ is bad) (120).

This reformulation is not based on the 'beliefs about the world' or the 'states of affairs' but just on the beliefs themselves: there are not 'beliefs about the world' but just 'beliefs being true'. However, this possible doxastic norm is not fundamental of beliefs and it is applicable to other mental states like desires (see section 2.4) or promises: it is good for an agent to desire p and p is true (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 120).

In short, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) show that blindspot cases create problems to the normative accounts of belief. Possible reformulations of these normative accounts must face other stronger problems: a violation of an agglomeration principle based on a conjunction fundamental norm -if an agent ought to or may believe p and she ought to or may believe q , then she ought to or may believe $(p \ \& \ q)$ -, a break of the link between truth and correctness on beliefs -correct beliefs are true beliefs- and the possible application of the reformulated norms to other mental states -so these norms would not be fundamental norms of belief. Wedgwood (2013) replies that it is not

necessary for an *ex ante* prescriptive norm of belief -like *the ought* or *the may norms*- to include an agglomeration principle (see above in this section).

1.5. RATIONALITY OF BELIEF

Many times belief is said to be rational if it aims at truth and irrational if it aims at falsity. So rationality depends on the belief's norm or value of truth.

At the same time, a difference between rationality of belief and epistemic correctness of belief should be made (Owens, 2003). Let's consider the following case:

(The mirage in the desert case) Joe is in the desert. He sees a woman in front of him. So he believes there is a woman in front of him. But it turns out to be a mirage.

These delusions are rational but incorrect beliefs (see section 2.6). They are rational as the believer comply with the norm of truth -i.e. his belief really aims at truth. But they are incorrect, as the belief turns out to be false and it does not comply with the epistemic standard of correctness. In both the delusion and the true belief that there is no woman in the desert, evidence -true or false- may come into play. Evidence is a rational reason to belief (see section 1.3). Let's consider another case:

(The geocentric model) Most people believed during hundreds of years that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme in different ages believed the opposite. Their ideas were not accepted.

Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme's beliefs were incorrect from the social epistemic standard of correctness of their ages, but they were rational, as both authors

aimed at truth when believing. Actually, many of their beliefs that were considered incorrect -even irrational- are now considered correct from our epistemic standards of correctness.

Cohen (1989) states that knowledge entails both beliefs -internally epistemically assumed- and acceptances -influenced by social and pragmatic considerations (see section 2.3)- if they are based on correct evidence (see section 2.1 and section 1.3). In *the mirage in the desert case*, Joe's belief is not knowledge as his evidence is a delusion, but the final acceptance he may have that he is seeing a delusion because a friend tells him is knowledge. Cohen would say that believing there is a woman in the desert is not knowledge because that belief is based on bad evidence: the *acceptance* that he is seeing a mirage is the knowledge. However, during hundreds of years people believed the Earth was the centre of the Universe as most available evidence promote so. Even when some people like Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme showed the opposite, their ideas were not accepted. Cohen would say, contrary to *the mirage in the desert case*, that evidence for their beliefs was true while the evidence for the social acceptance that the Earth is the centre of the Universe was false: the *belief* that the Earth was not the centre of the Universe is the knowledge in this case. Both cases are judged in terms of *a posteriori* evidence and in that way the associated beliefs and acceptances are considered knowledge or not.

Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) show a different idea of rationality. They consider that rational beliefs are beliefs formed via rational processes like valid logic and material reliable evidence. Rationality is defined in terms of these processes and that is what engages beliefs to aim at truth. These authors defends a non-normative approach to belief based on the *no-guidance argument* (see section 5.1.1): “no truth norm can make

any difference to belief formation. Consequently, it is at odds with the very basic idea of rule-guidance” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 83). Basically, they defend that beliefs may be formed in accordance with a norm, but not guided by it: the believer first develops her belief, and it is only once the belief is formed that she may judge if it accommodates a norm of truth. So the norm “comes too late” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 84). As a result of this criticism, normativist philosophers may argue that the normativity of belief relies on its rationality and not directly on the aim of truth. Two norms of rationality are the following:

- (i) One ought to believe that p if and only if one has sufficient evidence that p .
- (ii) If one believes that p and believes that if p then q , then one ought to believe that q (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 81).

The norm (i) relates to evidence (see section 3.3) and the norm (ii) relates to an inferential norm of valid logic. Both norms consider the rationality of the belief formation process and Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) refer to them as 'subjective' as they engage directly subject's perspective. The norm of truth is 'objective' as it engages in the content of the belief. However, Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) also refuse norms of rationality considering the no-guidance argument: believers may develop their beliefs in accordance to norms of rationality but these norms do not guide them, believers just develop their beliefs without the pressure of any norm. Furthermore, even if we try to accommodate an objective truth norm of belief and subjective rational norms of belief, sometimes they can be at odds: as shown above with *the mirage in the desert case* and *the geocentric model case* there can be false but rational beliefs -and also true but irrational beliefs-, so a particular belief can be both correct and incorrect depending on the considered norm -e.g. in *the mirage in the desert case* the belief of Joe that he sees

a woman in the desert is objectively incorrect but it may be considered subjectively correct in terms of norms of rationality (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 88-9; see section 1.5).

In short, for Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) rationality refers to the subjective processes of believe formation, like the evidence available to the subject and the logic used by her. Beliefs and rationality are essentially connected, but this connection is not normative: believers try to develop their beliefs in a rational manner, but there is no rule-guidance in this process²².

Contrary to Glüer and Wikforss (2013a), Wedgwood (2013) defends that rationality is normative and that norms of rationality derives from a fundamental norm of truth:

it seems plausible that the notion of a *rational* belief is also a normative concept (...) It may also be plausible that the principles that articulate the conditions under which beliefs count as rational form part of the essential nature of belief (...) But it may also be that the norms of rational belief are in some way explained by the more fundamental truth-norm that applies to belief.

It may be that one of the requirements of rationality applying to belief is that the propositions that form the contents of one's beliefs should all be consistent with each other. But why should rationality require consistency in this way? What is bad about having inconsistent beliefs? The explanation may have to appeal to the more fundamental truth-norm that applies to belief (...) it seems plausible that the truth-norm is the most fundamental of the constitutive norms that apply to belief (124-5).

In general, the underlying idea is that there is a difference between the epistemic norm of belief with its standard of correctness and the rationality norms of belief that establishes how beliefs emerge with their standard of correctness. Normativist philosophers state that beliefs are under these norms while non-normativist philosophers deny it: if norms exist, they only describe but they do not prescribe nor guide. In this

²² For an extended analysis of Glüer and Wikforss ideas, see section 5.1.1.

sense, the constitutive link between belief and truth I defend -the believer always considers her belief to be true- may be considered a constitutive norm of belief by some philosophers, but as it describes and defines but it does not prescribe -if agents do not consider their states or propositional attitudes to be true, then these states or propositional attitudes are not beliefs- other philosophers would deny it is a proper norm (see chapter 5 and specially section 5.1 for a further analysis). Anyway, I consider that there is always a link between belief and truth based on the believer's attitude towards her belief (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5).

1.6. BELIEF AIMS AT JUSTIFICATION

Related to the rationality of belief and its norms (see section 1.5), some philosophers state that belief aims at justification. For instance, Whiting (2013) when promoting the truth aim of belief against the knowledge aim of belief (see section 2.1), establish that the knowledge aim is swamped by the truth aim, but also takes into account the possibility that the truth aim of belief is swamped by a 'justification aim of belief'²³. This philosopher considers that the aim of justification is derived from the aim of truth, and not the other way around.

Epistemic justification may also be used to defend the knowledge aim of belief (see section 2.1), considering knowledge as justified true belief. In general, to consider knowledge or truth as justified beliefs is problematic. Goldman popular fake barn facades case shows that sometimes knowledge is not just justified belief. It can be said

23 “Accordingly, a possible objection at this point is as follows. Doesn't the truth view face a similar swamping problem? I have granted that, if there is an aim in believing which is satisfied only if one's belief is true, this might generate a subsidiary aim which is satisfied only if one's belief is justified. Surely, by parity of reasoning, the latter aim gives way to the former. This might in turn cast doubt on attempts to generate (J) from (T)” (201).

that epistemic justification is the aim of belief, but agents can believe something without being *epistemically* justified to do so. In other words, there can be justified false beliefs.

Justification is often considered a means to achieve the aim of truth when believing. Similar to norms of rationality (see section 1.5), justification seems to provide an explanation for guidance on beliefs aiming at truth. Accepting the justification of beliefs, then beliefs can be evaluated under two different criteria: the one provided by truth and the one provided by justification. It is strange if these two different evaluations differ, so philosophers who defend justification often try to accommodate it in terms of the doxastic aim of belief (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 205). Among these positions, the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic justification explain justification as a means to achieving the aim of believing the truth. More accurately, believers cannot aim to believe the truth directly, so they do it via norms of epistemic justification “as 'instruments' to forming true beliefs” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 205). Justification, similar to rationality (see section 1.5), presents an instrumental normativity.

For many philosophers, justification entails truth. As a result, as stressed above, there cannot be justified false beliefs. But sometimes there seems to be:

(The geocentric model) Most people believed during hundreds of years that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme in different ages believed the opposite. Their ideas were not accepted.

People's belief about the Earth being the centre of the Universe were justified: their initial evidence showed that and the ideas of Eratosthenes and Oresme were not spread at their time, so most of people did not get the evidence considered by these authors. Actually, the main evidence against the belief of the Earth being the centre of

the Universe was given by the planets' movements, and that evidence could only be understood by very few people at their times (Kuhn, 2012). In other words, people were justified to believe that the Earth was the centre of the Universe even though that belief turned out to be false.

The instrumentalist may stop focusing on the justification of individual beliefs to start focusing on the methods or norms of justification: “[w]hen evaluating whether justification serves the truth aim, we shouldn't evaluate whether individual justified *beliefs* serve that aim, but whether this aim is served by the general *methods* by which the beliefs are formed” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 206). Nevertheless, the instrumentalist cannot admit any justified false beliefs: the internal aim of justification is to believe the truth, and if a particular belief turns out to be false, then that belief is no longer justified regardless of the method²⁴.

A related problem to the instrumentalist accounts of justification is the possibility of unjustified true beliefs. In Steglich-Petersen's (2013a) words, “it is possible to get what one values while being unsuccessful in bringing it about” (209). More accurately, the problem may arise when agents consider that a justified false belief is less valuable than an unjustified true belief. But this does not suppose any problem for the instrumentalist account of justification. A proposition can be truly believed without making itself a successful reliance on epistemic justification and this “is no obstacle to regarding the obtainment of a true belief as the internal aim of justification” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 210). Sometimes truth is obtained via justification and sometimes it is not, but epistemic justification is always a means towards truth.

24 “The ambitious instrumentalist cannot help herself to a predetermined set of norms of justification, and, upon observing that following them in most cases advances the aim of truth, decide that they are essentially means to advancing that aim, even if they sometimes allow false beliefs. Instead, she begins with the guiding assumption that the essential nature of epistemic justification is to advance the aim of truth, and on that basis decide what the valid norms or methods of belief formation ought to be (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 207-8).

Generally speaking, if epistemic justification and truth can be at odds, then several problems arise. First, the truth aim cannot provide an explanation for justification -there can be unjustified true beliefs- so there is a less reason to defend that beliefs aims at truth. Second, the 'guidance argument' (see section 5.1.1) that justification provides to the doxastic aim of belief vanishes, and that makes beliefs aiming at truth less plausible (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 210).

Steglich-Petersen (2013a) replies that the very notion of justification relates to truth in terms of epistemic reasons to believe. For that, he defines justification in the following way:

In asking whether some type of fact or consideration could act as justification for *S* in believing *p*, I shall focus on whether the fact or consideration could act as an *adequate epistemic reason for which S* believes that *p*. Some type of fact or consideration justifies *S* in believing *p*, in this sense, if mentioning that a fact or consideration of that type obtains, would be an adequate, that is, sufficient, answer on *S*'s behalf to the question 'what gives you epistemic reason to believe that *p*?' (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 211).

1.6.1. PROBABILISM, BLAMELESSNESS AND MODAL CONDITIONS FOR BELIEF JUSTIFICATION BASED ON IMPLICATION

Then, Steglich-Petersen (2013a) delves into three different accounts in favour of justified false beliefs that usually are said to be serious problems for the instrumentalist positions: probabilism, blamelessness and modal conditions²⁵. He finally defends that instrumentalism is not at odds with possible justified false beliefs.

Probabilism is defined as follows:

(*Probabilism*) When the evidential probability for *S* that *p* is

²⁵ Modal conditions relate to probabilism.

sufficiently high, *S* has justification for believing that *p* (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 211)

Steglich-Petersen (2013a) states that probabilism (i) concerns the *sufficiency* but not the necessity of the antecedent for the consequence, (ii) it is about *propositional* justification rather than *doxastic* justification and (iii) it does not state anything about the cognitive relation between the agent and the antecedent -in order for the agent to rely on the antecedent in justifying the relevant belief (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 212). Let's consider the following case:

Suppose that Stanley has a ticket in a lottery. The chances of winning the lottery are, as Stanley is aware, 1/1.000.000. Stanley has yet to hear the results of the lottery, which was drawn earlier in the day. He asserts flat-out: 'My ticket didn't win'. Assume that it is true. Despite this, and despite the extremely strong probabilistic grounds in support of this, intuitively Stanley should not assert this. Instead, he should only conjecture that his ticket didn't win, or assert that his ticket probably lost (Gibbons, 2014, 191).

If Stanley believes he is not going to win the lottery, he has a justified false belief: the true belief is that he has very little chance of winning the lottery -a probability of 0.0001-, not that he is not going to win the lottery. It is possible for a proposition -Stanley did not win the lottery- to have a high probability and yet be false.

However, for Steglich-Petersen (2013a) probabilism is committed to allowing irrational belief formation via *doxastic risk-taking*.

(*Doxastic risk*) When *S* forms a belief that *p* while having merely probabilistic knowledge that doing so will result in believing *p* truly, *S* forms the belief under risk.

The believer forms her belief in the hope that it will be successful, but she is not

completely sure that his belief is going to be successful. Some philosophers would consider that this mental state is a guess and not a proper belief (see section 2.2).

Probabilism entails that the agent is ultimately committed to two different -and apparently contradictory- beliefs: the belief about the probability and the belief about the final outcome. Stanley is committed to believe both (i) that his probability of winning the lottery is 1/1.000.000 and (ii) that he is not going to win the lottery. The probabilist may reply that there is only one proposition for Stanley to believe -he is not going to win the lottery- and that probabilities only influence the reliability of the evidence to form such a belief. But that solution is not satisfying²⁶. Another possible answer is that both propositions can be believed at once without contradiction. Steglich-Petersen (2013a) refuses this option²⁷. A final reply is to consider degrees of subjective credence on beliefs (see section 3.1) and to consider that outright beliefs are those in which the degree of credence on a proposition is above a particular threshold, but the solution does not solve the initial problems (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 216). In sum, if probabilism allows for justified false beliefs, it does so considering two different incompatible beliefs at the same time.

Another account that considers justified false beliefs is the one based on *blamelessness*:

(*Blamelessness*) Where the epistemic situation of *S* is such that she couldn't be blamed for believing *p* even if *p* is false, *S* has justification for believing *p*.

26 “So even if the probabilist can avoid commitment to explicit beliefs that are rationally incompatible, she is still committed to something just as bad, namely implicit reliance on the truth of some set of propositions, which cannot be rationally believed at once” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 215).

27 “observe first that the fact that two propositions can be true at once doesn't entail that they can be believed at once without irrationality. The most famous example of such a pair of propositions is the one involved in 'Moorean absurdities'” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 2015).

Steglich-Petersen (2013a) argues that this falsificationist way of dealing with justification -not to be blamed for- is not a correct one: “The fact that one would be blameless for believing p is not a good reason for believing p ” (217). Furthermore, if blamelessness is a genuine norm of beliefs, then blamelessness is subject to the very blamelessness norm: “there must also be a set of conditions under which one can be excused for not conforming to Blamelessness. But this is absurd” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 217).

Steglich-Petersen (2013a) calls *modal conditions* the latter account that admits justified false beliefs. The author illustrates modal conditions with the following case:

(The screen's colours case) Bob has configured his computer screen such that, whenever it is turned on, the background colour is determined by the following random selection mechanism: 0.999999 chance of the screen being blue and 0.000001 chance of the screen being red. Then Bob turns on the screen, leaves the room and Bruce enters the room. Bruce sees that the screen is blue (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 218).

The key point is that Bruce has direct perceptual evidence of the screen being blue, but that evidence is less reliable than the probabilistic evidence Bob possesses. Bruce is empirically better justified than Bob in spite of being probabilistically worse justified, because his perceptual mechanism may fail with a higher probability than 0.000001. More accurately, Bruce being better justified than Bob is not a matter of probabilities, but it is a matter of perception: Bruce has more probabilities of developing a false belief than Bob -because his perceptual mechanism may fail with a higher probability than 0.000001- but Bruce would be more surprised than Bob if the belief turns out to be false. Bruce wholly relies in his sensory evidence while Bob is aware of the failure possibilities of probabilistic evidence. The belief that is more likely to be

mistaken seems to be justified while the belief that is less likely to be mistaken is not (see the criticism on probabilism above).

Steglich-Petersen (2013a) finally defends that an instrumentalist account of justification may allow for justified false beliefs. For that, he determines implication as a minimal constraint:

(Implication) *S* has justification for believing *P* only if the truth of *P* is implied by *S*'s evidence.

This 'implication' entails a necessary but no sufficient doxastic condition for a belief to be justified. For that, Steglich-Petersen (2013a) considers three mitigating considerations:

(i) in many cases where a person's evidence doesn't imply the truth of *p*, implication allows that the evidence may nevertheless justify the person in believing a proposition concerning the evidential *likelihood* that *p*, by implying the truth of this probabilistic proposition.

(ii) even in cases where we lack epistemic justification for *believing* a proposition, it is possible to be justified in *accepting* a proposition for some restricted range of purposes, where the latter justification will often involve a combination of epistemic and pragmatic considerations [see section 4.7]

(iii) implication says nothing about the conditions under which one can be held blameless of believing what one is not justified in believing. It is possible for a person's belief to not satisfy implication, and nevertheless be blameless (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 221-2).

Another related question assumed by Steglich-Petersen (2013a) is that this instrumentalist account of justification via implication does not explain evidence and its obtainment, but for the author they are not intractable in the terms he defends (223)²⁸.

28 "a theory of the essential point of epistemic justification will in many cases decide, and be needed to decide, between rival accounts of more particular epistemic properties. This means that even if our theory of particular epistemic properties such as evidence will invoke additional resources than those relied upon by the instrumentalist account of the aim of epistemic justification, the instrumentalist account will be far from obsolete" (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 224).

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2. RELATED CONCEPTS

In the first chapter I introduced the main features of belief. This second chapter is also an introductory chapter that deals with the main concepts related to belief: knowledge, guess, acceptance, assumption, assertion, desires, delusions, schmeliefs and aliefs. These concepts -specially knowledge and mental states or propositional attitudes like guess, acceptance, assumption, assertion and desire- present an extensive epistemic literature and each of them could be subject of specific research. In this chapter I just introduce them and I pay attention to the links of these concepts with belief in order to better address the following chapters.

I also pay special attention to wishful thinkings cases, I deal with a functionalist account of belief as an alternative to the normative accounts and the pragmatic accounts and I finally introduce the idea of a basic epistemic relationship between belief and truth.

More specifically, in section 2.1 I deal with the relationship between belief, truth and another epistemic concept, *knowledge*. Generally, knowledge is taken to be an epistemically more demanding concept than truth -i.e. an agent may consider something to be true without knowing it. Some authors defend an epistemically stricter norm for belief based on the concept of knowledge, but such option is not out of criticism -i.e. an agent may believe some proposition without knowing it and she may know something without believing it. Related to this debate, in section 2.2 I introduce *guess* as a state that aims at truth -there seems to be a doxastic standard of correctness in both guess and

belief. Proponents of the knowledge aim of belief usually state that guesses aim at truth but they do not aim at knowledge. In section 2.3 I introduce *acceptances*, *assumptions* and *assertions*, and I compare these states, propositional attitudes and actions with belief in terms of voluntariness, passiveness, context-independency and transparency, something that permits the introduction of pragmatic issues in the debate. Actually this section 2.3 complements section 1.1 and section 1.2 about such basic features of belief. In section 2.4 I compare belief with another state or propositional attitude, *desire*. While desire is said to be mainly a conative state -it reflects the world the agent wants-, belief is said to be mainly a cognitive state -it reflects the world the agent perceives. Nevertheless, some cases like *wishful thinking* ones are influenced by conative features and they are commonly taken to be beliefs. That may suppose a problem for strong doxastic normative accounts of belief and an argument for pragmatic accounts. For that reason I establish an independent section 2.5 to explain these cases that are continuously quoted during the dissertation, and specially in chapter 4 that deals with pragmatic accounts of belief. Section 2.6 is about *delusions* and their conceptualization as irrational beliefs or as different states. The debate present some similarities with the wishful thinking one (see section 2.5), but there are differences of evidence treatment and the necessary presence of conative reasons. Then, in section 2.7 I deal with *schmeliefs*, a state introduced by some authors in different manners, similar to belief but under no doxastic norm or value. The concept of *schmelief* is also useful to face *wishful thinking* cases (section 2.5).

In section 2.8 I introduce an account of belief different from the two families here considered -the doxastic normative one (see chapter 3) and the pragmatic one (see chapter 4): a functionalist account that defines belief in terms of the agents' cognitive

regulatory systems function to track the truth in terms of evidential in-puts to develop further beliefs and actions. In this section 2.8 I also deal with the concept of *alief* as a mental state or propositional attitude that enhances further action with weak previous evidential reasons.

Finally, in section 2.9, after introducing the main features of belief (see chapter 1) and concepts, states and attitudes related to belief (chapter 2), I advance the thesis I defend: there is a constitutive link between belief and truth based on the believer's internal attitude, i.e. *the believer always considers her belief to be true*.

2.1. KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE AIM OF BELIEF

Some authors consider another aim for belief: knowledge. In that way, they defend a stronger epistemic commitment (Gibbons, 2014) of the believer and a straight connection between beliefs and external facts²⁹. It may be said that the counterpart of the belief aiming at knowledge is guessing: a propositional attitude in which the guesser aims at truth -or knowledge, if preferred- but with weak or no epistemic commitment (see section 2.2).

Although it can be thought that truth and knowledge are very similar, if not the same, some cases show the opposite.

29 Gibbons (2014) gives the following definition of *commitment* when believing: "Believing that *p* commits you to *q*. That means that it commits you to *q*'s being true. It doesn't merely commit you to believing that *q*. And being committed to *q*'s being true involves the idea that if *q* is false -even if you have no way of knowing that *q* is false- then there's automatically something wrong with your view. And it's not just that there's something wrong accordingly to this arbitrary standard or that arbitrary standard. There's something wrong from your own point of view. In some sense, the standards the belief doesn't live up to are automatically yours (...) The relevant notion of commitment is objective in the epistemically relevant sense in two different ways. You can be committed to *q* even if you don't know that you're committed to *q*. And there can be a failure of your commitments, e.g., you can be committed to something false, even if you have no way of knowing that there's such a failure" (98-9).

(The elections case) Suppose David asks, 'Who do you believe will win the next election?' Kelly might reply, 'The Republicans'. It would be very odd for David to reply, 'You don't know that!' And it would be entirely appropriate for Kelly to reject this challenge by saying, 'I never said that I did' -I was only telling you what I believe'. Note that David might be right that Kelly does not know this but, still, his remark seems out of order (Whiting, 2013, 186).

Kelly's belief aims at truth. But her epistemic commitment is lower than the epistemic commitment obtained when considering something as known. The certainty of her belief is not high enough in order to state that her belief aims at knowledge. But she does not stop believing and she is not believing something false: she is just believing what is more likely to happen from her point of view. The promoters of the knowledge aim of belief would reply that Kelly really believes that she does not know which party is going to win the elections, but she *guesses* that Republicans are going to win.

The elections case of belief aiming at truth and not at knowledge can be analysed in two different ways. First, Kelly considers true that the Republicans are going to win the next election, but as her evidence is weak -but stronger than the evidence for the Democrats- and many things can happen during the election, she cannot say that she knows it. In this case, Kelly's belief find its reasons in evidence. Second, Kelly is in some way influenced by her personal ideas and desires: as she is supporter of the Republicans and as there are no strong evidence for the Republicans nor for the Democrats, she is inclined to believe that the Republicans are going to win the next elections. Interestingly, this second option opens the door to non-evidential reasons for belief. For the promoters of the knowledge aim of belief, belief formation relies on evidence as they consider an external objective evaluation of beliefs³⁰ (see

30 "At the very least you need evidence, and what we look for in evidence is a genuine connection to the facts (...) Taking a stand on how things are, like taking a stand on what to do, commits you not

section 1.3).

Another similar way of showing the differences between belief and knowledge is given by Radford (1966), as Cohen (1989) explains:

[imagine] the possible case of someone who answers a string question about, say, the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs correctly but very hesitantly, so that the answerer may be said to have the relevant knowledge even though he does not really believe what he says (Cohen, 1989, 384)

This case is likely to be explained in terms of correct *guess* (see section 2.2) for the proponents of the knowledge aim of belief. As the hesitancy is explicitly recognized, the agent does not believe what she says, she just guesses. She believes that 'she does not know' the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs. Other authors may state that the agent is *believing* and that she previously had some evidence: otherwise she could not give the correct answer.

However, the definition of knowledge given by Cohen (1989) is different from the ones the authors I am managing provide, as it implies both the results of passive involuntary beliefs and the results of active voluntary acceptances (see section 1.1 and section 2.3)³¹.

It must be noted that if it is possible to believe without knowing -that is, if the previous cases are considered beliefs and not just guesses-, it is also possible to know without believing:

only to being in the world. It commits you to being connected to the world” (Gibbons, 2014, 113).

31 “My claim is rather that, instead of saying either 'Knowledge that *p* entails acceptance that *p*', or 'Knowledge that *p* entails belief that *p*', one should prefer to say 'Knowledge that *p* entails either acceptance that *p* or belief that *p*' (Cohen, 1989, 387). The author states that both beliefs and acceptances should be judged in terms of evidence: “But how could any adequate evidential reasons for accepting that *p* not also constitute evidential justification for believing that *p*? (...) The evidential standards that we apply retrospectively when we judge the merits of beliefs that come upon us or upon others must be the same as those that we apply prospectively in debating or deliberating about what to accept”.

(*The Schrödinger's cat case*) After studying the quantum mechanics and after having done the Schrödinger's cat experiment, Mary knows that the cat is alive and dead at the same time, as electrons can be in two different positions at the same time. But she cannot believe it.

Whiting (2013) shows that the knowledge aim of belief faces problems in the Moorean beliefs (see section 1.4) and in *the lottery case*:

(*Dogs Moorean belief*) Dogs bark, but I don't know that dogs bark
(188)

If knowledge is the norm of belief, when believing the previous statement, (i) the agent knows that dogs bark and (ii) the agent knows that 'she does not know that dogs bark'. For Whiting (2013) the knowledge norm of belief is not plausible in Moorean beliefs as (i) and (ii) are incompatible. However, the agent can believe that dogs bark as something true and can believe that she does not know that dogs bark as something true, in a similar manner that Kelly may believe that the Republicans are going to win the elections but at the same time she believes that she does not know that the Republicans are going to win the elections³². Supporters of the truth aim of belief explains so by making a difference between truth and knowledge. Gibbons (2014), a supporter of the knowledge aim of belief, considers that we have three options when facing questions about personal beliefs: yes, no and 'I don't know'. So, the agent believes that she does not know if dogs bark and Kelly really believes she does not know who are going to win the elections. If Kelly says 'The Republicans' without

32 Note that the previous *elections case* can be put in terms of a similar Moorean case, so Kelly's idea can be put in the following manner: [Kelly believes that] 'The Republicans are going to win the elections but I don't know that the Republicans are going to win the elections'.

knowing it, she is not believing but guessing (see section 2.2) (Gibbons, 2014, 112)³³.

(The lottery case) Suppose that Stanley has a ticket in a lottery. The chances of winning the lottery are, as Stanley is aware, 1/1.000.000. Stanley has yet to hear the results of the lottery, which was drawn earlier in the day. He asserts flat-out: 'My ticket didn't win'. Assume that it is true. Despite this, and despite the extremely strong probabilistic grounds in support of this, intuitively Stanley should not assert this. Instead, he should only conjecture that his ticket didn't win, or assert that his ticket probably lost (Gibbons, 2014, 191).

In this case, Stanley believes that his ticket did not win the lottery but he does not know that. Again, for the proponent of the truth aim of belief Stanley may consider that it is true that his ticket did not win the lottery, but he does not know that. The promoter of the knowledge aim of belief would say that Stanley is not believing but guessing that his ticket did not win the lottery (see section 2.2). If his belief motivates him to consider that his ticket did not win as something truth or known, he may throw away the ticket without consulting the lottery results. Both proponents of the knowledge and the truth aims of belief would say that final action depends on more factors than only beliefs -e.g. costs and possible outcomes of the action.

Philosophers may state that knowledge as a goal is more valuable than truth, and they can establish an evaluative norm of knowledge. It is more valuable to know who are going to win the elections, if the dogs bark and if Stanley's ticket has won the lottery. Nevertheless, for the supporters of the truth aim of belief such a norm seems too demanding. Agents cannot always believe aiming at knowledge, and sometimes they need to form beliefs without knowing accurately (Whiting, 2013, 195-7)³⁴. There can be

33 "If you guess that p , then you're aiming at the truth or trying to get things right. And if it turns out that p is true, then things have gone as well as they can for the guess (...) But when you believe that p , it can't be an open question whether or not you've gotten it right. That would mean that it was an open question whether or not p . And that would mean that you haven't yet made up your mind or taken a stand on p . So you don't really believe p after all" (Gibbons, 2014, 112-3).

34 "In general, the fact that ϕ ing is better than ψ ing does not seem to entail that one should not ψ or that

a standard of correctness when believing, but for the rationality of the belief (see section 1.5), it is only necessary to aim at truth. The supporters of the knowledge aim of belief may reply that Kate is not believing but guessing when stating that the Republicans are going to win the elections, that the agent is not believing but guessing when saying that dogs bark and that Stanley is guessing and not believing when saying that his ticket did not win the lottery (see section 2.2). Proponents of the truth aim of belief and proponents of the knowledge aim of belief ultimately introduce two different concepts of belief and the latter is epistemically more demanding than the former.

It is also possible to consider that belief aims at truth and, from there, to establish that belief aims at knowledge (Engel, 2013a, 60). Something like, 'justified true beliefs aim at knowledge'. Nevertheless, the promoter of the truth aim of belief may reply that it is not necessary for the agent to attribute to her beliefs more demanding aims than just truth (Whiting, 2013, 198-200; Horwich, 2013, 23)³⁵³⁶. Furthermore, knowledge does not always relate to justified truths: sometimes the latter are not sufficient for the former. That is what Gettier cases like Goldman popular fake barn facades case show. And the definition and application of *justification* also face problems about how and why the agent can establish that her belief is correctly justified (see section 1.6)³⁷. In short, for the promoter of the truth aim of belief there can be cases in

it would be wrong to ψ . Recall that the fact that ϕ ing is better than ψ ing is consistent with its being the case that there is some value in ψ ing or some reason to ψ " (Whiting, 2013, 197).

35 "why should we expect the aim to believe only the truth than the less demanding aim to have justified but less-than-well-grounded beliefs? How careful one should be in one's efforts to secure an aim depends on how serious it would be if one failed to meet it" (Whiting, 2013, 200).

36 "The idea would be that knowledge is the *ultimate* good in this area, and true belief gets its value merely as a means to an end. But this view must confront a variety of difficulties.

For one thing, it's plausible that the desirability of true beliefs is somehow related to the rational expectation of obtaining practical benefits from their use in deliberation. But such expectations will be no less rational in connection with true beliefs that aren't *justified* and so wouldn't qualify as cases of knowledge" (Horwich, 2013, 23).

37 Gibbons (2014) offers this alternative: "I also think, though this might not be generally assumed, that the relevant degree of justification is when it's more reasonable to believe than to withhold or deny" (111).

which the agent's belief may aim at truth and may not aim at knowledge. These beliefs are incorrect but rational (see section 1.5). Even more, the agent's belief may aim at truth, this belief may be justified, but this belief finally does not aim at knowledge.

(The navigation charts case) Sailors have used navigation charts based on geocentric and a flat model of the Earth during centuries.

These beliefs may be negatively evaluated from a historical perspective but the truth proponent focuses on the possibility of consciously believing without knowing -i.e. people believed the Earth was flat and the centre of the Universe but they did not know that it really was not. On the contrary, Gibbons (2014) considers that knowledge is justified true belief plus 'something', where this 'something' is “whatever it is that rules out Gettier cases”. As a result, belief aims at *this* knowledge. And many propositional attitudes that proponents of the truth aim call beliefs are not proper beliefs but guesses (Gibbons, 2014, 112). It also can be said that in these cases the belief aims at truth and also at knowledge, being just mistaken beliefs formed in terms of defective or tricky evidence (see section 1.3).

Turp (2013) considers knowledge as “true belief plus a third element such as warrant or justification” (99). The third element gives belief an extra normative character and Turp conceptualizes it in terms of 'epistemic virtues'³⁸ (see section 3.8) giving knowledge an extra epistemic evaluation that is not available for truth. Turp (2013) thus establishes three conditions for belief to aim at knowledge:

I know some proposition *p* only if *p* is true, I believe that *p* and I

38 “[Epistemic virtues] are stable dispositions of thought which are reliably and non-accidentally conducive to forming true beliefs for creatures like us in an environment like ours. Examples include intellectual integrity, precision, care and consistency; virtues because of the relationship in which they stand to truth” (Turp, 2013, 95).

have acquired the believe that p virtuously (99).

In short, Gibbons (2014) and Turp (2013) relates belief, truth and justification when dealing with knowledge. Nevertheless, these three items are not enough to exhaust the analysis (Unwin, 2007, 138). Unwin (2007) states that when deciding between theories -as justified beliefs- many times agents just rely on pragmatic criteria and not on truth, and there is no need of relating belief and justification (see section 1.6) with extensional knowledge. These pragmatic criteria are non-evidential but they are cognitive -e.g. simplicity, familiarity, symmetry, heuristic value-, so they influence beliefs' choices when all the evidence is gathered in (Unwin, 2007, 140; see also section 1.3.2 & Reisner, 2013). Turp (2013) admits that non-epistemic issues may come into play when forming beliefs and acting, but not when evaluating beliefs (100-101).

Unwin (2007) prefers to analyse knowledge in a pragmatic pluralist way as “optimal cognition itself” (143) suited to the organism's internal design³⁹, in what he calls “an ecological model” (143). This ecological model should be understood in a biological adaptive sense. In its terms, knowledge is contingent and it is defined in terms of practical considerations: “knowledge is nothing more than adequately justified belief” (Unwin, 2007, 152). It relates to truth only if truth is a practical requirement that justifies knowledge -which is anyway the most common situation⁴⁰. The agent who possesses knowledge “is essentially in tune with her environment” (Unwin, 2007, 144). This intensional treatment of knowledge allows for a knowledge norm of belief -*belief should aim at knowledge*- which is softer than the extensional truth norm of belief previously shown. The intensional knowledge norm of belief can be applied to creatures

39 “empirical cognition is always the product off both external input and internal processing” (Unwin, 2007, 158).

40 “In practice, at any rate, the easiest way to aim extensionally at empirically adequacy is surely to aim intensionally at truth. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any other way -at least, when dealing with ordinary, non-theoretical empirical matters” (Unwin, 2007, 147).

and beings with different cognitive systems and beliefs, and furthermore its target can be hit by every creature and being. On the other hand, this agential knowledge is not neutral⁴¹.

Unwin (2007) defends that his proposal is not in tension with the doxastic aim of belief in an ordinary sense⁴². In fact, he argues that his proposal can manage the traditional epistemic practices based on a link between belief and truth, as truth usually is a practical and a justificatory consideration (see section 4.3). The underlying idea of the ecological model and its treatment of belief and knowledge is that 'what is natural is right' even if agents do not realize how beliefs and knowledge emerge (Unwin, 2007, 159-60).

2.2. GUESSES AND THE TRUTH AIM OF GUESSES

Belief is not the only state that has truth as its objective. As I advanced in section 2.1, guess also aims at truth (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 106-7), but the epistemic commitment when guessing is lower, if not negligible, than when believing (Gibbons, 2014, 98). Guesses may leave open questions, and it is usually said that guesses present no or weak evidence whereas beliefs present stronger evidence. Epistemic norms while believing are much more demanding than while guessing: the value of truth in belief is stronger than in guess. Owens (2003) points out that in beliefs, the agent actually

41 “We also have a different image of the ultimate end of knowledge. Ideal knowledge does not assume anything like a perfectly neutral, God's eye view of the world. Nor does it even require ultimate convergence by all parties who genuinely aim at truth. Rather, it implies a kind of ultimate harmony between organism and environment, but one which permits and celebrates diversity” (Unwin, 2007, 155).

42 “Can we still be said to be aiming at truth? In the most ordinary, down-to-earth sense, we surely can. For what more can we do to discover the truth than to investigate the world as carefully and as thoroughly as we can, relying solely on the data available, and making the best possible use of our cognitive apparatus, such as it is, to interpret these data? That is all that aiming at truth can possibly amount to as far as we are concerned; and were it not for subtle philosophical objections, no one would have the slightest problem with this” (Unwin, 2007, 160).

considers that truth is achieved, something that does not happen in guesses (290).

Owens (2003) also states that guesses are more sensible to non-evidential reasons than beliefs (see section 1.3). When believing, agents reflect the reality given by evidence. When guessing, agents may take into account other considerations. Guesses can be dominated by reflection, beliefs cannot⁴³.

(The gambler case) A gambler will receive a 1.000.000\$ if she guesses that next car she sees is green. There is only one green car in the city. So, the possibilities of winning are very small. On the contrary, if she guesses that the next car she sees is not green, she will receive 0.10\$.

Because of the probabilistic evidence and justification (see section 1.6 and specially 1.6.1), the gambler believes that the next car she will see is not green. Nevertheless, as the amount of money she would receive is much larger if she guesses that the next car she will see is green, and as guesses can be dominated by reflection, she is likely to guess that the next car she will see is green. It must be noted that if there were not any green car in the city and the agent knows it, as guesses also aim at truth, it would not be rational (see section 1.5) for the agent to guess that the next car she will see is green.

Some authors (Shah & Velleman, 2005, 498) defend that guessing is not always a propositional attitude. So when the agent guesses p , she has no view of any kind about p . But often when the agent guesses p , she has some suspicions about p , and this suspicion can be considered as a propositional attitude governed by correctness as shown above. Anyway, the evidence required for a belief is different from the evidence

43 “In respect of control, guessing is much more like imagining or supposing than believing. Guessing is a mental action executed for a purpose in way that believing is not. A guess aim at the truth; the guesser has the truth as his goal and can guide his guess towards the truth, tanking into consideration his goals and purposes” (Owens, 2003, 300).

required for a guess or a suspicion.

2.3. BELIEFS, ACCEPTANCES, ASSUMPTIONS AND ASSERTIONS

One way to accommodate pragmatism to the debate about beliefs is to consider that 'assertions, assumptions and acceptances aim at practical outcomes'. It does not make any problem for the doxastic aim of belief: assertions, assumptions and acceptances, and beliefs are different things⁴⁴.

(The lawyer case) A lawyer believes that her client is guilty. And she believes so no matter the context: with her partner, her friends and even during the trial. She does it automatically and involuntarily. Nevertheless, during the trial she may assert, accept and assume that her client is innocent in order to obtain the best possible verdict.

Even if a particular belief usually is taken to be a reason for accepting, assuming and asserting the content of this particular belief, *the lawyer case* shows that belief, on the one hand, and assertions, acceptances and assumptions, on the other hand, may differ. When asserting, assuming and accepting, other pragmatic reasons may come into play (Cohen, 1989; Toribio, 2013, 82-3; Unwin, 2007, ϕ 1).

Whiting (2013) goes a step further. He denies that belief and assertion are the internal and the external counterparts. Belief is automatic, involuntary, context-independent and transparent (see section 1.1 and section 1.2), while assertions and acceptances are not. In fact, an agent may believe something and she may assert the opposite. For that reason, the external counterpart of belief should be judgement (Whiting, 2013, 187). Cohen (1989) prefers to use the term 'acceptance' but he also

44 Whiting (2013) considers that belief is a state while assertion and acceptances are actions (187).

realizes the terminology⁴⁵. Anyway, for our purposes pragmatic reasons may come into play in assertions, assumptions and acceptances in a way that it is not found in beliefs (see section 4.6 and section 4.7).

For Cohen (1989), acceptance is “a mental act, or a pattern, system, or policy of mental action, rather than speech act” (368). Acceptances imply some kind of commitment to what is accepted. In *the lawyer case*, acceptance implies a commitment to the proposition 'my client is innocent' during the trial. In other words, acceptance is more than just stating 'my client is innocent'. In that way, acceptances imply some kind of responsibility.

Cohen (1989) also relates assertions with acceptances rather than beliefs,

there is no reason at all why an assertion that p should normally imply that the speaker believes that p . He may well be insisting on recognition of his claim that p because he wants people to know that he accepts that p , though he lacks as yet any corresponding belief (376).

As already said, a big difference between beliefs and acceptances is that the former are said to be involuntary, context-independent, automatic and transparency (see section 1.1 and section 1.2), while the latter are decidable at will⁴⁶. For that reason, agents are accountable and responsible for what they accept and assert, while it is harder to put responsibilities on them due to beliefs.

By accepting a proposition the agent accepts its consequences. So if q is derived from p , and an agent accepts p , he is also accepting q . If it turns out that she does not accept q , what we have is an inconsistency in her system of acceptances. Nevertheless, while believing agents do not have to assume these kind of consequences of her beliefs:

45 “Indeed fifty years ago the term 'judgment' was often used by philosophers to cover much of what I am calling 'acceptance'” (Cohen, 1989, 368).

46 “We can control what we consider, but not what we feel” (Cohen, 1989, 370).

an agent can believe p without believing q . In other words, deductive closures are implicit in acceptances but not in beliefs (Cohen, 1989, 372). That is because acceptances are voluntary while beliefs just come over agents (see section 1.1).

For Cohen (1989, 374) beliefs may present degrees (see section 3.1) while acceptances do not. So the lawyer may believe more or less the culpability of her client, but once she accepts her client's innocence during the trial, she wholly accepts it. Acceptances are not a matter of degree while beliefs can be. Acceptances are a matter of context while beliefs cannot be.

Differences between beliefs and acceptances can also be seen while analysing Moorean cases of the sort 'It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining' (see section 1.4). While these cases offer problems to beliefs and their links with knowledge and truth, there is not any inconsistency in terms of acceptances and assumptions: an agent can perfectly accept and assume that it is raining and she can accept and assume that she does not believe it is raining. In the lawyer example, the lawyer during the trial can accept and assume that her client is innocent and she can accept and assume that she does not believe that.

Contrary to Cohen (1989), Unwin (2007) discriminates between assertions and acceptances, and he relates assertions to beliefs (see also Turp, 2013). Assertions are the linguistic expressions of beliefs (Unwin, 2007, 10), so if there is a norm on beliefs, the same norm must apply to assertions. On the contrary, acceptances present different normative constraints and, contrary to beliefs, they are context-dependent, they may be influenced by non-evidential practical reasoning, they are voluntary and sometimes they cannot be agglomerated across contexts (see section 1.1). In the previous case, the lawyer believes that her client is guilty but she accepts that her client is innocent during

the trial. If assertions are the linguistic expression of beliefs, then the only assertion the lawyer can make is that her client is guilty. This is something controversial, and the natural response is to deny that statements like 'my client is innocent' -made by the lawyer during the trial- are proper assertions. Unwin (2007) recognizes this problem and he admits that agents can breach assertions -they can assert what they take to be false- more easily than beliefs: “assertion is clearly voluntary in a way in which belief is not (...) Despite this, assertions and beliefs do run together, by and large, and our truth norm⁴⁷ does manage to articulate this fact quite satisfactorily” (Unwin, 2007, 18).

Unwin (2007) also establishes that assertions relate to truth in two different ways: they have a doxastic sense and they also imply force on the statement doxastic value. The word *true* in the analysis of assertions -and beliefs- has two meanings: the main doxastic one and also a non-semantic function that indicates assertoric force. This 'force meaning' makes a difference between assertions and beliefs, and other propositional attitudes like desiring or imagining (Unwin, 2007, 21).

Unwin (2007) also explore the pragmatic possibility of replacing beliefs by a new propositional attitude similar to acceptance. As stated above, beliefs are context-independent, involuntary, they can be agglomerated across contexts and they aim at truth (see section 1.1) while acceptances may be context-dependent, they are typically voluntary, they cannot be agglomerated across contexts and they can be influenced by non-doxastic practical considerations. Unwin's (2007) proposal try to accommodate both beliefs and acceptances following a pragmatic trend. I pursue this issue further in section 4.7.

47 An agent should believe/assert *p* only if *p* (Unwin, 2007, 8-16).

2.4. BELIEFS AND DESIRES

A brief introduction of desire is mandatory in order to face the nature of belief and its relation with truth and pragmatism, specially when one of the hotspots of this issue is the influence of conative features in the development of some beliefs, like in wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5).

Jeanne desires to go to the Moon but she believes she will not be able.

Both desires and beliefs are automatic, passive and involuntary (Wilkinson, 2013, 111-4; see section 1.1). The former are conative states -or more conative than cognitive- while the latter are said to be cognitive states -or more cognitive than conative. When agents believe, they reflect -in some way- 'the reality' or, if preferred, 'their reality'. When agents desire, they reflect -in some way- how they want 'the reality' to be (Papineau, 2013; Wilkinson, 2013)⁴⁸. Jeanne considers that the reality is that she will not be able to go to the Moon ever, but she also would like to get another reality, the one in which she goes to the Moon.

Desires may present the associated aim of acting to fulfil goals. So Jeanne may try to be a spacewoman in order to fulfil her desire. Other times, that does not happen and agents also can act to achieve goals that they do not really desire. In that way, Cohen (1989) establishes a similarity in the relationships between beliefs-acceptances and desires-goals. Acceptances may not coincide with beliefs, but beliefs are usually

48 Papineau (2013) puts it clear: “the function of beliefs is to fit the way the world is, where the function of desires is to change it” (73). Also Wilkinson (2013): “an opposition between the phenomenon of belief (viz. the map) and the phenomenon of desire (viz. the goal). The former involves *taking* the world to be a certain way, whereas the latter involves *wanting* it to be a certain way” (110).

reasons for acceptances. In a similar way, goals may not coincide with desires, but desires are usually reasons for adopting goals⁴⁹. This author also considers that desires, like beliefs and unlike acceptances, do not present deductive closures: this states just come over agents' minds⁵⁰.

2.5. THE AUTONOMY OF BELIEF AND WISHFUL THINKING

Wishful thinking is one of the most important phenomenon I take to analyse and consider pragmatic approaches to belief and how conative reasons may influence its emergence and persistence (see chapter 4). Although it is strictly related to desire and this section may work as a subsection of the previous section 2.4 “beliefs and desires”, the importance I give to these cases justifies that I explain them here in a particular independent section.

Unwin (2007) analyses the link between belief and desire (see section 2.4). Some philosophers have defended a symmetry between both propositional attitudes, establishing that the latter without the former is undirected while the former without the latter is inert (Unwin, 2007, 170). However, an agent may change her desires due to new beliefs, but she cannot change her beliefs due to new desires. In other words, there is an asymmetry between beliefs and desires based on the fact that desires cannot influence beliefs. Beliefs are autonomous while desires are not. Unwin (2007) calls this principle 'the autonomy of belief principle' (ABP) (169-77), and “it just says that I can have no reason for believing that something is true just because I want it to be true. The

49 “though adopting x as one's goal may cause or help to cause desire for x , it is not a possible reason for desiring x , just as accepting that p is not a reason for believing that p . But, just as belief that p is a *prima facie* reason for accepting that p , so too having a desire for x is certainly one possible reason for adopting x as one goal” (Cohen, 1989, 380-1).

50 “Though you may desire to empty a petrol tank now and also desire to light a cigarette now, you do not therefore desire to do both those things now” (Cohen, 1989, 381).

world is independent of my will” (173).

Nevertheless, wishful thinking cases show how desires may influence beliefs, facing the autonomy of belief principle:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

Paul's belief on the requited love is false, and he has enough available evidence to know it. But he believes that Olga loves him and this belief is influenced by his desire of the requited love. However, these cases should not be confused with possible voluntary beliefs (see section 1.1). Wishful thinking are involuntarily developed even when conative attitudes may come into play when they emerge and persist.

Unwin (2007) argues that beliefs are not isolated but that they are part of a web of beliefs. So false beliefs with possible good pragmatic outcomes “in the short term” (Unwin, 2007, 178), like wishful thinking cases, indirectly affects other beliefs and the overall outcomes will be bad in the long term (see also Haack, 1996, ϕ 10). Unwin (2007) also makes a difference between wishful thinking cases and self-deception. The former does not need to involve a deception, while the latter does (Unwin, 2007, 178).

As I see it, wishful thinking cases are false beliefs developed from poor or no evidence (see section 1.3) that accommodate to the constitutive relationship between belief and truth I am considering: the agents considers their beliefs to be true -Paul considers that Olga loves him to be true- regardless of the evidence.

2.6. DELUSIONS

Delusions constitute also an interesting topic for the analysis of belief. Some authors defend that delusions are beliefs, while others deny it. The debate on delusions offers some clues to the analysis of belief and its normativity. It should be noted that delusions are similar to wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5), but the latter are influenced by conative reasons while the former do not always. Philosophers who defend that delusions are beliefs usually classify them as irrational beliefs (see section 1.5). Philosophers who defend that delusions are not beliefs classify them as other states under a different norm to the one that defines belief (see chapter 3) .

Wilkinson (2013) refers to the treatment of delusions given by Gregory Currie (2000) who considers that delusions are not beliefs. Currie (2000) bases this idea on the following facts:

- (i) [delusions] are not supported by evidence in their initial formation,
- (ii) [delusions] do not fully guide action, reasoning, or elicit the appropriate emotional responses,
- (iii) [delusions] are not open to review in the face of contrary evidence (Wilkinson, 2013, 108).

As a result, beliefs must comply with the following statements:

- (i') beliefs are supported by evidence in their initial formation,
- (ii') beliefs do fully guide action, reasoning, or elicit the appropriate emotional responses
- (iii') beliefs are open to review in the face of contrary evidence.

Disagreements to this treatment of delusions can follow two paths. First, it can be argued that delusions do not need to comply with the previous statements (i'), (ii')

and (iii') to be considered beliefs -i.e. beliefs do not always comply with these statements (i'), (ii') and (iii'). Second, it can be argued that delusions accommodate the statements (i'), (ii') and (iii'), so they are beliefs.

Following the first objection, some philosophers (Bortolotti, 2009) may consider that many states we are used to call 'beliefs' infringe (i'), (ii') or (iii'). To deny these states the category of beliefs is theoretically costly. That is what would happen in wishful thinking cases like *the love case* (see section 2.5):

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

Facing this first objection, Wilkinson (2013) considers that there are two ways of dealing with concepts. First, agents can look at the current usage of concepts and then they can try to stick them. Second, agents can be revisionists and define the concepts and how they should be used regardless of their current usage. In this terms, Wilkinson (2013) considers that philosophers should be revisionists about beliefs -contrary to Bortolotti (2009). Even if many times agents currently use the term belief for states that do not follow (i'), (ii') or (iii'), “they are not, strictly speaking, believing” (Wilkinson, 2013, 109).

Following the second objection -delusions accommodate (i'), (ii') and (iii')-, philosophers who consider that delusions are beliefs may argue to (i') that delusions are based on defective evidence, but evidence, to (ii') they may show that sometimes they lead to action⁵¹ and to (iii') they may argue that defective evidence of agents under

51 Wilkinson (2013) says that agents under the Capgras delusion manifest violence in 18% of cases and he quotes a particular case.

delusions is so strong that these agents refuse other possible evidence.

Dealing with the first objection, Wilkinson (2013) specifies that the empirical manner to analyse if all beliefs accommodate (i'), (ii') and (iii') relates to upstream considerations: it *evaluates* how beliefs -once the states or propositional attitudes have currently been considered as beliefs- emerge and accommodate (i'), (ii') and (iii'). The revisionist manner to analyse if all beliefs accommodate (i'), (ii') and (iii') relates to downstream considerations: it establishes that (i'), (ii') and (iii') must apply to all beliefs -if not, they are not proper beliefs even if people refer them using the word 'belief'. Wilkinson (2013) defends that upstream considerations define the evaluative normativity of belief -they qualify beliefs as better or worse beliefs- but they do not define the constitutive normativity of belief. On the contrary, downstream considerations about belief application define the constitutive normativity of belief. Wilkinson (2013) recognizes himself as a revisionist about belief.

Upstream considerations focus on belief formation and its correctness in terms of its common usage while downstream considerations focus on the determination of the belief existence in terms of a previous characterization of belief. Philosophers who take delusions to be different from wrong beliefs must focus on downstream considerations. More specifically, Wilkinson (2013) takes (i) and (iii) to be related to upstream issues as they are based on evidence -which can be better or worse. But he takes (ii) to be related to a downstream consideration, as it refers to an application of the already formed belief: the action it guides or enhances. And for Wilkinson (2013) beliefs motivate corresponding actions while delusions do not, so delusions cannot be classified as proper beliefs:

The problem with delusional patients is not only that we find it

hard to understand how it is that they come to make the claims that they do (these upstream considerations are what make us call them delusional) we find it hard to grasp how they actually take the world to be. They claim one thing, and act in a way that is not consistent with what they claim (117-8).

The constitutive relationship between belief and truth that I am considering -believers consider their beliefs to be true- is a downstream consideration that can be applied to delusions. It does not evaluate beliefs, as all believers take their beliefs to be true -if not, they are not believing-, but it defines a constitutive property of beliefs. As I see it, delusions are beliefs characterized for their incorrectness from a doxastic evaluative perspective, but they are still beliefs, and I do not need to assume that beliefs always guide or promote further action.

2.7. SCHMELIEFS

Some philosophers (Engel 2013a, Papineau 2013) have speculated about the possibility of agents having mental states similar to beliefs but that are not under a norm of truth: *schmeliefs*. Engel (2013a, 2013b) considers that *schmeliefs* governed by other aims, such as comfort or pleasantness⁵². Papineau (2013) considers that *schmeliefs* have the function of tracking the truth, but there is no external requirement that *schmeliefs* should be true and no sensitivity to a norm of truth by *schmelievers*⁵³.

(*The love case*) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that

52 “Why could we not accept that in some cases we might form other attitudes than belief -call them *schmeliefs*- governed by other aims, such as comfort and pleasantness? Indeed we can, but by hypothesis it would not be the attitude of *belief*” (Engel, 2013a, 52).

53 “The [*schmelievers*] form cognitive states whose cognitive function is to track the truth, and these states are prompted by perception and guide action in just the way that normal beliefs do. But in this society there is no blanket social requirement that such states should be true, and no sensitivity on the part of thinkers to any such general principle (...) the *schmelievers* are doing nothing wrong if their insensitivity to standards lead them into error” (Papineau, 2013, 76-7).

it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

It can be said that *the love case* is not a proper belief, but a schmelief or something very similar to a schmelief. Engel (2013a, 2013b) would say that this schmelief is governed by a motivational or usefulness aim, while Papineau (2013) would say that this schmelief tries to track the truth, but there is no external requirement or sensitivity to do so -i.e. it is not considered wrong if it turns out to be false. Evidentialists may consider that schmeliefs are beliefs formed by poor evidence or they may say that they are not proper beliefs. Non-evidentialists admits these cases (see section 1.3). Among the former, Adler and Hicks (2013; see also section 1.3.1) state that it is hard to accommodate transparency (see section 1.2) and schmeliefs: the 'why'-question on beliefs cannot be correctly applied to schmeliefs (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 145). If so, they would be just beliefs⁵⁴. Transparency works as a testimony of a constitutive link between belief and truth (see section 1.2 and section 5.2.1) and at the same time transparency is something to be expected in schmeliefs if they are otherwise like beliefs. Papineau (2013) replies that the 'why'-question is just optional for schmeliefs.

More precisely, Engel (2013b, 30-1) admits the possibility of schmelieving and communities of schmelievers. But that does not alter the nature of belief: even if schmeliefs exist, beliefs are subject to a norm of truth. Engel (2013b, 31) also argues that doxastic relativists like Papineau do not show that schmelievers do not have the

54 "Reflection on justification-seeking 'why?' questions makes a 'schmelieving' community harder to imagine that Papineau suggests, though. If schmelief is otherwise like belief, it will arise in the process of rational inquiry, and schmelievers will expect justification-seeking 'why do you schmelieve that *p*?' type questions. Just as above, such questioners will not be satisfied by non-epistemic considerations. If so, schmelief just is belief, with its conceptual connection to truth and knowledge" (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 145).

concept of belief, conceiving that beliefs are states that obeys a different norm than schmeliefs -a doxastic norm.

I consider that these kind of cases are beliefs. Actually they are commonly called beliefs by people. There can be other non-epistemic reasons, values and aims to develop them, but they are -false- beliefs. These states can be form without evidence or with weak evidence, but it does not alter the relationship between belief and truth I am considering: the believer, when believing, considers what she beliefs to be true. And, even if the evidentialist approach is admitted -they are formed by poor evidence but evidence- other non-evidential reasons come into play when developing them.

2.8. A FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF BELIEF

Parallel to the normative accounts of belief (see chapter 3) and the pragmatic accounts of belief (see chapter 4), Glüer and Wikforss (2013) offer a functionalist account of belief in terms of a first-order functional role, evidence as belief's input and further beliefs and actions as belief's outputs. Belief's input role is characterized by evidence-sensitivity and belief's output role provides reasons for further belief and action.

The characterization of belief in terms of evidence-sensitivity is problematic. The 'extension problem' shows that beliefs are not always formed in terms of sufficient and reliable evidence (see section 1.3), like in the *the love case*:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing

hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

Normativists argue that beliefs are under a norm of truth and they qualify these cases as improper or bad beliefs that do not comply with the doxastic norm (see chapter 3). Teleologists establish that beliefs are formed by some -biological- mechanisms as tools that sometimes fail or act in an improper way when developing beliefs aiming at truth (see chapter 4 and specially section 4.2).

Glüer and Wikforss (2013) face Velleman's (2000) criticism that belief cannot be characterized only in terms of its output role -i.e. belief provides reasons for further belief and action- because other propositional attitudes like acceptance or assumption (see section 2.3) coincide in the same output role. Velleman (2000) proposes the existence of first-order attitudes and second-order attitudes. Assumption is a first-order attitude adopted for the sake of the argument while belief is a second-order attitude adopted “with the aim of thereby accepting the truth” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 141).

This is what happens in *the lawyer case*:

(The lawyer case) A lawyer believes that her client is guilty. And she believes so no matter the context: with her partner, her friends and even during the trial. She does it automatically and involuntarily. Nevertheless, during the trial she may assert, accept and assume that her client is innocent in order to obtain the best possible verdict.

The aim of second-order attitudes like belief belongs to the agent. But Velleman's (2000) account face a problem: beliefs do not need to depend on individual's aims and intentions, “something can be a belief irrespectively of the individual's aim and intentions” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 141). Velleman (2000) replies that the aim does not belong to the believer herself but to her cognitive system designed to regulate

cognitions. In that way the notion of 'function of belief' cannot be understood just causally -in terms of the causal powers- but it is also teleological -in terms of how the cognitive mechanism must work. Glüer and Wikforss (2013) sum up Velleman's idea in the following sentence:

Belief is an acceptance attitude regulated by cognitive mechanisms designed for tracking the truth (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 142)

For Velleman (2000), differences between beliefs -paying special attention to wishful thinking cases like *the love case* (see section 2.5)- and other attitudes like fantasies or desires are explained in terms of the cognitive regulative system and its tendency to track the truth: the latter attitudes have no tendency to track the truth -they do not aim at truth- while beliefs do have, even if they are biased beliefs. Both kind of attitudes can play a similar motivational role. But it may be argued that if this motivational role is the same in both kind of attitudes, then believe cannot be *sufficiently* characterized in term of its motivational role. Velleman (2000) establishes that imaginings and fantasies are less likely to cause action than beliefs even with the same motivational role, and he explains it considering that imaginings come together with 'countervailing beliefs' and inhibitions -something provoked by the agent's cognitive regulative system (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 144). This fact provokes that beliefs try to track the truth while imaginings confronted with countervailing beliefs and inhibitions do not, even when they have the same motivational role.

On the contrary, Glüer and Wikforss (2013) defend that imaginings and beliefs do not play the same motivational role:

Whereas beliefs interact with further beliefs to produce actions, imaginings do not. If I imagine that I am an eagle, and I desire to fly, I am not thereby motivated to jump off a cliff (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 145).

As a result of this, Glüer and Wikforss (2013) explain belief in terms of its motivational role and its production of action regardless of the design of the cognitive regulative mechanism.

More specifically, Glüer and Wikforss (2013) argue that Velleman needs to admit that (i) a creature without a cognitive system designed to track the truth cannot develop beliefs and (ii) if a state is not regulated by a mechanism to track the truth, then it is not a belief. The latter problem relates to the extension problem: wishful thinking cases like *the love case* seem not to be regulated by a mechanism designed to track the truth (see section 2.5). Velleman replies that these states are not proper beliefs as they are not regulated by the belief mechanism designed for truth, but this answer is “too restrictive to (fully) solve the extension problem” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 146-7). Glüer and Wikforss (2013) also note that normative approaches (see chapter 3) do not need to face the extension problem: they just judge if a state is a correct or incorrect belief -or if they are beliefs or not- in terms of its responsiveness to the norm of truth, no matter if they comply with these norms⁵⁵. Glüer and Wikforss (2013) criticize both Velleman's and normativists' answers to the extension problem:

55 “[For normativists] what is constitutive of belief is not that belief is designed to behave a certain way, or that it does behave a certain way, but that it *ought* to behave a certain way (...) Since the relation between truth and belief is merely normative, it is possible to have a belief that is not responsive to truth, such as in cases of bias or wishful thinking. Indeed, on a purely normativist account of belief a state could be a belief quite independently of how it in fact behaves” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 147).

It should be noted that this quote refers to making a difference between correct and incorrect beliefs in terms of the norm of truth -"on a purely normativist account of belief a state could be a belief quite independently of how it in fact behaves"-, while in other parts of the text Glüer and Wikforss (2013) refer to making a difference between beliefs and other states depending on how they follow the norm of truth -"the swampman may have cognitive states that behave like beliefs but *which are not beliefs* since the subject is not guided by the truth-norm" (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 147-8, italics added)

[B]oth teleofunctionalism and normativism face the swampman problem: The former, since it follows that swampman [Paul in *the love case*] may have cognitive states that behave like beliefs (by and large responsive to evidence, etc.) but which are not beliefs since they are not regulated by a system designed for truth; the latter since it follows that swampman may have cognitive states that behave like beliefs but which are not beliefs since the subject is not guided by the truth-norm (or any related norms, such as the norm of sufficient evidence) (Glüer and Wikforss, 2013, 147-8).

Glüer and Wikforss (2013) focus their criticism in the fact that both answers try to solve the extension problem making a difference between 'the essence of belief' and 'its first-order role or function'. These authors offer a different solution that accommodates the essence and the function of belief, and for that they start criticizing the concept of 'alief' introduced by Tamar Gendler (2008a, 2008b): “[a] cognitive mental state, a mental state like belief in being action motivating, but unlike belief in being largely evidence-immune: Alief (...) Aliefs are mental states with [representational] *content*, but they are *not* propositional attitudes [of acceptance]” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 150). Let's consider the following examples of alief:

(The cliff and the bottle of sugar cases) In what we shall call “the cliff case”, a subject tries to walk onto the Grand Canyon Skywalk, a semi-circular glass bridge hanging over the edge of the canyon. He is completely convinced that the bridge is perfectly safe. Nevertheless, he is trembling and anxiously recoils. The reaction is so strong that the subject does not manage to walk out the bridge. The second example, let's call it “the poison case”, involves experiments with subjects who see two glass bottles being filled with sugar from the very same box. Then, they themselves label one of the bottles 'sugar' and the other 'sodium cyanide'. And subsequently, they show reluctance to consume the sugar from the second bottle (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 150).

Beliefs are sensitive to reality while aliefs are not: new evidence may change the former but not the latter. States similar to beliefs but that are not regulated by

mechanisms to track the truth or under a norm of truth may be considered aliefs, and in that way, the introduction of the concept of alief may solve the extension problem. Aliefs also motivate and explain behaviour, and that's why Glüer and Wikforss (2013) consider them to cause “*intentional actions* or at least *sufficiently similar to intentional actions* to allow for explanation by means of cognitive states with representational content” (152). But if aliefs are intentional, for Glüer and Wikforss (2013) they become too similar to -irrational- belief. On the contrary, if aliefs are taken to be sufficiently different from -irrational- beliefs, then they cannot be intentional. Glüer and Wikforss (2013) consider that aliefs are intentional, they have representational content and furthermore this representational content needs to be propositional⁵⁶. If the representational content of alief is not propositional, it is hard to see how alief leads to action. But even if the content is propositional, “[m]erely representing a propositional content does not explain anything” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 153). Glüer and Wikforss (2013) defend that a representational state not only has to have a propositional content p but it also has to represent the world as being as p obtains⁵⁷, and they add that

what connects a truth-conditional content to the actual world, what makes a state into a strongly representational state is not the content itself, but the state's 'mode' or attitude component (...) the only kind of attitude that can make the right kind of difference to the explanation of behavior is a strongly representational or 'committal' attitude (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 154).

56 “We are not completely sure what [Gendler] takes to be required for a content to be propositional, but assuming a minimal notion of propositional content, it is hard to see how alief could lack such content (...) [if it is not propositional] it would be hard to see how having such 'content' could explain anything at all. Just 'representing' a cliff that could be everywhere, or a bottle of poison that might not even exist, would not plausibly move anybody” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 153).

57 “Even if a state has a truth-conditional content, this content needs to be connected to the *actual* world to explain or motivate behaviour. Just by itself, representing a way the world might, or might not, be does not motivate or explain acting in any particular way. Of course, merely tokening representations with truth conditional contents could have all sort of causal effects, but again, that was not the kind of explanation we were after” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 154).

In other words, for Glüer and Wikforss (2013) agents take their aliefs to be true and these aliefs imply a strong propositional or 'committal' attitude as they explain behaviours and actions⁵⁸. But all this makes aliefs very similar -if not identical to -irrational- beliefs:

That is the alief-dilemma: Either alief-explanation is recognizably intentional. Then alief becomes too much like (irrational) belief. Or alief is sufficiently different from (irrational) belief. Then alief-explanation is no longer recognizably intentional -not even in a wide sense (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 155).

The main difference between aliefs and beliefs seems to rely on the evidence taken to form these states. There is not a big difference about how these states represent reality and how these states enhance action. As a result, it is not clear how do alief and irrational beliefs differ (see section 1.5). However, and contrary to wishful thinking cases that can be considered beliefs emerging from defective or no evidence (see section 2.5), it does not seem natural to consider that agents believe that the bridge is not safe⁵⁹ and to consider that they believe that there is no sugar but sodium cyanide in the bottle⁶⁰.

Interestingly, Glüer and Wikforss (2013) consider belief to be a propositional attitude that explains agents' behaviour. Believers have a 'committal' attitude and that is what connects the essence of belief with its function. This approach is similar to the constitutive link between belief and truth I defend: believers consider their beliefs to be true (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5).

58 This conclusion is not accepted by authors like Gendler (2008a, 2008b) that just focus on the content of aliefs and not on the representational or 'committal' attitudes of 'aliefers'.

59 "He is completely convinced that the bridge is perfectly safe" (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 150).

60 "subjects who see two glass bottles being filled with sugar from the very same box" (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 150).

2.9. THE AGENTIAL LINK BETWEEN BELIEF AND TRUTH

After dealing with the main features and concepts around belief, in this section I introduce the thesis I defend: there is always a constitutive link between belief and truth based on the believer's attitude, i.e. believers always consider their beliefs to be true. I adopt this position after dealing with normative accounts of belief (see chapter 3) and pragmatic accounts of belief in the current epistemic framework (see chapter 4). Even if pragmatic issues may come into play when believing there is a doxastic component in all beliefs, and this doxastic component relies on agent's internal attitude. Some philosophers would consider this link to be a constitutive norm of belief while others would deny that it is a norm as it does not prescribe nor guide (see section 5.1 and specially subsection 5.1.1).

Many philosophers consider that a doxastic correctness standard defines the normativity of belief (see section 3.2)⁶¹:

For belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief. My belief that snow is white is correct just in case the belief is true, just in case snow is white (...) Correctness, now, seems normative. More precisely, as we should put it, the concept of correctness seems to be a normative concept (Gibbard, 2005, 338).

False beliefs violate the norm of correctness. However, sometimes false beliefs are useful, and it can be said that they are -to a certain extent- correct in terms of other standards of correctness:

(*The love case*) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so.

61 "Let's us use 'normativism' to stand for the view that belief, by its very nature or essence, possesses the normative property of having truth as its correctness condition" (Chan, 2013, p. 3).

Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

(The Jimmy's lottery case) Jimmy decides to play the lottery. The probability of winning the lottery is 0.0001, but he believes that today he is going to win the lottery. Intuition or something like that tells him it. He believes he is going to win the lottery today.

For Paul, it might be useful to believe in the requited love to motivate himself or to feel better. For Jimmy, it might be useful to believe he is going to win the lottery as hopes are many times useful in agents' lives. Even if the standard of correctness of the majority of beliefs seems to be epistemic, there are false but useful beliefs, incorrect for epistemic standards of correctness, but not for other standards of correctness.

The constitutive link between belief and truth I propose can accommodate these different cases. This link affects the belief developed by the believer and not its results. Agents, when believing, try to mirror the reality and they internally consider they are doing so. In other words, agents are committed to truth when believing, even if beliefs turn out to be false. Paul's belief and Jimmy's belief are false -or likely to be false- and they may help their bearers to feel better, but regardless of these normative and pragmatic considerations, once they believe, they are epistemically committed: Paul and Jimmy consider their beliefs to be true, even when they are not and their bearers do not have proper evidence. Paul considers true that Olga loves him and Jimmy considers true that he is going to win the lottery. Once an agent believes p , he considers true that p . The degree of belief may change (see section 3.1), but the believer always takes his belief to be true.

Beliefs can be judged according to epistemic standards of correctness. But it is too optimistic to evaluate all beliefs only according to epistemic standards of

correctness: other non-epistemic standard of correctness, like the motivational ones, may come into play.

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

It is epistemically incorrect for Kate to believe that her son is innocent. However, it is difficult to strongly judge Kate's belief as incorrect. The agent who is judging Kate's belief should take into considerations other non-epistemic criteria. But for my purposes, Kate considers true that her son is innocent, so her belief is under the link I defend.

If believers try to mirror the reality, agents are likely to focus on evidence to form beliefs. But as showed with *the love case*, *Jimmy's lottery case* and *Kate's hated terrorist son case*, it is not the case that beliefs are always formed following reliable evidence: conative features may come into play. It might be said that sometimes there is no evidence on beliefs (see section 1.3). But it does not make any difference: agents are committed to truth while believing, even if they follow non-evidential reasons.

In chapter 3 I analyse doxastic normative accounts of belief, in chapter 4 I analyse different pragmatic options and features on beliefs and in chapter 5 I develop the idea of a universal constitutive link between belief and truth based on the agent's attitude towards belief and I consider similar ideas from other authors.

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3. THE DOXASTIC NORMATIVITY OF BELIEF

Considering the statement 'belief aims at truth', the aim of belief can be interpreted in different ways. It may be considered that the aim expresses something fundamental of belief and its relation with truth and it can be considered as a metaphor, as beliefs do not point consciously and planned at truth “as missiles towards their target” (Engel, 2013a, 32) or “archers aimed with bows and arrows” (Wedgwood, 2013, 123).

Normative approaches to belief present metaphysical, conceptual and factual implications. From a metaphysical approach, believers are sensitive to a fundamental norm involving truth. From a conceptual approach, the concept of belief relates to the concept of truth. And from a factual approach, believers try to mirror the reality when believing. Normativist philosophers establish that there is a doxastic norm of beliefs under the statement 'belief aims at truth': the doxastic aim is an essential feature of belief that (i) defines or is part of belief itself and (ii) distinguishes belief from other mental states like desires. As a result, many of them defend that the norm can guide or prescribe beliefs.

In this chapter I focus on the normative accounts of belief. Specifically, I analyse the degrees of belief in connection with the normativity of belief (section 3.1). Then, I introduce the correctness norm of belief: a belief is correct if and only if it is true (section 3.2). In section 3.3 I illustrate the evidential norm of belief related to the evidentialist thesis (see section 1.3): if agents (should) believe p then there is (enough)

evidence for p . Both the correctness and the evidential norm are commonly considered the most basic constitutive doxastic norms of beliefs. Then I deal with the most extended norm proposals for beliefs: the 'ought' norm -agents ought to believe p if and only if p is true- (section 3.4), the 'may' or permissibility norm -agents may believe p if and only if p is true- (section 3.5), the 'ought to want' norm -agents ought to want to believe p if and only if p is true- (section 3.6), norms based on doxastic values (section 3.7) and the virtue-theoretic account of the doxastic norm of belief proposed by Turp (2013) (section 3.8). Then, in order to explain my thesis, I delve into the differences between constitutive and evaluative normativity in section 3.9.

As I advanced in section 2.9, I consider that the doxastic aim of belief expresses a doxastic attitude in the believer: an involuntary and automatic commitment to mirror the reality. Even admitting that evaluation and formation of beliefs can be done out of doxastic parameters, I defend that believers always present a commitment to truth when believing. There is a constitutive agential link between belief and truth based on believer's attitude. I finally explain this link in a more analytical fashion in section 3.10: agents believe p if and only if agents consider p to be true.

Some philosophers would argue that my proposal is not a proper norm as it does not guide nor prescribe believers (see section 5.1.1 and Glüer & Wikforss, 2013). That is why I call it 'link' and not 'norm'. But for my purposes it is enough: this link defines belief, it distinguishes belief from other propositional attitudes or states and it always exists regardless of how belief is formed or evaluated, saving a constitutive relationship between belief and truth even if pragmatic accounts are adopted (see chapter 4).

3.1. DEGREES OF BELIEF

It seems that I establish binary normative evaluations of beliefs. From the agent point of view, beliefs are true or beliefs are false. From an external epistemic standard of correctness, beliefs are correct if they fit the reality or they are false if they do not. But it must be noted that there are degrees of belief (Horwich, 2013, 21-22, 29; Wedgwood, 2013, 125-7; Unwin, 2007, 130-7)⁶².

Agents may consider a belief to be true or to be false. But among true beliefs, agents may consider that some of them are more reliable than others. Among false beliefs, agents may consider that some of them are clearly false while others might be doubtful.

Some philosophers may consider that the true belief is the completely certain one, while the false belief is the uncertain one. Other philosophers may state that true beliefs are those which present an acceptable level of plausibility (see section 2.2 and specially section 1.6.1). It may be stated that the completely certitude is impossible to reach (Unwin, 2007) and it may be defended a treatment of beliefs always in terms of their degrees. Teleologists may establish that degrees of belief are better understood in terms of the values associated to beliefs rather than on norms (Papineau, 2013, 70; see also section 4.2). On the other hand, it may be said that once an agent develops a belief she always takes her belief to be true, even if she has different confidence levels.

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Hugo believes he sees a pig, and that belief based on good evidence is perfectly

62 Something similar can be said about the pragmatic approaches: there can be different degrees of usefulness on beliefs (see chapter 4 and chapter 6).

rational (see section 1.5). But imagine that Hugo has the opportunity to get new reliable evidence: what Hugo sees snores like a pig and smells like a pig. Hugo's degree of belief would be higher. The current belief is more likely to be correct than the past one. But his current belief is as rational as the previous one and in both cases Hugo takes his belief to be true, that is, he considers he sees a pig.

Wedgwood (2013) states that “if a belief is held with *maximum confidence*, it is *perfectly correct* if and only if the proposition believed is true”. About beliefs that are not held with that maximum confidence, Wedgwood (2013) states that

(i) if the proposition believed is *false*, then the *greater* the confidence with which you believe that proposition, the more incorrect your belief is; and (ii) if the proposition believed is *true*, then the greater the confidence with which you believe that proposition, the *less incorrect* your belief is (125).

The idea about beliefs that are not held with maximum confidence is that some of them are more correct than others. Agents also may avoid developing a belief on a particular proposition. But if the believer considers a proposition, she automatically “at least in a broad sense” (Wedgwood, 2013, 126) develops a doxastic attitude towards it. And if she does not believe nor disbelieve the proposition, her doxastic attitude towards that proposition cannot be maximally correct nor maximally incorrect: for a proposition to be maximally correct, the agent must believe the proposition and it must be true or she must disbelieve the proposition and it must be false, and for a proposition to be maximally incorrect the agent must believe the proposition and it must be false or she must disbelieve it and it must be true.

Wedgwood (2013) defends a “Brier-score model” (126) for the treatment of the degrees of belief based on 'degrees of incorrectness' that has three implications:

1. *Maximum belief* in p when p is true, and *maximum disbelief* in p when p is false, both get the perfect 'incorrectness score' of 0 (that is, they are not incorrect at all).
2. *Maximum belief* in p when p is false, and *maximum disbelief* in p when p is true, both get the worst possible 'incorrectness score' of 1 (that is, they are *totally* incorrect).
3. *Considering p but having no definite belief towards p* is in a sense the most indeterminate possible attitude that you can have towards p , which can be represented by means of the set that includes *all* possible credences between 0 and 1 in p ; regardless of whether p is true or false, this attitude will always get the intermediate 'incorrectness score' of $1/3$ (that is, the average value of x^2 for all real numbers between 0 and 1) (127)

Unwin (2007, 130-7) offers another approach to the degrees of belief. Subjective or Bayesian theories of belief establish degrees of belief in terms of the probabilities agents give to events and not in terms of the direct probabilities of events. But different agents do not give the same probabilities to the same beliefs, so it is not possible to develop a universal Bayesian theory of belief to be equally applied to the beliefs of every agent. Even if the evidence the agents have is the same, their beliefs can still be different:

(The grue user case) Let us suppose we have an ordinary person A and a grue-user B who both have access to all the data there could possibly be about the world before midnight tonight. If H is the hypothesis that emeralds will be green after midnight, then A will assign a very high probability to H even though B will assign a very low probability to it. The divergence is not resolvable by appeal to any further pre-midnight *evidence*, in any useful sense. Even if we insist that A 's evidence is not strictly the same as B 's evidence (since they are conceptualized differently), both A and B will still have all the evidence that could conceivably be available to each of them -and yet will still assign very different probabilities to the same hypothesis. Moreover, this is exactly what both A and B *ought* to do. Their local inductive norms demand it (Unwin, 2007, 134-5).

For Unwin (2007), the point is that belief cannot be reduced in terms of probabilities as Bayesian theories support: "the relativization involves quite different

types of consideration” (Unwin, 2007, 135) and not only the empirical data. Belief presents three dimensions which are content, degree and the restriction level depending on the agent. Bayesian theories do not account for the latter.

3.2. THE CORRECTNESS NORM: A BELIEF P IS CORRECT IF AND ONLY IF P IS TRUE

The correctness norm of belief states that if a belief is true then it is correct. And if a belief is false then it is incorrect⁶³. And this biconditional is justifiable if the belief p is already assumed to exist. In that way it cannot be argued that the norm forces the agent to be omniscient: 'if an agent S believes p , then p is correct if and only if p is true'. This correctness norm -based on truth as its standard of correctness- is said to be the most fundamental norm of belief (Wedgwood, 2013; Unwin, 2007, 16-7)⁶⁴ and the rest of norms that guide and prescribe beliefs are developed from this norm. Let's consider the following case:

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

If Hugo really sees a pig, then his belief is evaluated as correct. If his vision turns out to be an illusion and what he really sees is a dog, then his belief is evaluated as incorrect. Nevertheless, other cases are not so clear:

63 “For belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief. My belief that snow is white is correct just in case the belief is true, just in case snow is white (...) Correctness, now, seems normative. More precisely, as we should put it, the concept of correctness seems to be a normative concept” (Gibbard 2005, 338).

64 “the most fundamental of the constitutive norms applying to beliefs is the principle that (to put it roughly) a belief is *correct* if and only if the proposition believed is *true*” (Wedgwood, 2013, 124).

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Kate's belief is false, so under the correctness norm it is evaluated as an incorrect belief. Nevertheless, that is an epistemic evaluation and it is difficult to establish that the same belief is incorrect under other standards of correctness. Furthermore, it can be said that, all factors considered -Kate is terminally ill and she does not deserve to suffer more-, the final evaluation of her false belief is positive. Sometimes some false beliefs may be considered correct beliefs.

Agents can establish an epistemic evaluative normativity of beliefs: if beliefs are true they are correct, and if beliefs are false they are incorrect. But it is harder to establish that this kind of normativity is the only one present on belief. Other norms with their own evaluative standards may come into play.

Horwich (2013) criticizes a possible deflationist interpretation of belief in terms of the doxastic correctness norm. In terms of the deflationist interpretation the agent determines first if a proposition is true, then she evaluates the correctness of her attitude, and finally she judges her attitude towards the true proposition as a belief if such an attitude is correct. However, Horwich (2013) states that first the agent develops her belief and then she judges if it is true and correct.

For instance, Hugo believes he sees a pig. Then he evaluates the correctness of that belief and for this he touches it. Finally he considers that his belief that he sees a pig is correct. For Horwich (2013, 27), the deflationist interpretation of belief would change the order of the steps. First, Hugo considers that it is true that he sees a pig. Then, he evaluates the correctness of that consideration. And finally he considers that his attitude is a belief, the belief that there is a pig.

Unwin (2007) points that the correctness norm treats beliefs as states -as actual entities-, and not as propositional attitudes possessed by the believer, “and in asking whether and when one should *believe* something, we are not automatically committed to any particular doctrine about the nature of *beliefs*” (17). In order to analyse the aim of belief, the important issue is the attitude the believer when believing, not the state of belief⁶⁵ (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and more in general, chapter 5). There is no need to make a difference between belief as a state and the believer’s attitude, as the former can be reduced to the latter (Unwin, 2007, 121-2).

Normativist philosophers state that doxastic correctness has normative import: it claims what agents ought to or may believe⁶⁶. Some of them consider that doxastic correctness captures a metaphysical essence of belief while others consider that doxastic correctness captures a conceptual truth. In both cases, doxastic correctness makes a difference between belief and other mental states. Sometimes doxastic correctness is used to explain why beliefs take evidential and inferential norms -norms of rationality (see section 1.5)- for its constitution: the truth-norm derived from doxastic correctness is used to argue for evidentialism (see section 1.3) and to explain why agents ought to avoid contradictory beliefs. Other normativist philosophers focus on the transparency phenomenon (see section 1.2 and section 5.2.1) stating that it is caused by the doxastic correctness norm inherent to beliefs.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) refuse that doxastic correctness implies a constitutive normativity arguing that (i) 'correct' is not an essentially normative term and

65 “It was always slightly odd to say that beliefs aim at truth, since that suggests that the beliefs themselves have aims, objectives or other conative attitudes -which, of course, they do not. Rather, it is the believers who have the aims, and they are believers by virtue of having them” (Unwin, 2007, 121).

66 “To say that the belief that *p* is correct is to say that it meets a standard; in some contexts, this is the standard of truth. It is a further question what normative consequences follow, if any. The normativists must, therefore, express the view that belief is constitutively normative in terms of the paradigmatic normative concepts, ought or permission” (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 107).

(ii) correctness is not constitutive of belief because it does not distinguish beliefs from other mental states like desire or guess (102). They apply these arguments to different doxastic norms derived from doxastic correctness: the ought to norm (see section 3.4), the may norm (see section 3.5) the 'ought to want' norm (see section 3.6) and norms based on values and correctness as goodness (see section 3.7 and section 3.8).

First, to demonstrate (i) they show that

[j]udging that φ -ing is correct is compatible with judging that one ought not to φ . Judging that φ -ing is incorrect is compatible with judging that one ought to φ . When it is a fact that φ -ing meets a certain standard, there is always a further question whether the standard ought to be met. In some cases, the standard ought to be met, in others, not (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 103).

For instance, a woman driving in Arabia Saudi violates the conventional standard of correctness, but it does not imply that one ought to negatively judge a woman driving in Arabia Saudi (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 103). Only a deflationary notion of normativity -'being in accordance with a norm'- accommodates correctness⁶⁷.

Then, with (ii) these authors state that if correct is identified with truth and incorrect is identified with falsity, then correctness does not distinguish beliefs from other mental states like guesses -a correct guess is a true guess-, perceptions -a correct perception is a true perception-, assumption -a correct assumption is a true assumption- or suppositions -a correct supposition is a true supposition. So correctness is not constitutive and unique of beliefs, and hence it is not metaphysically nor conceptually fundamental: "it does not answer the question of what makes the belief that p a *belief* rather than some other mental state with the same content" (Bykvist & Hattiangadi,

67 "If 'correct' is not an essentially normative term, then what does it mean? On our view, 'correct' is a context sensitive predicate, roughly synonymous with 'in accordance with a standard x ', where the value of x is the standard salient in the context (...) it seems natural to assume that in the context of belief 'correct' just means 'in accordance with truth' or simply, 'true'" (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 102-3).

2013, 106).

On the contrary, Engel (2013b) defends correctness as the source of the normativity of belief. Correctness says when an attitude like belief is right -appropriate or fitting- or wrong. In this sense, the correctness condition of belief is truth -a belief is correct if it is true- and as a result correctness establishes a normative link between belief and truth -we ought to believe what is believable as truth. Engel (2013b) considers the criticism stated above⁶⁸, he identifies these positions as 'doxastic relativist' positions and he defends his 'doxastic absolutist' account against these other positions that admits other standard of correctness (see below). Furthermore, his doxastic absolutism supports that there is an essence or foundation of belief while doxastic relativism refuses that (22).

Correctness also determines the conditions and reasons to believe: for the doxastic absolutist, if the correct belief is the true belief then evidence constitutes the reason to believe (see section 1.3). Other philosophers may state that sometimes pragmatic reasons to believe are more suitable than epistemic reasons, like in the *the hated terrorist son case B*. But doxastic absolutists state that the right reasons for a belief are the epistemic ones and the wrong kind of reasons for a belief are the pragmatic ones. Actually, some absolutists may finally establish that epistemic reasons are the only reasons of belief and that pragmatic reasons are no reasons at all. The distinction between epistemic and pragmatic reasons to believe is similar to the distinction between 'extrinsic reason for believing' and 'constitutive reason to believe' (Adler & Hicks, 2013), or between 'object or content reasons' and 'attitude or state reasons' (Parfit, 2011; Piller, 2006), 'cognitive reasons' and 'conative reasons' or many times just 'reasons to

68 "why should correctness conditions be *absolute*? Why should beliefs be correct only when they are true? Can't correctness of attitudes, and for beliefs in particular, not be a purely *relative* matter? After all there are many ways in which plenty of things can be correct (...) variety of criteria of correctness" (Engel, 2013b, 21).

believe' and 'reasons to want to believe - reasons for believing'. In section 1.3 I prefer to talk of evidential and non-evidential reasons to believe, but it must be noted that some non-evidential reasons to believe may be considered epistemic or cognitive reasons rather than pragmatic or conative reasons -e.g. simplicity, familiarity, symmetry, heuristic value (Unwin, 2007, 140; see also section 1.3.2 & Reisner, 2013).

Engel (2013b) also identifies doxastic relativism with teleologism (see section 4.2.1), because considering truth just an aim allows for balancing it against other aims. On the contrary, doxastic absolutism relates to normativism or the idea that there is only one norm or standard governing belief: truth. Engel (2013b) admits the criticism that there are pragmatic factors in reasoning and final action, but

[t]he truth norm does not require us to form a given belief or not to form it. It only requires that *once we deliberate about what to believe, the answer is expected to be true* (...) it is easy to make the confusion between *belief aiming at truth* (or being normed by truth) and *aiming at having true beliefs* (...) The weighing does exist, but is not part of the belief-formation process (29).

Engel (2013b) also focuses on the idea that all reasons to believe are attitude or state-given reasons and the so-called object-given reasons are not at odds with attitude or state-given reasons but they “are only a special subclass of state-given reasons”. Furthermore, evidence may be a reason for the suspension of belief:

(The skin cancer case) For instance one might want to defer judgment as to a condition of one's health (say that one has a skin cancer) by waiting for the results of a particular medical examination. In such cases of withholding or of suspension of judgment, the reason to believe (rather: to withhold or to suspend judgment) are attitude or state-given, but they are clearly of the right kind (Engel, 2013b, 26).

For Engel (2013b), evidential reasons are attitude or state-given reasons that

have no instrumental but epistemic character (see section 1.3). In the previous case, evidence is still an epistemic reason -for the suspension of belief⁶⁹.

3.3. THE EVIDENTIAL NORM: IF AGENTS (SHOULD) BELIEVE p THEN THERE IS (ENOUGH) EVIDENCE FOR p

Evidentialists defend that this principle is unavoidable for belief formation. Non-evidentialists consider that agents may form and adopt beliefs regardless of the evidential principle, due to other non-epistemic reasons and values (see section 1.3).

The evidential norm can be thought in a constitutive manner -if the agent believe p then there is evidence for p - or in an evaluative manner -if the agent should believe p then there is enough evidence for p . The first evidential norm establishes that the agent believe p only if she has evidence for p , regardless of such evidence being weak or poor. Some authors would deny the normativity of such statement, as it does not guide nor prescribe (see section 4.1). The latter evidential norm is stronger: it establishes a prescription on agents and the necessity of stronger evidence, as they should believe p only if there is enough evidence for p . This latter norm cannot positively evaluate belief emergence in terms of weak or poor evidence.

In both cases agents do not need to develop beliefs for every available piece of evidence. What the norm establishes is that if the agent believes p (or should believe p) then necessarily there is (enough) evidence for p . Generally, the presence of evidence does not imply belief formation -i.e. the evidential norm does not establish the implication, 'if there is evidence for p , then agents (should) believe p '- but a strong

69 “the fact that there can be state of attitude-reasons for not to believe (let us leave aside intentions here) in no way undermines the distinction between evidential and pragmatic reasons to believe, for the reason why the patient withholds his judgment about his potential illness awaiting more evidence from the medical tests remains as evidential as it was in the case of a first-order belief: he suspends judgment because he lacks evidence, for an evidential, and not for a pragmatic reason” (Engel, 2013b, 27).

version of the evidential norm may establish that 'if there is *enough* evidence for p , then agents (should) believe p' both in an constitutive manner -if there is *enough* evidence for p , then agents believe p' - and in a evaluative manner -if there is *enough* evidence for p , then agents should believe p' .

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

For the evidentialist, there are weak evidence -but evidence- that allow Paul to form his false belief -e.g. maybe he saw Olga touching her hair the last time they met. For the non-evidentialist, no evidence is mandatory to develop the belief. The evidentialist would say that 'if Paul believe that Olga loves him, then he has evidence for such belief' -i.e. the evidentialist would defend that this wishful thinking belief accommodates the evidential constitutive norm- and the non-evidentialist refuse the necessity of evidence. The evaluative norm tells that Paul should not believe that Olga loves him, as he has not enough evidence -or no evidence at all. If so, other pragmatic standard of correctness of belief may appear and this wishful thinking belief may be positively evaluated (see chapter 4).

Papineau (2013) does not defend a normative approach to beliefs. He prefers to explain beliefs and its links to truth in terms of values, motivated by biological design and established practices in human societies (see section 4.2). But he considers basic non-normative standards of beliefs based on evidence:

Match your beliefs to the evidence you currently possess

(Papineau, 2013, 77)

Papineau (2013) establishes that the principle should be understood in terms of 'sensitivity' rather than in terms of 'conformity'. The evidential principle is unavoidable -so, constitutive of beliefs- but it is not prescriptive. In that way it cannot be interpreted as an orthodox normative principle. And for Papineau (2013), what ultimately explains the evidential principle is human biological design⁷⁰.

A different approach is given by Whiting. He (2013) supports a normative account of belief⁷¹. And he (2014) relates pragmatic perspectives and epistemic perspectives making a difference between belief as a state and the final action: belief aims at truth and actions aim to be guided by practical reasons. The link is given by the fact that truth constitutes practical reasoning for action, so belief provides practical reasons for action. But truths are not the only practical reasons that actions may have: more states than only beliefs can supply practical reasons for actions. For instance, agents' desires may justify their actions. What distinguishes beliefs from other mental states is that they are based on evidence, and as a result, they aim at truth. In other words, believers take evidence to develop their beliefs, these beliefs aim at truth and truth constitutes practical reasoning for action, although truth is not the only practical reason actions may have (see section 4.4 for an extended analysis of this position).

70 “Even if ['Match your beliefs to the evidence you currently possess'] is indeed unavoidable for human beings, and to this extent *schmelieving* is not a real option for us, nothing of a prescriptive nature follows (...) It is essential to beliefs fulfilling their cognitive function that they are controlled by relevant evidence, rather than other factors (...) Evolution has instilled in us the habit of matching our beliefs to the evidence (...) We have no choice but to match our beliefs to the evidence. But this doesn't mean that we *ought* so to match our beliefs. If nothing of moral or personal or aesthetic value would be lost, then there would be nothing wrong with ignoring the evidence, even if we can't” (Papineau, 2013, 78-9).

71 Whiting (2013) defends the 'may' norm of belief: agents may believe *p* if and only if *p* (see section 3.5).

3.4. THE 'OUGHT' NORM: AGENTS OUGHT TO BELIEVE p IF AND ONLY IF p IS TRUE

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Hugo ought to believe that he sees a pig if and only if he sees a pig. As he really sees a pig, the norm is fulfilled. This account does not allow the existence of other compelling norms when believing. That an agent ought to believe p if and only if p is true is the most fundamental norm. There are two way of dealing with this norm: the narrow one and the wide one (Engel, 2013a, 44-8).

(The narrow ought norm) Agents ought to (believe that p) if and only if p is true.

That establishes two conditionals: (i) if p is true, agents ought to believe p ; and (ii) agents ought to believe p only if p is true. The first condition is problematic: it establishes that agents ought to believe every existent truth, and this is something hard to assume (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 82; Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 108; Toribio, 2013, 80; Turp, 2013, 93, 97; Unwin, 2007, 9). Agents are not omniscient -e.g. Hugo may see also some ferns, but it is too demanding to develop beliefs for every available truth; furthermore, there are infinite non-available truths. The conjunction of true propositions is also a true proposition, so there can be extremely complex true propositions that ought to be believed by the believer.

Some authors (Boghossian, 2003) solve the omniscience problem taking only the second conditional (ii):

(*The weak narrow ought norm*) You ought to (believe that p) only if p is true.
 * If p is false, it is not the case that you ought to (believe that p).

This 'weak narrow ought' norm is problematic because it does not tell the agent what to believe (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 82; Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 108; Toribio, 2013, 80). It just says that 'if $\neg p$, then it is not the case that you ought to believe p '. If there is no pig, then it is not the case that Hugo ought believe that there is a pig. But the condition does not say anything about what Hugo ought to believe. And it does not demonstrate the normative commitment to evidentialism: "If all that can be said about the fundamental nature of belief is that it is not the case that one ought to believe falsehoods, we cannot on this basis show that evidential reasons are superior to pragmatic reasons" (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 108).

A possible solution is to reformulate (i) taking only the propositions that agents take into account and to reformulate (ii) remarking explicitly that agents ought not to believe falsehoods:

(*The narrow ought norm 2*) If an agent considers p , then: if p is true, the agent ought to (believe that p) and if p is false, the agent ought not to (believe that p) (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 108).

In this way, the omniscience problem is solved: the propositions taken are those that the agent considers. And the norm is clearly normative as it judges the proposition believed: it clearly states what the agent ought and ought not to believe. But Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) show that this reformulation of the 'ought' norm cannot accommodate blindspot cases, like 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining' (see section 1.4). If it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining' then the agent ought to (believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining'), but

in that way, she comes to (believe that 'it is raining') and so the initial proposition 'it is raining and *nobody* believes that it is raining' turns out to be false. So, if it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining', the agent ought not to (believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining'): the obligation to believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining' if this proposition is true cannot be satisfied. Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) explain that the problem relies in a violation of the principle that 'ought' implies 'can satisfy': "If you ought to *A*, then it is logically possible for you to *A* while its being true that you ought to *A*" (109), or in other words, the agent cannot have an obligation that she cannot satisfy. The 'narrow ought norm 2' assumes this principle, that is, the 'narrow ought norm 2' assumes that 'ought' implies 'can satisfy'. But this is sometimes impossible, as the blindspot cases show.

Again the 'ought' norm can be reformulated to accommodate this problem:

(The narrow ought norm 3) If an agent considers *p*, and *p* is *truly believable*, then: if *p* is true, the agent ought to (believe that *p*) and if *p* is false, the agent ought not to (believe that *p*) (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 110).

And if the agent is faced to a non-truly believable proposition *p*, like a *blindspot case*:

If an agent considers *p*, and *p* is not truly believable [e.g. blindspot case], then the agent ought not to (believe that *p*) (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 110).

But there is a conflict with this latter norm. Blindspot cases are not truly believable propositions, but they are the conjunction of truly believable propositions. 'It is raining but nobody believes that it is raining' is the conjunction of 'it is raining' and

'nobody believes that it is raining'. 'It is raining' is truly believable, so if it is true and the agents considers it, then the agent ought to believe that 'it is raining'. 'Nobody believes that it is raining' is also truly believable, so if it is true and the agent considers it, then the agent ought to believe that 'nobody [she included] believes that it is raining'. Blindspot cases suppose a violation of the agglomeration principle: 'if an agent ought to (believe that p) and she ought to (believe that q), then she ought to (believe that p and q)' (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 111). But if beliefs' content is normative, it is plausible to state that this agglomeration principle is a norm of beliefs⁷². The reformulations of the first conditional of the 'ought' norm -if p is true, then agents ought to believe p - may solve the omniscience problem, but they cannot accommodate blindspot cases.

Wedgwood (2013) replies to the objections of Bykvist & Hattiangadi (2013) for the 'ought' norm and for the normativity of belief in general⁷³. He starts considering a difference between *ex post* and *ex ante* normative assessments. The former refer to retrospective assessments, that is, assessments that have already been complied, assessments in which the agent has actually done what the assessments establish. The latter refers to prospective assessments in which the agent has not done what the assessments establish yet. The term 'ought' -as well as 'right' or 'wrong'- express an *ex ante* prospective assessment: that an agent S ought to believe the proposition p does not mean that she has already believed p , it just means that it is *right* for her to believe p .

72 "If content is constituted by norms, it is plausible that *Agglomeration* will be constitutive of the ordinary concept of *conjunction*, since *Agglomeration* seems to be a good candidate for a normativized version of the introduction rule for conjunction (...) even though each obligation is satisfiable separately, and therefore conforms to the principle that 'ought' implies 'can satisfy', they are not *jointly* satisfiable. Crucially, in this case, necessarily, if you believe all the things you ought to believe, you end up in a situation in which you believe something (viz. that no one believes that it is raining) that it is not true you ought to believe in that situation" (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 111-2).

73 Wedgwood (2013) also replies to the objections for the 'may' norm and other possible norms (see section 3.5).

At a certain time, the agent has a certain subset of available beliefs that are “fitting or appropriate” (Wedgwood, 2013, 130) for an *ex ante* prospective assessments. But these available beliefs are beliefs in which an *ex post* retrospective normative assessment would be right. Wedgwood (2013) defends that the correctness fundamental norm -a belief is correct if and only if it is true, see section 3.2- is better understood considering an *ex post* retrospective correctness of beliefs and not exclusively an *ex ante* prospective correctness of beliefs like in the 'ought' norm. He sums up the correctness norm -in outright beliefs and belief suspension- with three *ex post* propositions⁷⁴:

1. The state of having an outright belief *p* when *p* is true is a *perfectly correct* belief.
2. The state of having an outright belief *p* when *p* is false is a *maximally incorrect* belief.
3. The state of suspending judgment about *p* has an *intermediate* value, somewhere in between the perfect correctness of believing *p* when *p* is true and the extreme incorrectness of believing *p* when *p* is false⁷⁵ (Wedgwood, 2013, 131).

In short, Wedgwood (2013) establishes a relationship between retrospective *ex post* and prospective *ex ante* normative assessments: an agent *S* ought to believe that the proposition *p* is true (*ex ante* claim) if and only if there are available⁷⁶ beliefs about *p* being true and the associated *ex post* assessments of fittingness or appropriateness are likely to be true (131). The fundamental correctness norm presents an *ex post*

74 “Every instance of these three general propositions is an *ex post* assessment of a doxastic attitude that a thinker actually has towards a specific proposition *p*” (Wedgwood, 2013, 131).

75 “the only cases in which it is, in this correctness-related sense, 'permissible' for you to suspend judgement about *p* are cases where *all* the relevantly available possibilities in which you have the least incorrect doxastic attitude towards the propositions in question are ones in which you suspend judgement about *p*. They cannot be cases where there is an available possibility in which you either believe *p* or believe the negation of *p* and thereby believe a truth” (Wedgwood, 2013, 134).

76 “In general, a possibility is 'relevantly available' if and only if there is a way of reasoning or thinking open to you at *t* such that, if you were to think in that way at *t*, that possibility would be realized (...) The favoured subset of the relevantly available possibilities consists of the possibilities in which you get the *lowest* overall incorrectness score for your doxastic attitudes towards these propositions” (Wedgwood, 2013, 132-3).

retrospective normativity and the derivative 'ought' norm presents an *ex ante* prospective normativity.

Interestingly, Wedgwood (2013) establishes that permissible beliefs are true beliefs regardless of the believer's reasoning -e.g. they may be motivated by the believer's reasoning due to, for instance, some kind of performativity. Non permissible beliefs are false beliefs regardless of the believer's reasoning -e.g. they may be motivated by the believer's reasoning like in the blindspot cases (see above; also see section 1.4).

The answer that Wedgwood (2013) gives to the objection of Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) based on blindspot cases is that those cases still accommodate the fundamental correctness norm of beliefs: a belief is correct if and only if it is true. This is an *ex post* retrospective normativity. So, a blindspot proposition like 'it is raining but nobody believes it is raining' is correct if and only if it is true and it is incorrect if and only if it is false, and this evaluation is done once the assessment has already been complied. The derivative 'ought' norm that presents an *ex ante* prospective normativity -the agent does not know if what the blindspot says is true or not yet- refers only to *available* beliefs, but blindspot cases are not available beliefs. However, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) showed that, even if blindspots are not available beliefs, they are the conjunction of available beliefs. Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) argues that blindspot cases break the agglomeration principle based on a conjunction norm: for an agent *S*, if she is able to believe *p* and she is able to believe *q*, then she is able to believe (*p* & *q*). Wedgwood (2013) replies that

we should never have expected the permissibility-operator to agglomerate. It is permissible for Buridan's Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Left, and it is also permissible for the Ass to go to the

bale of hay on the Right, but it is *not* permissible for the Ass both to go to the Left and to go to the Right (135).

Generally speaking, the 'permissibility' logic does not suppose an agglomeration principle, being similar to the 'possibility' logic: it is permissible or possible to p , it is permissible or possible to q , but that does not imply that it is permissible or possible to $(p \ \& \ q)$. Wedgwood (2013) also refuses the 'permissibility' logic thus stated to be different from a particular 'permissibility of beliefs' logic (135-6). Specifically on blindspots, in some context the agent ought to believe 'I do not believe that p ' -the agent ought to believe that 'she does not believe it is raining'- while in other contexts she ought to believe that p -she ought to believe it is raining- and she ought not to believe 'I do not believe that p ' -she ought not to believe 'she does not believe that it is raining' (138). For Wedgwood (2013) belief is normative and there are norms of belief that guide and prescribe beliefs -the *ex ante* prospective ones-, but their application depends on the context: the propositions considered and the 'ought' of beliefs about them are context dependent⁷⁷. The *ex ante* prospective normativity of belief is context dependent, and as a result it is not necessary for this normativity to include an agglomeration principle.

That agents 'ought not to believe p if p is false' ('the narrow ought norms 2 and 3') is also problematic in some cases for other reasons:

(*The hated terrorist son case B*) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

77 "In this context, if one makes a judgment (about what one ought to believe) involving *that* precise concept, it will be that judgement that will guide one's thinking (...) the propositions that are in question are precisely the propositions that one has considered in that context" (Wedgwood, 2013, 138)

Kate's belief is false but it is hard to establish that Kate ought not to believe that her son is innocent. It can be evaluated positively in terms of other non-epistemic standards of evaluation (see chapter 4 and specially section 4.3).

Finally, another possible reading of the 'ought' norm is the wide one:

(The wide ought norm) Agents ought to (believe that p if and only if p is true).

This other norm is fulfilled if (i) the agent believes p and p is true, or if (ii) it is not the case that the agent believes p and p is false. It is incorrect if (a) the agent believes p and p is false, or if (b) it is not the case that the agent believes p and p is true. Hugo's case satisfies (i): Hugo believes he sees a pig and he actually sees a pig. But Kate's belief is problematic: (it is the case that) she believes she believes that her son is innocent but her son is guilty. Again, evaluated from this norm, Kate's belief is incorrect⁷⁸. Other authors consider that this last norm is weak. It does not force agents to believe the truth (Engel, 2013a, 47; Toribio, 2013, 80): it does not establish any prescription -any 'ought'- or it does not refer to agent's beliefs but to “the state of the world” (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 107). In terms of Wedgwood (2013) the wide 'ought' norm does not establish any *ex ante* normativity.

3.5. THE 'MAY' NORM: AGENTS MAY BELIEVE P IF AND ONLY IF P IS TRUE

(The may norm) (Agents may believe p) if and only if p is true

⁷⁸ Engel (2013a) realizes this criticism: “Aren't there cases -in particular those in which subjects are self-deceived, wishful thinkers or otherwise irrational in some way- where the norm is, by definition, not followed?” (48).

This norm is specially defended by Whiting (2010, also 2014) and it establishes two conditionals: (i) if p is true, agents may believe p , and (ii) agents may believe p only if p is true -i.e. if p is false, agents ought not to believe p . The first conditional allows agents to believe truths, but it does not force them. It solves the omniscience problem present in the 'ought' norm (see section 3.4). The second conditional establishes that the agent is able to believe p only if p is true. In other words, if p is false, then agents ought not to believe p . In a falsificationist fashion, under this norm the agent is able to believe the truth, but she cannot believe the falsity.

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Hugo may believe that he sees a pig (i). But he is not forced to do so. In the same way, he can see ferns and many other things. But he is not forced to believe every available truth. Actually it is cognitively implausible for agents to believe every truth. And Hugo should not believe the falsity (ii) -e.g. Hugo should not believe that he sees a dog.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) describes this norm in terms of permission:

(The permission norm) If an agent considers p , then the agent is permitted to (believe that p) if and only if p is true.

These authors consider that this norm faces problems with blindspot cases (see section 1.4), problems that are similar to the ones the 'ought' norm had (see section 3.4). In terms of the 'permission' norm, if it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining' then the agent may believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is

raining', but in that way, she may believe that 'it is raining' and the initial proposition 'it is raining and *nobody* believes that it is raining' turns out to be false -there is at least one agent who believes that it is raining. So, if it is true that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining', the agent ought not to believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining': the permission to believe that 'it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining' if this proposition is true cannot be satisfied. The problem is parallel to the one describe in the 'ought' norm (see section 3.4), and the possible the reformulation to solve it is similar:

(The permission norm 2) If an agent considers p and p is *truly believable*, the agent is permitted to (believe that p) if and only if p is true.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) argues that blindspot cases are not truly believable propositions, but they are the conjunction of truly believable propositions. 'It is raining but nobody believes that it is raining' is the conjunction of 'it is raining' and 'nobody believes that it is raining'. 'It is raining' is truly believable, so if it is true and the agent considers it, then the agent *is permitted to* believe that 'it is raining'. 'Nobody believes that it is raining' is also truly believable, so if it is true and the agent considers it, then the agent *is permitted to* believe that 'nobody [she included] believes that it is raining'. Agents are permitted to believe p and they are permitted to believe q , but they are not permitted to believe $(p \ \& \ q)$, so blindspot cases suppose a violation of the agglomeration principle: 'if an agent *is permitted to* believe that p and she is *permitted to* believe that q , then she is *permitted to* believe $(p \ \& \ q)$ '. As I said for the 'ought' norm in section 3.4, if beliefs' content is normative, it is plausible to consider this

agglomeration principle as a norm of beliefs⁷⁹.

Wedgwood (2013) replies to this criticism and defends the normativity of belief⁸⁰. For that, he makes a difference between *ex post* retrospective norms and *ex ante* prospective norms. The former refers to assessments that have already been complied -so the agent can judge it- and the latter refers to assessments that has not been complied yet. The correctness norm -a belief is correct if and only if it is true- is considered the most fundamental norm of beliefs (see section 3.2) and it is an *ex post* norm: agents judge if beliefs are correct once they realize if the fact described in the belief's proposition is true. The 'may' norm is a derivative *ex ante* norm: it tells what the agent is permitted to believe before the agent can judge if the belief is correct or incorrect. That an agent *S* may believe the proposition *p* does not mean that she has already believed *p*, it just means that she is permitted to believe *p*. Wedgwood (2013) considers that in a certain context the agent has a certain subset of available beliefs “fitting or appropriate” (130) for an *ex ante* prospective norm -like the 'may' norm- and this available beliefs are beliefs that would accommodate an *ex post* retrospective norm -the correctness norm. To sum up, Wedgwood (2013) establishes a relationship between *ex post* retrospective norms -the correctness norm- and derivative *ex ante* prospective norms like the 'may' norm: an agent *S* may believe that the proposition *p* is true (*ex ante* claim) if and only if

79 “If content is constituted by norms, it is plausible that *Agglomeration* will be constitutive of the ordinary concept of *conjunction*, since *Agglomeration* seems to be a good candidate for a normativized version of the introduction rule for conjunction” (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 111).

80 The reply given by Wedgwood (2013) is further developed in section 3.4 talking about the 'ought' norm. In some paragraphs, Wedgwood (2013) considers a parallelism between the 'ought' norm and the 'may' norm: “It is plausible that the terms 'ought' and 'may' are *duals* of each other. That is, a statement of the form 'You may permissibly ϕ ' is true if the corresponding statement 'It is not the case that you ought not to ϕ ' is also true. If this is right, then a specification of the truth conditions of statements about what you may permissibly believe will immediately entail a specification of the truth conditions of statements about what you ought to believe. Thus, given what I have proposed, it follows that 'You ought to believe *p*' is true, in the correctness-related sense of 'ought', if and only if *all* of the relevantly available possibilities in which you have the least incorrect beliefs possible in the propositions in question are ones in which you believe *p*” (Wedgwood, 2013, 134).

there are available⁸¹ beliefs about p being true and the associated *ex post* assessments of fittingness or appropriateness are likely to be true (131).

Facing the criticism of Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) based on blindspots, Wedgwood (2013) defends that blindspot cases (see section 1.4) accommodate the correctness norm -that is, the *ex post* retrospective fundamental norm of beliefs: a blindspot case like 'it is raining but nobody believes it is raining' is correct if it is true and it is incorrect if it is false, and it is evaluated once the assessment has already happened. The 'may' norm -that is, the *ex ante* prospective norm- refers only to *available* beliefs, but blindspots are not available beliefs. As I showed before, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) replied that, even if blindspot cases are not available beliefs, they are the conjunction of available beliefs. As a result, blindspots break the agglomeration principle based on a conjunction norm: for an agent S , if she is permitted to believe p and she is permitted to believe q , then she is permitted to believe $(p \ \& \ q)$. Wedgwood (2013) replies that if p is an available belief and q is an available belief, that does not imply that $(p \ \& \ q)$ must be an available believe:

we should never have expected the permissibility-operator to agglomerate. It is permissible for Buridan's Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Left, and it is also permissible for the Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Right, but it is *not* permissible for the Ass both to go to the Left and to go to the Right (135).

The 'permissibility' logic does not assume an agglomeration principle, being similar to the 'possibility' logic: it is permissible or possible to p , it is permissible or possible to q , but that does not imply that it is permissible or possible to $(p \ \& \ q)$. And a

81 "In general, a possibility is 'relevantly available' if and only if there is a way of reasoning or thinking open to you at t such that, if you were to think in that way at t , that possibility would be realized (...) The favoured subset of the relevantly available possibilities consists of the possibilities in which you get the *lowest* overall incorrectness score for your doxastic attitudes towards these propositions" (Wedgwood, 2013, 132-3).

possible 'permissibility of beliefs' logic is not different from the general 'permissibility' logic (Wedgwood, 2013, 135-6). Specifically on blindspots and the *ex ante* prospective 'may' norm, in some contexts the agent may believe 'I do not believe that *p*' while in other contexts she may believe that *p* and she ought not to believe 'I do not believe that *p*' (138). As I explained in section 3.4 and in section 3.5, Wedgwood (2013) considers norms that guide and prescribe beliefs -*ex ante* prospective norms, like the 'ought' norm and the 'may' norm- and he states that their application depends on the context⁸². The *ex ante* prospective normativity of belief given by the 'may' norm is context-dependent, and as a result it is not necessary for this normativity to include the agglomeration principle.

Some authors also criticize the 'may' or 'permissibility' norm because it does not guide nor prescribe believers. It just tells what agents are able or are permitted to believe. In other words, it just tells what agents ought not to believe but not what they ought to believe (Engel, 2013a, 47-8; Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 113; see also Adler & Hicks, 2013, 153; Unwin, 2007, 16). This norm is not properly prescriptive⁸³. It substitutes the idea that beliefs aim at truth, for the idea that belief aims to avoid falsity, and Whiting (2010) recognizes it (217). For Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2010) that supposes that the norm of belief does not explain why belief is committed to evidentialism and other inferential norms like those of valid logic (see section 1.5). Furthermore, it does not explain what the fundamentality of the norm of belief is about: if belief aims to avoid falsity, it is better not to form any belief than to form beliefs in

82 "In this context, if one makes a judgement (about what one ought to believe) involving *that* precise concept, it will be that judgement that will guide one's thinking (...) the propositions that are in question are precisely the propositions that one has considered in that context" (Wedgwood, 2013, 138)

83 "It seems, however, that such a weak form of the truth-norm, although it respects normative freedom and accommodates the blindspot problem (we are only allowed to believe them), either loses the normative force which the norm of truth is supposed to carry" (Engel, 2013a, 46).

terms of evidence, as sometimes evidence fails.

To solve these problems, Whiting (2014) appeals to another reason to believe based on 'practical reasoning for action': belief aims at truth and truths are practical reasons for action. And in order to supply practical reasoning for further action, belief must be based on evidence (see section 3.3). For some authors (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 114), this idea supposes that beliefs are not explained by norms of truth but by pragmatic reasons for final action (see section 4.4), so doxastic norms of belief are deflated:

if belief is necessary for action, and action is necessary for the satisfaction of desires, then you have to form some beliefs as opposed to forming no beliefs at all. But this is a pragmatic reasons for belief -it is not explained by [the permission norm 2], nor any other truth-related consideration, but by your desires. If this further pragmatic reason is required to explain why should proportion your beliefs to the evidence, the [the permission norm 2] is not explanatorily fundamental (...)

Pragmatic reasons for belief are on a par with evidential reasons, since neither stem from the fundamental truth-norm, but from the need to form beliefs for the sake of action (114).

The 'may' norm based on permission to believe the truth and avoidance to believe the falsity also faces problems to explain the transparency of beliefs (see section 1.2). Transparency states that if the agent asks herself if she believes p , she automatically asks herself if p is true. In terms of the 'may' norm, an agent may believe p if and only if p is true. So, transparency in terms of the 'may' norm is redefined as follows: if the agent asks herself if she believes p , she automatically asks herself if she may believe p -i.e. she automatically asks herself is she ought not to believe p . But that opens the door to judgement suspension about p being truth. And transparency states that 'if an agent asks herself if she believes p , she is automatically asking herself if p is true', so transparency supposes an automatic judgement about p being true. This

problem is parallel to the no-guidance objection stated above.

3.6. THE 'OUGHT TO WANT' NORM: AGENTS OUGHT TO WANT THEIR BELIEFS TO BE TRUE (AND THEREFORE NOT-WANT TO HAVE ANY FALSE BELIEFS)

This norm based on agents' desires is proposed by Paul Horwich (2013). It establishes that agents should aim at truth when believing, but it is possible for them not to reach the goal or to ensure it.

(Chicago Bulls supporter case) Matt is a supporter of Chicago Bulls basket team. All Chicago Bulls' stars are injured, they play against LA Lakers in Los Angeles -the best team at the moment-, and Chicago Bulls performed very bad recently. Despite of the evidence, Matt believes that Chicago Bulls are going to win.

Matt ought to want his belief about Chicago Bulls victory to be true. And in fact he does, but he cannot ensure the truth of that believe.

This approach also supposes that agents are not always forced to develop beliefs when they are exposed to evidence. In other words, it is not mandatory for a agent to develop the proper belief if she is exposed to a true fact. The development of many beliefs is useless, the cognitive resources of agents to develop beliefs are limited and the stimuli too bast. But once an agent develop a belief, she ought to want that belief to be true.

However, agents may develop unwanted beliefs aiming at truth:

(The hated terrorist son case A) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Kate believes that her son is a a terrorist but she does not want to believe so.

Does she ought to want to believe that her son is a hated terrorist? Horwich (2013) replies that this 'ought to want' norm must be understood in terms of just one of the possible normative pressures of beliefs: the “epistemological pressure” (19). When an agent ought to want to believe something, she ought to want to mirror the reality. Kate may not want to believe that her son is guilty under non-epistemic pressures, but she ought to want to believe that her son is guilty under the epistemic pressure present in beliefs⁸⁴. Horwich (2013) ultimately regards the value of truth as moral⁸⁵.

The 'ought to want' norm explains the standard of correctness of beliefs: once agents consider some beliefs, these beliefs are correct if and only if agents want their beliefs to be true -under an epistemic pressure. Another criticism to this view is that the 'ought to want' norm does not take into account that beliefs are involuntary and automatic (see section 1.1):

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

It is not the case that Hugo considers that he 'ought to want' to believe that he sees a pig. He just automatically and involuntarily believes that he sees a pig. Then, once the belief is formed, he ought to want his believe that he sees a pig to be true. Horwich (2013) realizes this possible criticism and he states that agents first develop their beliefs, and then they should want them to be true.

The constitutive link between belief and truth that I propose -when an agent believes p , she considers p to be true- presents some similarities to this normative

84 “Thus 'OUGHT' is to be understood as saying that we ought to have some desire -independently of how we feel about the prospect of k being F , or of k being not F - that if we have a belief one way or the other on this matter then it be the true one... etc.” (Horwich, 2013, 19).

85 “Respect for truth is commonly recognized as a *virtue*. And this suggests that we regard the non-pragmatic value of truth as moral -that is, that it's from a moral point of view that a person ought to want each of his belief to be true (including those whose truth could never promote the satisfaction of his desires) (Horwich, 2013, 25).

account, but it is automatic and involuntary, so it saves the latter criticism. It is not the case that once the belief is formed the believer ought to want it to be true: it is just the case that believers automatically and involuntarily take their beliefs to be true. My proposal is not based on a proper 'ought' so it can be said that it does not establish a normativity. However it is not necessary to explicit an additional 'epistemic pressure'.

3.7. A TRUTH-NORM BASED ON DOXASTIC VALUES

Teleologists (see section 4.2) prefer to treat beliefs in terms of values rather than norms. Specifically, some teleologists defend that beliefs can be analysed or evaluated according to different values and other teleologists defend that there is a superior doxastic value. The latter position is very closed to normativism on beliefs (Engel, 2013a)⁸⁶.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) introduce an analysis of a truth-norm based on doxastic values, considering a norm of doxastic value maximization on beliefs:

You ought to have doxastic attitude *D* towards *p* if and only if you consider *p* and you *Dp* in all of the highest-ranked doxastic possibilities (relative to your considered propositions).
 You are permitted to have doxastic attitude *D* towards *p* if and only if you consider *p* and you *Dp* in some of the highest-ranked doxastic possibilities (relative to your considered propositions) (115).

After a detailed analysis of blindspot cases in terms of this norm based on doxastic values, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) conclude that agents ought to

86 “So either the teleological account is implausible, or it is hard to distinguish from the normative account. Actually, there is no reason to object to the idea that the two views are actually compatible, if the teleological account is understood in this constitutive sense. But they do differ on the way the norm regulates, which is not the same as how an aim regulates” (Engel, 2013a, 52).

disbelieve blindspot cases or they ought to suspend beliefs about them (see section 1.4)⁸⁷. However, that means that there may be true propositions that are impermissible to believe and, in some cases, agents ought to believe false propositions⁸⁸. And if agents ought to believe false propositions, what is false is not always incorrect, and what is true is not always correct: “If false beliefs are incorrect, then the theory entails that I ought to have an incorrect belief. If ‘incorrect’ entailed ‘impermissible’, we would have the absurdity that it can both be obligatory and impermissible to believe that p at t ” (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 117). As a result, a truth-norm based on a doxastic value maximization is not explanatorily fundamental -sometimes believers ought to believe the falsity- and it does not explain evidentialism: when believers ought to believe the falsity, false evidence gives no reason to disbelieve p . When believers are forbidden to believe p , true evidence gives no reason to believe p (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 118).

A possible solution to these inconveniences is to consider that correctness is defined in terms of goodness: an incorrect belief is not a false belief but a bad belief and a correct belief is not a true belief but a good belief. Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) refuse this solution. First, correctness is not gradable while goodness is⁸⁹. Second, it is not a proper normative solution, as normativism tries to understand the relation between

87 These cases also suppose a problem for the ‘ought’ norm (see section 3.4) and the ‘may’ norm (see section 3.5).

88 “For example, take the blindspot that *it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining*, where you can only affect its truth-value by changing your doxastic attitudes. In the best doxastic possibility you will disbelieve that *it is raining and nobody believe that it is raining*, believe that *it is raining*, and believe that *you believe that it is raining*. Though this is the best doxastic possibility, by hypothesis, the proposition that *you believe that it is raining* is false at @. Hence, this view tells you that you ought to believe that *you believe that it is raining*, even though that proposition is actually false” (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 117).

89 Agents cannot say that something is more correct or less correct, while they can say that something is better or worse (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 118-9). By contrast, Wedgwood (2013) replies that “the statement that one belief is ‘more incorrect’ than another is not really correct English. So, for our purposes, it should be taken as an abbreviation of an idiomatic but more cumbersome statement, such as the statement that the first belief ‘deviates from perfect correctness to a greater extent’ than the second (125).

truth and belief in terms of norms. As a reply, a doxastic norm based on goodness can be stated:

(*Doxastic value norm 1*) Your believing that p is good if and only if p is true.
Your believing that p is bad if and only if p is false (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 119).

This norm faces problems similar to those blindspot cases had (see section 1.4): if p is a blindspot case and it is true, then believing p is good. But doing so, p turns out to be false. So in blindspot cases the initial good states of affairs finally play the role of bad states of affairs, and they make the world *worse* by obtaining. An alternative norm of goodness based on the agent -it is good for the agent to believe that p if and only if p is true and it is bad for the agent to believe that p if and only if p is false- faces the same problem. By contrast, Wedgwood (2013) considers that blindspot cases are not permissible beliefs (see section 1.4). The problem of blindspots relies on the assumption of an agglomeration principle on norms of belief: for an agent S , if her belief that p is permissible and her belief that q is permissible, then her belief that $(p \ \& \ q)$ is permissible. But Wedgwood (2013) refuses this agglomeration principle:

we should never have expected the permissibility-operator to agglomerate. It is permissible for Buridan's Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Left, and it is also permissible for the Ass to go to the bale of hay on the Right, but it is *not* permissible for the Ass both to go to the Left and to go to the Right (135).

The logic of 'permissibility' is similar to the logic of 'possibilities': it is possible to p , it is possible to q , but that does not imply that it is possible to $(p \ \& \ q)$. Wedgwood (2013) also refuses a difference between the logic of 'permissibility' and the logic of 'permissibility of beliefs'. On blindspots, an agent may believe 'I do not believe that p ' in

some contexts while in other different contexts she may believe p and she ought not to believe 'I do not believe that p ' -being p the statement 'it is raining' (Wedgwood, 2013, 138). In short, what Wedgwood (2013) calls 'the *ex ante* prospective normativity' given by the 'ought' and the 'may' norms is context dependent (see section 3.4 and section 3.5). As a result, it is not necessary for these norms to accommodate an agglomeration principle based on a conjunction norm and blindspots are not permissible even if their substatements are.

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) consider another alternative to solve the problem they stated about 'Doxastic value norm 1' and blindspots:

(*Doxastic value norm 2*) Your belief that p being true is good (equivalently, the state of affairs that S believes p and p is good). Your belief that p being false is bad (equivalently, the state of affairs that S believes p and p is bad). (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 120).

There are no beliefs but 'belief being true'. The value does not rely on the 'state of affairs' nor on a belief-type, and the evaluative variance of blindspot cases is solved. But this possible doxastic norm does not make a difference between beliefs and other mental states: it is good for an agent to *desire* p and p is true, it is good for an agent to *take pleasure* in p , and p is true, it is good for an agent to *promise* p and p is true (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 120).

Apart from the criticism showed, to consider truth in terms of goodness goes beyond the scope of normativist interests that try to establish a doxastic norm of belief. Furthermore, there can be good but false beliefs:

(*The love case*) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many

times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

(*The hated terrorist son case B*) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Paul's belief is a false belief, but in some situations it would be difficult to establish that this false belief is a bad belief. For instance, imagine that Paul is going through a bad time, and believing that Olga loves him too makes him feel better. *The hated terrorist son case A* is clearer: it is very difficult to establish that her false belief is a bad belief. It may be good for Paul to believe that Olga loves him too and that belief is false, and it is good for Kate to believe that her son is innocent and that belief is false.

3.8. A VIRTUE-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC NORMS AND EVALUATIONS

Turp (2013) establishes that a doxastic norm of belief is coherent with a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic evaluation. He defends that belief is governed by a doxastic norm, he refuses teleological accounts of belief (see section 4.2)⁹⁰ and he mentions three arguments. First, transparency⁹¹ as a constitutive phenomenon that relates belief and truth in a normative manner (see section 1.2 and section 5.2.1). Second, Moore's paradox *-p* but I do not believe that *p*- is better explained by a normative account (see section 1.4; also section 3.4, section 3.5 and section 3.7). Third, doxastic norms that govern belief formation are the same as the rules of deductive

90 "It is not that we form beliefs with the aim of believing true propositions, as we might have the aim of believing, say, interesting propositions. Rather, part of what it is to form a belief is to be normatively governed by and evaluable against the truth of belief (...). Of course, belief formation can be evaluated against other standards. Beliefs can be beautiful, useful and much else besides. However the constitutive relationship holding between truth and belief privileges the aim of truth from an epistemic perspective" (Turp, 2013, 92).

91 The fact that if an agent asks herself whether to believe *p*, she is automatically asking herself if *p* is true.

validity, so doxastic norms guarantee truth preservation.

About the first argument, it can be replied that the inference ' p therefore I believe p ' demands the agent to be omniscient, but Turp (2013) replies that doxastic norms can deal with this problem (see section 3.4 and section 3.5). About the second argument, in spite of the use of blindspot cases by antinormativist philosophers (see section 1.4, section 3.4, section 3.5 and section 3.7) Turp (2013) argues that it is counter-intuitive to sincerely assert p and not to believe p (see section 1.4, and specially Unwin, 2007, 10, 18). From that fact, Turp (2013) infers that

Our handle of the concept of belief depends on the relationship in which belief stands to the goal of truth. It does not depend on the contingent relations which beliefs bear to other valuable goals, although these can certainly provide us with reasons for belief (93).

About the third argument, Turp (2013) defends that belief is a propositional attitude under the rules of deductive validity while other propositional attitudes -e.g. desires- are not⁹².

However, truth is neither sufficient nor necessary to form beliefs. There can be false beliefs and there can be available truths that do not produce beliefs on agents. Furthermore, beliefs are not immediately voluntary in order to be evaluated in terms of virtues (see section 1.1). Turp (2013) replies that even if beliefs cannot be immediately voluntary, believers can bring about the appropriate circumstances for the beliefs to arise in with different ways: affecting their own belief forming dispositions or affecting the available evidence -e.g. focusing on different testimonies or aspects of the world. In order to bring about the appropriate circumstances to form beliefs, agents must cultivate

92 An agent may desire p and she may desire q , but that does not imply that she desires ($p \& q$) (Turp, 2013, 94).

epistemic virtues:

These are stable dispositions of thought which are reliably and non-accidentally conducive to forming true beliefs for creatures like us in an environment like ours. Examples include intellectual integrity, precision, care and consistency; virtues because of the relationship in which they stand to truth (Turp, 2013, 95).

In this way agents do not directly evaluate beliefs in terms of a normative standard of truth but rather as “manifestations of epistemic virtue” (Turp, 2013, 94). Believers cannot develop beliefs at will, but they still are responsible for their beliefs in terms of the epistemic virtues they use to form them. This virtue-theoretic account also enables for correct judgement of wrong beliefs developed in terms of appropriate epistemic virtues.

Turp (2013) addresses an objection to the doxastic accounts of belief based on its quantitative interpretation: the more truths agents have the better. But this thought may drive agents to develop many false beliefs. Turp argues that his virtue-theoretic account states that forming as many beliefs as possible “is not reliably *conductive* to truth” (Turp, 2013, 96). The important issue for a virtue-theoretic account is not the quantity of beliefs but their quality⁹³.

Turp (2013) also argues that his approach solves the problems the 'ought' norm account had -an agent *S* ought to believe *p* if and only if *p* is true (see section 3.4). First, if *p* is false, *S* may develop a false belief using her epistemic virtues and that would be correct. Let's consider the following case:

(*The mirage in the desert case*) Joe is in the desert. He sees a

93 “if one formed as many beliefs as possible one would likely catch many true propositions in one's cognitive net. But one would not believe them *because* they were true and so would not be forming beliefs on the basis of epistemic virtue” (Turp, 2013, 96).

woman in front of him. So he believes there is a woman in front of him. But it turns out to be a mirage.

That there is a woman in front of Joe is false, but Joe correctly developed his false belief because he trusted his perceptual evidence -evidence in this case is a delusion- in absence of defeaters. Truth -there is not any woman in front of Joe- is not available for Joe but he is not intuitively blameworthy in terms of the virtue-theoretic approach.

Second, if p is true, it is not mandatory for S to develop the correspondent belief. To demonstrate this, Turp (2013) refers to a distinction between deontic and evaluative norms of belief, he considers that agents are cognitively limited⁹⁴, they cannot believe every existent truth and as a result of this he defends that the doxastic norm of belief formation in terms of epistemic virtues is evaluative rather than deontic: “To evaluate someone as bad in some respect is frequently not only to label them imperfect, but also to censure or reprimand. But censure is inappropriate when someone fails to do what is best because he cannot do so” (Turp, 2013, 98).

Finally, Turp (2013) addresses the relationship between belief, knowledge and practical outcomes (see section 2.1 and section 4.4). For that, he makes a difference between knowledge and true beliefs, and he introduces the concept of knowledge as a “true belief plus a third element such as warrant or justification” (Turp, 2013, 99; see also section 2.1 and section 1.6). This third element is normative and this normativity gives knowledge -as justified or warranted true beliefs- an epistemic evaluation that is not available for simple true beliefs. The last step of this argument is to relate the normativity given by concepts like justification or warranty to epistemic virtues. Turp (2013) resumes it in three necessary conditions to establish knowledge:

94 “Whilst it would be good, indeed ideal, to cultivate the disposition of epistemic omniscience, it is not the case that we ought to do so” (Turp, 2013, 98)

I know some proposition p only if p is true, I believe that p and I have acquired the believe that p virtuously (99).

The obvious step to link this account with practical interests and outcomes is to relate justification, warranty and the virtues associated to the practical interests of the believer. But Turp (2013) refuses this account and he considers that, even if the overall evaluation of action can depend on practical interests and outcomes, belief evaluation is independent of practical interests and outcomes (see section 4.4): belief evaluation can be only explained in terms of epistemic virtues⁹⁵. Finally, Turp (2013) relates practical interests and outcomes not only to action but also to belief formation (see section 4.4 and section 4.5): “We need to note here that belief formation is subject to evaluation on a number of grounds that we can easily fail to distinguish. We are never solely engaged in epistemic pursuits” (Turp, 2013, 100).

3.9. CONSTITUTIVE NORMS

It is interesting to consider the difference between evaluative and constitutive norms in beliefs. Evaluative norms about p establish if p is done well or badly while constitutive norms about p establish if p is done or not done at all. A popular analogy to explain the difference between evaluative and constitutive norms is that of the game of chess: once the agent moves the pieces following the rules, the agent can do it well or badly and that establishes the evaluative normativity -if the agent moves the pieces badly she will lose the game-, but if the agent moves the pieces violating the rules of chess, she is violating the constitutive normativity of the game. Constitutive norms are a

95 To demonstrate it, Turp (2013) refers to the scenarios described by Stanley (2005, 3-4).

precondition to further evaluative norms. However, the application of this distinction to belief is much more complex: chess is just a created game, while belief is a pre-existent state and its norms and properties must be explained (Wilkinson, 2013, 107, 110).

Some philosophers argue that doxastic norms of belief are not constitutive, as there are many false beliefs and some of them can be positively evaluated in terms of non-doxastic standards of correctness (see *the hated terrorist son case B*), believers do not always consider the most reliable evidence to form true beliefs (see section 2.5, section 1.3 and section 3.3) and sometimes they want to believe the falsity (see *the hated terrorist son case A*). Normativist philosophers argue that the doxastic norm of belief is constitutive. They establish that the doxastic aim is an essential and fundamental feature of belief that (i) defines or is part of belief itself and (ii) distinguishes belief from other mental states like desires. Propositional attitudes or states that do not comply with the constitutive norm are not beliefs. Furthermore, normativists defend that “the most fundamental of the constitutive norms applying to beliefs is the principle that (to put it roughly) a belief is *correct* if and only if the proposition believed is *true*” (Wedgwood, 2013, 124; see section 3.2).

Papineau (2013) establishes a distinction between constitutive norms of belief that affects the content of beliefs and constitutive norms of beliefs that affects the attitude of the believer. The former describes the belief *p* in terms of its doxastic result -true or false-, while the latter describes the specific attitude developed by the believer when believing as opposed to other mental states like desires. A content normativity of beliefs may imply an attitude normativity on believers: the norm of truth on the content of beliefs may constrain believers (71-2). But the attitude constitutive norm on believers can be thought separately. I defend that there is a constitutive link of belief based on

believers attitudes that relates belief to truth: 'believers consider their beliefs to be true' (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5).

3.10. THE CONSTITUTIVE LINK BETWEEN BELIEF AND TRUTH: AGENTS BELIEVE p IF AND ONLY IF AGENTS CONSIDER p TO BE TRUE

I advanced in the introduction and in section 2.9 the thesis I defend: agents consider their beliefs to be true. In that way, I consider that there is a constitutive link between belief and truth. This constitutive link relies in the attitude the believer has towards her belief: she always has a commitment towards the truth of her belief. This link defines belief and distinguishes it from other propositional attitudes or states. This idea is already present in different authors and I show it in chapter 5. It is also criticized as a non-normative proposal as it does not guide nor prescribe believers when believing. I also deal with this issue in chapter 4. What is new -and what I call “my proposal”- in this dissertation is the following analytic statement of such constitutive agential relationship between belief and truth:

For an agent S and a proposition p ; S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

This analytical definition supposes the following implications:

- (i) If S believes p , then S considers p to be true
- (ii) If S considers p to be true, then S believes p .
- (iii) If S does not believe p , it is not the case that S considers p to be true⁹⁶.
- (iv) If it is not the case that S considers p to be true, then S does not believe p .
- (iv) If S believes $\neg p$, then S considers $\neg p$ to be true.

96 The conditional 'If S does not believe p ' should not be confused with 'If S believe $\neg p$ '. The former implies that 'it is not the case that S considers p to be true' (iii), while the latter implies that ' S considers p to be false' (iv').

- (iv') If S believes $\neg p$, then S considers p to be false.
- (v) If S considers $\neg p$ to be true, then S believes $\neg p$.
- (v') If S considers p to be false, then S believes $\neg p$.
- (vi) If S does not believe $\neg p$, it is not the case that S considers $\neg p$ to be true.
- (vi') If S does not believe $\neg p$, it is not the case that S considers p to be false.
- (vii) If it is not the case that S considers $\neg p$ to be true, then S doesn't believe $\neg p$.
- (vii') If it is not the case that S considers p to be false, then S doesn't believe $\neg p$.

Let's consider the following archetypical case:

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Hugo believes that he sees a pig. So, in terms of this proposal,

- (i) If Hugo believes he sees a pig, then Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be true
- (ii) If Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be true, then Hugo believes he sees pig.
- (iii) If Hugo does not believe he sees a pig, it is not the case that Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be true.
- (iv) If it is not the case that Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be true, then Hugo does not believe he sees a pig.
- (iv) If Hugo believes he does not see a pig, then Hugo considers 'he does not see a pig' to be true.
- (iv') If Hugo believes he does not see a pig, then Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be false.
- (v) If Hugo considers 'he does not see a pig' to be true, then Hugo believes he does not see a pig.
- (v') If Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be false, then Hugo believes he does not see a pig.
- (vi) If Hugo does not believe he does not see a pig, it is not the case that Hugo considers 'he does not see a pig' to be true.
- (vi') If Hugo does not believe he does not see a pig, it is not the case that Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' pig to be false.
- (vii) If it is not the case that Hugo considers 'he does not see a pig' to be true, then Hugo does not believe he does not see a pig.
- (vii') If it is not the case that Hugo considers 'he sees a pig' to be false, then Hugo does not believe he does not see a pig.

Regardless of how the belief is formed and how the belief is evaluated, this

constitutive link and its implications are always present. Let's consider a belief formed in terms of poor or no evidence:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

Paul believes that Olga loves him. So, in terms of the constitutive link I defend, Paul considers that it is true that Olga loves him. Paul does not believe his friends testimonies. So, in terms of the constitutive link I defend, it is not the case that Paul considers his friends testimonies to be true. Probably Paul believes that his friends testimonies are false. So, he considers that his friends testimonies are not true -they are false. More generally, all the implications previously established apply. The evidence may be weak or non-existent but the constitutive agential link between belief and truth remains.

Let's consider another belief that can be positively evaluated in terms of non-epistemic standards:

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

This belief is negatively evaluated in terms of doxastic norms of belief (see section 3.2, section 3.3, section 3.4, section 3.5, section 3.6 and section 3.7) but it is hard to completely evaluate it as an incorrect belief. Under other non-doxastic standards of correctness this belief may be correct as it supplies an emotional benefit for its bearer

(see section 4.3). However, regardless of this belief being correct or incorrect and regardless of the reasons for its formation, once Kate believes that her son is innocent, then she considers her son's innocence to be true. If Kate considers that her son is truly innocent, then she believes that her son is innocent. Kate does not believe that her son is innocent if and only if it is not the case that Kate considers her son to be innocent. Actually, if Kate believes that her son is guilty -she believes that he is not innocent-, then Kate considers her son to be guilty -she considers him not to be innocent-, and if Kate considers her son culpability to be true, then Kate believes that her son is guilty (*the hated terrorist son case A*). Once again, all the implications previously stated apply to this belief.

Some philosophers may argue that this constitutive link between belief and truth is not normative, as it does not prescribe nor guide believers (see section 4.1, section 5.1 and 5.1.1 for further analysis) but it just describes what a belief is or how it works (Engel, 2013a). Anyway, this constitutive link between belief and truth based on believers' attitude is fundamental, it defines belief and distinguishes it from other propositional attitudes or states, and it is compatible with the pragmatic issues concerning belief formation, evaluation and final action.

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4. PRAGMATIC APPROACHES TO BELIEF

In chapter 3 I analysed the different doxastic normative approaches to belief. In this chapter, I analyse different accounts that relate belief and pragmatism.

For doing so, I pay special attention to the relationship between belief and possible non-epistemic features for its emergence, for its evaluation and for the development of further action. More specifically, I consider wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5):

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

Even considering truth as the aim of belief, it is perfectly possible to have false beliefs. Paul believes Olga loves him and that is false. All the evidence demonstrates the falsity of such belief. But Paul believes the falsity. Even more, false beliefs can be useful. So, it can be defended that these beliefs are not incorrect, or at least, that not all false beliefs are *completely* incorrect -they are just incorrect from an epistemic perspective. This question is accurately sketched by Engel (2013a):

There are, after all, plenty of ways in which we can assess beliefs, besides their truth or falsity, and in a number of cases it can be beneficial to disregard or to ignore their alethic or rational dimensions. Why suppose that there is only one standard of evaluation? Why should we adopt the absolutist view that there is

only one constitutive norm of belief rather than the relativist view that there is no particular privileged criterion for assessing belief which enjoys a privileged status? On this view there might be as many 'norms' for beliefs as there are dimensions of evaluation, depending upon our particular interests in particular contexts, none of which enjoy any central status (34-5)

Accepting a distinctive doxastic normativity of beliefs when there exist false but useful beliefs that seem not to be subject to this normativity is problematic. That opens the door to pragmatic analysis and positions about beliefs⁹⁷. This debate between doxastic and pragmatic positions about beliefs refer to belief evaluation, but also to belief formation and to the action developed after believing.

In this chapter I analyse the non-guidance argument (section 4.1) that states that no doxastic norm of belief guides nor prescribes the believer's attitude when believing. Believers' may aim at truth when believing⁹⁸ but they are not determined by any constitutive norm of belief: first beliefs come and then believers may *evaluate* them in terms of latter norms.

In section 4.2 I deal with teleologism. Both normativists (chapter 3) and teleologists take truth to be a special feature to develop and characterize beliefs, but normativists consider that truth constitutes the only norm of belief -also working as its criterion of correctness- while teleologists may consider a range of different aims and values. Some philosophers argue that teleologism opens the door to pragmatic -and also relativist- accounts of belief (section 4.2.1). Other philosophers argue that teleologism is suitable to characterize beliefs, denying the normativist criticism based on the transparency phenomenon and the explicitness in belief formation processes required by

97 “The status of any distinctive doxastic normativity would be extremely obscure. Why should we be moved by this kind of normativity, given that this is supposed to remain even in cases where we attach no other kind of value to the truth?” (Papineau, 2013, 70).

98 I state that believers consider true their beliefs (see section 2.9 and section 3.10) regardless if they are formed in pragmatic terms, if they are evaluated in non-doxastic terms or if they promote further practical action or not.

normativists (section 4.2.2). In section 4.3 I analyse Papineau's (2013) approach that reduces truth to other moral, personal or aesthetic values.

In section 4.4 I deal with the account that relates belief doxastic normativity to actions: belief aims at truth because truth supplies practical reasoning for further action. In this way, some philosophers (specially Whiting, 2014) try to accommodate the epistemic nature of belief -in a normative framework- to the pragmatic nature of action. In a similar manner, in section 4.5 I analyse an approach that relates belief to emotional fitness and the regulation of emotions: beliefs aim at truth because truth provides reasoning for the regulation of believers' emotions.

In section 4.6 I specifically dig deeper into the nature of assertions. Many times assertions are taken to be actions, something that allows for pragmatic criteria for its development. Furthermore, many times they are considered under a doxastic norm: even when assertions are voluntary, active and context-dependent, the speaker is supposed to transmit a true information and the listener is likely to suppose its truthfulness -at least at the very first moment. However, assertions -many times taken to be the linguistic expressions of beliefs and taken to be under a truth norm- allow for pragmatic criteria for their development in a way beliefs do not.

In section 4.7 I deal with another possible pragmatic position: the replacement of beliefs by acceptances while thinking and acting. Even if it is hard to assume -belief seems to be inherent to human nature and the distinction between both beliefs and acceptances is clearly assumed in humans' current worldviews- a new propositional attitude between both of them that can be applied to a broader range of cases may be defended: this is Unwin's (2007) revisionist proposal.

In section 4.8 I mention Reisner's (2013) doxastic voluntarism that I also worked

in section 1.3.2 as an argument against pure evidentialism. The author argues that some beliefs are not formed due to evidence, believers' attitude defines their formation and veracity, and in some cases there may be more than one true belief but being one of them a better choice in pragmatic terms. This doxastic voluntarism opens the door to a pragmatic encroachment for the formation and evaluation of some beliefs.

Finally, in section 4.9 I deal with 'robust pragmatism', the thesis defended by Rinard (2015) that states (i) pragmatic reasons for belief are always genuine reasons and (ii) the only genuine reasons for beliefs are pragmatic reasons (Rinard, 2015, 217-20). Interestingly, the author argues that the tension between evidentialism and pragmatism does no justice to neither of them: many times the evidence is also pragmatic, and true beliefs are also useful. That is why in section 1.3 I preferred to talk of evidentialism vs. non-evidentialism rather than talking of evidentialism vs. pragmatism.

4.1. THE NO-GUIDANCE ARGUMENT TO REFUSE NORMATIVITY OF BELIEFS

Glüer and Wikforss (2013) defend that there is not any fundamental norm on beliefs: beliefs do not present essential 'oughts' (see chapter 3 and specially section 3.4). There are not any rules that guide believers, and it is not constitutive of belief to be governed by norms. Believers can form their beliefs in accordance with a norm but they are not guided by norms: there are no essential prescriptions that guide belief formation.

Interestingly, these authors make a difference between belief normativity and content normativity. Belief is a state and the defence of its normativity relies in the nature of that psychological state. The content normativity refers to what the belief states and its final outcome. Belief normativity relies on the believer while content

normativity relies on what the belief states.

Both normativities use similar arguments: the idea of an essential connection between belief and truth -the truth norm- and a connection between belief and rationality -epistemic rules, like the rules of valid logical or material inferences (see section 1.5). Glüer and Wikforss (2013) call the former argument “objective”, while the latter is “subjective” as it directly engages subject's perspective (81).

The main argument given by the Glüer and Wikforss (2013) to refuse the 'objective argument for the normativity of belief' -there is an essential connection between belief content and truth- is the *no-guidance argument*: “no truth norm can make any difference to belief formation. Consequently, it is at odds with the very basics of any intuitive idea of rule-guidance” (83). Basically, to be guided by a norm of truth, the believer must form a belief as to whether the believed -call it *p*- is true. But for that, the believer must determine first whether *p*. A norm of truth cannot determine belief formation, because the believer *already* have had to form a belief as to whether *p*. First, the believer develops her belief, and then, she may ask if it complies with the norm of truth. But the norm of truth does not guide belief formation: it comes “too late” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 84)⁹⁹. Moreover, the norm of truth does not tell and does not provide the believer with a reason to believe something different to what she already comes to believe without the guidance of the norm. Let's consider the following case:

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

⁹⁹ See also Horwich (2013) criticism against a deflationist interpretation of belief of the doxastic correctness norm in section 3.2. This position resembles Engel's (2013b) one when criticizing doxastic relativism and teleologism (see section 4.2.1): “The truth norm does not require us to form a given belief or not to form it. It only requires that *once we deliberate about what to believe, the answer is expected to be true* (...) it is easy to make the confusion between *belief aiming at truth* (or being normed by truth) and *aiming at having true beliefs*” (29).

For Glüer and Wikforss (2013), Hugo forms its belief without the guidance of any norm. Hugo directly determines if there is a pig, regardless of any prescriptive norm. Then, Hugo may ask himself if his belief that he sees a pig is true, but for that, he already has formed his belief that he sees a pig -without the guidance of such a norm of truth. The norm of truth does not provide Hugo with any reason to believe something different to what he was already believing (see also Horwich, 2013).

Glüer and Wikforss (2013) refuse a doxastic norm of belief that guides its formation but they admit that there is an essential connection between belief and truth:

beliefs essentially have truth-evaluable contents. And even a stronger claim seems quite plausible: Belief arguably is the only propositional attitude taking as its conditions of correctness those of its content. Thus, we do not merely say that the *content* of a belief is false, but that the *belief* is: *S* has a false belief if and only if *S* believes that *p*, and *p* is false (84).

Agents can evaluate the correctness of the content of a belief -and thus the correctness of the belief- in doxastic terms but this does not involve any 'ought': there is no norm that guides belief formation processes as these hypothetical norms do not play any role in the believer's psychology. Even if Hugo can ask himself if his belief that he sees a pig is correct, that does not imply that a norm guides his initial belief that he see a pig. No norm tells Hugo that he ought to believe he sees a pig. Doxastic norms may evaluate beliefs but they do not influence their formation, so they do not guide believers: beliefs come first than norms.

Another option to support normativism is to consider that truth guides belief-formation indirectly, via the subjective norms of rationality like the inferential rules of valid logic and evidence (see section 1.5). So, for Glüer and Wikforss, “what is correct according to the the norms of rationality is not the true, but the rational” (89). They

show the following examples of norms of rationality:

- (i) One ought to believe that p if and only if one has sufficient evidence that p .
- (ii) If one believes that p and believes that if p then q , then one ought to believe that q (81).

The norm (i) refers to an evidential norm (see section 1.3 and section 3.3) and the norm (ii) refers to an inferential norm of valid logic. Both are subjective norms of rationality and they are usually said to be caused by the objective norm of truth (Boghossian, 2003). In other words, many normativist philosophers that use this argument consider that the truth norm of belief establishes an indirect guidance via the norms of rationality. Other philosophers like Gibbard (2005) consider that the norms of rationality are prior to the norm of truth when believing: the latter is a result of the former. However, sometimes agents believe what the norms of rationality tell them to believe and these beliefs turn out to be false¹⁰⁰. And it may be the case that an agent's belief is true but she got it without complying with the norms of rationality. But even if the objective 'oughts' cannot be reduced to the subjective 'oughts', a means-end relation between both norms may be defended, suggesting that rational beliefs aim at true beliefs.

Glüer and Wikforss (2013) refuse these approaches stating that a doxastic norm for beliefs and norms of rationality for beliefs cannot be both essential at the same time: “If truth is the aim of belief, the rules of rationality are not essential. And if the rules of rationality are essential to belief, truth is not its aim. There is a dilemma here” (87). If we consider a doxastic fundamental aim of belief and the norms of rationality, the latter

100 “there are scenarios where S has all the available evidence and believes what she subjectively ought to believe -that is on the basis of this evidence- and yet the believe in question is false” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 86).

can be different depending on the belief. In that way, the rules of rationality may vary from belief to belief, being just instrumental norms with the function of obtaining the truth. It can be replied that there are essential rules of rationality applicable to all the possible contexts, but it makes more difficult to defend that the essential nature of these norms derives from the aim of truth. In that case, belief would aim just at rationality and that opens the door to rational false beliefs and to irrational true beliefs that would be both correct and incorrect (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 88-9) depending on the considered norm (see section 1.5)¹⁰¹.

This does not mean that Glüer and Wikforss refuse rationality of beliefs. They admit that there is an essential connection between belief and rationality. What they (2013) dispute “is that belief is essentially such that its formation is guided by the 'rules' of rationality” (90). There are no norms that tell the believer how she ought to reason: believers form their beliefs according to some norms of rationality, but they are not guided or prescribed by these norms. Similarly, they admit that there is an essential connection between rationality and reasons for believing, but this connection is not normative. In short, there are essential connections between belief, truth, rationality and reasons for believing, these connections may present correctness conditions for further evaluation but these connections are not rule-guided, so they do not present any genuine normative dimension: “from the fact that *E* has certain correctness conditions, it does not directly follow that *E should* or *ought* to be applied in any particular way” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 93).

101 “We think that there is a general lesson here. It might either be held that the objective *ought* is essential to belief, in which case the problem of guidance remains unsolved: the rules that do guide, on this view, will be the rules of rationality and these will not be essential to belief. Alternatively, it might be held that the subjective *ought* is essential to belief, that the rules of rationality are not mere means-ends rules, in which case the objective *ought* will not be essential to belief. It is not possible to have it both ways: to hold that the objective *ought* is essential to belief and that the rules of rationality solve the problem of guidance” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 89).

Finally, Glüer and Wikforss (2013) argue that normative approaches to belief cause the problem of “the regress of motivation” (94). There is a difference between being guided by a norm and merely acting in accordance with a norm. The guidance makes a difference in the agents' behaviour via motivation: “a performance *A* is guided by a rule *R* if and only if *R* plays a certain role in *S*'s *motivation* for *A* (...) it is very natural and intuitive to spell this out in terms of an intentional condition on rule-guidedness” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 94). Normative approaches to belief generate syllogisms of this form:

- (P₁) I want to believe what is in accordance with [the rule] *R*.
 (P₂) To believe that *p* is in accordance with *R*.
 (C) I want to believe that *p* (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 94).

This syllogism is disruptive because practical inferences require the agent 'the belief that believing that *p* is in accordance with the norm'. In normativist terms, this other belief would also require to be motivated by a further belief and the correspondent further rule, embarking on a vicious regress: *the regress of motivation*. Let's consider *the Hugo's pig case*:

(*Hugo's pig case*) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

From a normativist point of view, Hugo wants to believe what is in accordance with the norm of truth. But that generates the 'belief that believing that there is a pig is in accordance with the norm of truth', thus generating a vicious regress: *the regress of motivation*. Even if essential rules of rationality are considered, they may overcome a regress of justification of beliefs but not this regress of motivation of beliefs:

The regress of motivations remains, since it does not turn on the idea that the belief that a performance is in accordance with the relevant rule is *justified*, but merely on the idea that that belief, too, formed as a result of *S* following certain rules. The regress, that is, is not a regress of *theoretical* reason, but a regress of *practical* reasoning (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 95).

Normativists may argue that there exist blind rules, rules that agents follow without involving any intentionality. And these rules are basic rules of motivations that overcome the problem of the regress of motivation. But this position breaks the distinction between acting according with a norm and being genuinely guided by a norm, a distinction assumed by Glüer and Wikforss (2013)¹⁰². Something similar happens when normativist propose forms of rule-guidance on the 'sub-personal' level (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 96). The very challenge for the normativist is to come up with an intuitive condition that distinguishes rule-guidedness from accordance with the rule¹⁰³.

The constitutive agential link between belief and truth I defend -agents consider their beliefs to be true (see section 2.9), i.e. an agent believes *p* if and only if she considers *p* to be true (see section 3.10)- is treated in terms of a 'constitutive link' that describes but does not prescribe nor guide the doxastic behaviour of believers. I do not call this relationship 'norm' and I do not treat it in a normative manner in order to solve this criticism (see section 5.1 and specially section 5.1.1). What I just want to show is

102 “After all, the intuitive, intentional condition appears to be satisfied in all uncontroversial cases of rule-guidedness. Giving it up in precisely certain controversial cases, cases to do with intentional states and their contents, would seem to be a perfectly ad hoc move, simply intended to save a normativist theory under severe pressure. If belief normativism requires endorsing quietism about rule-guidance, so much the worse for belief normativism” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013, 96).

103 A similar idea is defended by Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013): “according to a *deflationary* notion of normativity, being in accordance with a norm or standard is sufficient for being normative. But it is clear that the normativists are not deploying such a deflationary notion of normativity, for no one would deny that true beliefs are normative in the sense that they are accord with the standard of truth. For normativists, to say that *Doxastic Correctness* has normative implications is to say that it entails that a true belief is something we *ought* to have, are *permitted* to have, are *rationaly committed* to have, or something that it would be *good* to have” (103).

that this constitutive link describes and defines belief, that it differentiates belief from other propositional attitudes or mental states and that it can be applied to all beliefs regardless of their formation reasons and evaluation criteria.

4.2. THE TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS

Teleologism analyses belief and its aim in terms of values. There is a value of truth in belief, and it can be interpreted as an instrumental or a fundamental value. Although normativism many times is confronted with teleologism, both alternatives deal with the metaphor 'belief aims at truth' and the correctness standards of belief. Normativism speaks of norms and teleologism speaks of values, each with their own ontologies.

The normative accounts (see chapter 3) establish categorical epistemic norms that ultimately consider 'the basic norm of truth' while in the teleological accounts based on values, such values are usually instrumental and hypothetical (Engel, 2013a, 36).

A teleological position may establish that the final goal of belief is truth: there is an intrinsic doxastic value, and if this value is confronted with other values, the former prevails. This position is similar to the normative one. Other teleological instrumental position may take into account other aims and standards of correctness when forming and evaluating beliefs. This opens the door to pragmatic considerations for belief formation and evaluation.

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes his son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Doxastic normativists consider that Kate's belief is incorrect, as it violates the norm of truth. Some of them might also consider this belief to be irrational (see section 1.5). Teleologists consider that the value of truth is confronted with other non-epistemic values and standards of correctness.

As a result, teleologism may open the door to relativist positions (Engel, 2013a, 37) but at the same time it can be one way of accommodating the epistemic nature of belief with pragmatic positions. I develop this idea in the next subsection 4.2.1.

4.2.1. TELEOLOGISM AND PRAGMATISM

Teleological accounts of the aim of belief may accommodate pragmatism. Teleologists may consider that the ultimate goal of belief is epistemic, and in that way they approach the normative accounts analysed in chapter 3. But other teleologists also may consider that beliefs present different values and standards of correctness that can be compared. In other words, for some teleologists truth may be the most fundamental value while for other teleologists the doxastic value can be confronted with other non-doxastic values¹⁰⁴ considering that all values are hypothetical and instrumental. The former position is very similar to the normative accounts of belief (see chapter 3)¹⁰⁵. On the other hand, Engel (2013a) warns that the latter teleological accounts based on multiple hypothetical instrumental values open the door to relativist positions¹⁰⁶. Let's

104 “The teleologist thus faces a second dilemma: either he accepts the idea that the aim of truth can justifiably be balanced against other aims or reasons (for instance the prudential ones), and hence subscribes to a form of pragmatism about belief which denies exclusivity, or he must accept the truth aim is the exclusive one” (Engel, 2013a, 51).

105 “So either the teleological account is implausible, or it is hard to distinguish from the normative account. Actually, there is no reason to object to the idea that the two views are actually compatible, if the teleological account is understood in this constitutive sense. But they do differ on the way the norm regulates, which is not the same as how an aim regulates” (Engel, 2013a, 52).

106 “If correctness for belief is necessarily plural and relative to various standards of assessment or to different sorts of aims, the teleological account seems better, for there seems to be various kinds of goals that we can pursue (...) But then the problem becomes more pressing for the teleologist: how

consider the following case:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

In teleological terms, it is valuable for Paul to know that Olga does not love him. In that way, he can move on with his life. There is an epistemic value -truth- but this may not be the only one. In other words, for some teleological accounts truth is valuable when believing but it may not be the only value (Engel, 2013b, 29¹⁰⁷). There may be other non-epistemic values, like the emotional ones: it is valuable for Paul to believe that Olga loves him to feel better. It can be thought that teleological accounts based on multiple values allow for a good treatment of cases like *the love case*: truth is a value, but also comfort and self-motivation are other values. Paul's final belief can be understood as the final result of *-unconsciously-* considering all the present values.

Engel (2013a) argues that Paul's state is not a proper belief but a state similar to a belief but non-regulated by truth, a *schmelief* (see section 2.7)¹⁰⁸. Furthermore, it is hard to apply the same analysis in terms of multiple values to other cases:

(The hated terrorist son case A) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

is he to distinguish his view from the relativist one? For it seems clear that we do not always aim at truth in our belief, rather than at, say comfort. The relativist is tempted to conclude that truth is neither a norm nor an ultimate goal of belief. The absolutist teleologist and the normativist reject this consequence. But it's more difficult for the teleologist to reject this consequence, if he allows that the truth aim can be balanced against other aims" (Engel, 2013a, 37).

107 Engel (2013b) explains and opposes this account.

108 "Why could we not accept that in some cases we might form other attitudes than belief -call them *schmeliefs-* governed by other aims, such as comfort and pleasantness? Indeed we can, but by hypothesis it would not be the attitude of *belief*" (Engel, 2013a, 52).

It is painful for Kate to believe that her son is a hated terrorist. From a teleological perspective, this case can be understood only if truth is considered the most fundamental value or the norm of belief. But, as Kate is going to pass away soon, it is hard to see how the epistemic value outweigh other pragmatic non-epistemic values.. While Paul can believe that Olga loves him accommodating non-doxastic values, Kate cannot believe that her son is innocent.

4.2.2. FACING THE MAIN NORMATIVISTS COUNTERARGUMENTS TO TELEOLOGISM

Normativists usually argue that there are two features that teleologists cannot jointly explain, non-doxastic features for the regulation of some beliefs and transparency, forming *the teleologist's dilemma* (Shah, 2003, 460-5). First, some beliefs seem not to be wholly regulated -formed, maintained- in terms of the aim of truth, like wishful thinking beliefs (see section 2.5). Second, transparency must be explained -i.e. the fact that when an agent asks herself whether to believe p , she directly asks herself whether p is true (see section 1.2 and section 5.2.1¹⁰⁹). Toribio (2013) argues that a teleologist account of beliefs can simultaneously explain both phenomena. She starts explaining what she calls the teleologist commitment:

For any S , p : S believes that p if and only if S accepts p with the aim of accepting p only if p is true (Toribio, 2013, 78).

The teleological acceptance is both intentional and automatic. Belief regulation comes from some cognitive mechanisms of the agent and these mechanisms have been

¹⁰⁹ For an argument against the normative account of transparency, see also Steglich-Petersen (2013). His idea is also explained in section 1.2 and section 5.2.1.

designed by evolution or appropriate training.

Then, Toribio (2013) explains the normativist commitment:

For any S, p : S believes that p if and only if S accepts the truth-norm [p is correct if and only if p is true] (79).

In normativist terms belief presents a prescriptive nature -explicit in the term 'correct'. Belief regulation comes from this normative nature of belief.

Trying to find a solution to the teleologist's dilemma, a weak truth-regulation may allow for the influence of non-doxastic considerations in order to explain cases like wishful thinking ones (see section 2.5). But only doxastic considerations can be taken to explain transparency (see section 1.2) and a weak truth-regulation seems not to be a good option. A strong truth-regulation explains transparency but in that case many defective beliefs -like wishful thinking cases- could not be explained or considered beliefs (Toribio, 2013, 81). Normativists argue that the solution to this dilemma goes through the adoption of a conceptual truth-norm on beliefs that includes a doxastic standard of correctness. In this way, normativists capture the lack of inferential steps between the question 'whether to believe p ' and 'whether p is true'. This approach also makes possible the analysis of beliefs influenced by non-doxastic considerations like wishful thinking cases: although agents are causally influenced by non-doxastic considerations, they *ought to* consider only doxastic considerations in order to form beliefs. Toribio (2013) resumes the normativist argument in 8 steps:

1. All cases of doxastic deliberation necessarily exhibit transparency.
2. (1) needs to be explained.
3. Weak truth-regulation is not enough to explain (1).
4. Strong truth-regulation entails that defective beliefs cannot be

- considered beliefs.
5. Strong truth-regulation is not appropriate to explain (1).
 6. *Assumption*: the truth-norm is constitutive of the concept of belief.
 7. All cases of doxastic deliberation are cases in which the subject (S) deploys the concept of belief.
 8. (6-7) explain (1).
- C: The truth-norm is a constitutive part of the concept of belief (82).

Toribio (2013) criticizes this argument in its steps (3), (4) and (5), and in that way she refuses normativism and defends a teleologist account.

First, normativists establish that the question 'whether to believe that p ' is transparent to the question 'whether p is true' but also to the question 'whether it would be correct to believe that p ', and as a result, to the question 'whether it would be rational to believe that p ' (see section 1.5). But this latter question is also subject to norms other than the truth-norm. The normativist replies that these other norms may exist, but they must be compatible with the truth-norm. Toribio (2013) argues that "if that is the case, the idea that in deploying the concept of belief we commit ourselves to abiding by the truth-norm does not guarantee our *experiencing its sole authority* over relevant acts of belief formation, which amounts (1) unexplained" (83). The normativist needs to establish truth as the only norm of rational beliefs, and for doing so, she needs to accept some form of motivational internalism: "if S takes p to be true, then S will be motivated to believe p insofar as S is rational" (Toribio, 2013, 83). The truth-norm is only applied to rational beliefs and relying on this form of motivational internalism makes the transition from 'whether to believe that p ' to 'whether p is true' mediated by the rationality of belief, but the normativist tried to defend that transparency is an immediate phenomenon. Another possible normativist answer is that transparency and the exclusive truth norm affect belief formation or adoption, not belief evaluation: the question 'whether to believe p in order to adopt p or to form the belief p ' is transparent to

'whether p is true' (see section 1.2 and section 5.2.1).

Second, premise (3) establishes that weak-truth regulation is not enough to explain that doxastic deliberation exhibits transparency. To demonstrate that (3) is false, it must be noted that the explanation of belief as a cognitive process should rely on the process experienced by the agents and not on the final product or outcome of belief. It is odd to ask belief and its properties -from a normative approach- for an explanation of what agents take themselves to be doing when deciding 'whether to believe p '. For Toribio (2013) it makes much more sense to explain the properties of what agents take themselves to be doing when they 'engage in the process of deliberating about whether to believe p '. This author explains the agent's 'engagement in the process of deliberating about whether to believe p ' in terms of judgements, considering judgement a type of mental action. And "a mental event must constitutively involve a trying" (Toribio, 2013, 85). So when the agent considers 'whether to believe p ', she is judging, and as a result, she is trying to successfully obtain whether p is true or not. Obviously, she may fail in doing so, but as she takes herself "to be bringing about a successful instance of a judgement, and a successful instance of a judgement is a judgement that is true" (Toribio, 2013, 85), she is only moved by considerations pertaining to the truth of p . In short, considering the explanation of belief and its properties in terms of the processes it entails on the agent -and not in terms of final product or outcomes- demonstrates that premise (3) is false:

So, were the teleologist to consider belief to be acceptance weakly regulated for truth, appeal to the properties of the practice of doxastic deliberation -as a practice that constitutively involves judging as the type of mental action- would allow him to account for transparency as a necessary property of such practice -premise (1) in the master argument. Hence premise (3) is false (Toribio, 2013, 85).

Third, premise (4) establishes that strong truth-regulation does not consider many defective beliefs to be beliefs at all. Many propositional attitudes usually covered under the category of 'belief' would be out of this strong truth-regulation. As a solution, the aim or function of belief -truth- can be characterized in historical terms. In other words, sometime in the past a belief p aimed at truth and even if p currently does not aim at truth, its 'reproduction' is caused by historical motives. More generally, for the teleologist beliefs are states formed through mechanism like evolution or training that have been designed to track the truth, but this does not entail that these mechanisms always work as they are supposed to do. So, for teleological accounts, premise (4) is false:

Automatically formed defective beliefs would thus still count as beliefs on the strong reading of the truth-regulation endorsed by the teleologist, since their proper function remains to represent only the truth even if, *qua* defective beliefs, they fail to perform such a function (Toribio, 2013, 86).

Fourth and finally, premise (5) establishes that strong truth-regulation fails to explain that doxastic deliberation exhibits transparency (1). The normativist assumes that strong truth-regulation entails two different mental states: “a first-order state of discerning whether p is true and a second-order state of [explicitly] accepting p only if p is true” (Toribio, 2013, 87). But in that way, strong truth-regulation cannot explain doxastic deliberation in transparency as an immediate phenomenon: doxastic deliberation must be explicit. Toribio (2013) argues that the explicitness argued by normativists is not necessary:

no theory of concept possession requires that there be an explicit, i.e., conscious recognition of the metaphysical make-up of the concept deployed. So even if belief, characterized as *S*'s acceptance of *p* with the aim accepting *p* only if *p* is true, involved a second-order state, and the formation of such a second-order state were mediated by a causal process, *S* need not be aware of this underlying causal process in deploying the concept of belief (...) The teleologist can explain that *S*'s awareness of the exclusive authority of truth over her processes of belief formation through doxastic deliberation is thus *immediate*, although it may not be *unmediated*, because the formation of the second-order state in which *S*'s belief consists would be *mediated* by causal processes of which *S* is unaware (Toribio, 2013, 87).

4.3. ACCOMMODATING TRUTH AND OTHER VALUES

Another option to accommodate a doxastic value of belief to other non-doxastic values is to consider that truth is valuable for other reasons like moral, personal or aesthetic ones (Papineau, 2013)¹¹⁰. A reduced notion of truth is still there but it does not suppose any doxastic normativity.

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Hugo believes that he sees a pig and the truth of his belief is valuable for personal reasons: maybe he is hungry and lost in the forest and in that way he can hunt the pig, or he loves pigs and in that way he can touch it and play with it, or he is scared of pigs and in that way he can run away. But truth is not valuable itself, there are not any *sui generis* doxastic reasons when developing beliefs.

However, it can be argued that it is not always wrong to believe the falsity due to

¹¹⁰ Papineau (2013) explains the link between beliefs and truth in terms of values, and those values rely on biological design: "I am happy to agree that belief 'aims at the truth' in a way other attitudes do not. But I would explain this in terms of biological design rather than norms" (Papineau, 2013, 73) (see section 5.2.2). This biological design explains the 'established practice of pursuing the truth that human societies have' (Papineau, 2013, 76).

moral, personal or aesthetic values: truth does not always relate to these values. Papineau (2013) establishes that there are two possible ways of facing the objection without adopting a normative position: to insist that it is always valuable for moral, personal or aesthetic reasons to believe the truth, or to deny that it is always wrong to believe falsely (67). Papineau (2013) defends the latter option. Let's consider the following case:

(The hated terrorist son case B) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

In this case, it is harder to establish that truth is valuable for moral, personal or aesthetic reasons. It seems more plausible to consider that it is not wrong for Kate to hold that her son is innocent. In fact, it can be defended that her false belief has a positive value.

In general, the attempt to accommodate truth to other underlying values is confusing: sometimes truth is not valuable in terms of personal, moral or aesthetic reasons. Normativists reply that it is necessary to consider a doxastic norm in belief formation and then to value it: that is, there are prior doxastic norms which constitute beliefs.

4.4. BELIEF AIMS AT PRACTICAL REASONS FOR ACTION¹¹¹

111 This approach -specially defended by Whiting's (2014)- is very suggesting in order to analyse pluralistic ignorance phenomena. In these phenomena, (i) every agent believes p , (ii) every agent believes that the rest of agents believe $\neg p$, (iii) every agent finally acts as if $\neg p$, and (iv) all the agents take the actions of the rest of agents as evidential reasons for (ii). So, in pluralistic ignorance phenomena, initial agents' beliefs seem to provide no practical reasoning to act: actually, the final action faces the initial belief (i) but at the same time the action can be explained in terms of the believe developed in (ii). I delve into this interesting issue in chapter 6.

Daniel Whiting (2014) accommodates epistemic and pragmatic positions making a difference between beliefs as states of believers and the final actions developed by agents. He considers that the need of practical reasoning to act is what motivate beliefs to aim at truth, because truth provides practical reasons for further action¹¹². Let's consider the following cases:

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

(The teacher case) Tom is at class of Physics. His teacher tells him and the rest of pupils that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe. So he believes that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe.

It may be argued that Hugo develops his belief that there he sees a pig because that belief is useful for further action. Maybe Hugo is hungry and in that way he can hunt the pig or he is scared of pigs and believing that there is once in front of him allows him to run away. In these terms, Tom's belief also promotes further action: believing that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe is useful in order to pass the Physics' exam.

Instead of considering epistemic and pragmatic approaches to belief to be tackled, Whiting (2014) considers that epistemic approaches to belief are included into the pragmatic approaches that explain final action. Agents aim to act in terms of practical reasons to get practical results -Whiting (2014) says that this aim is

112 Glüer and Wikforss (2013) seems to state something similar, refusing normative accounts of belief but admitting a norm-guidance that motivates actions: "There is no general no-guidance problem for objective norms as 'Buy low and sell high' or 'One ought to always promote maximum happiness'. Naturally, such norms can serve to motivate actions only in conjunction with certain beliefs on the part of the agent, but in these cases this fact does not pose any difficulties: I believe that the market is at a low and hence the rule provides me with a reason to buy; I believe that action A would promote maximum happiness and hence the rule provides me with a reason to do A" (84; see also section 4.1).

“*constitutive of agency*” (226)-, and that is what motivates believers to aim at truth, because truth is a practical reason to act¹¹³. Belief aiming at truth is not at odds with practical considerations, but rather is determined by them through final agent's action. In fact, the 'may' norm of belief -defended by Whiting (2010), see section 3.5- does not enhance agents to form beliefs as it would be better for agents not to develop any belief in order to avoid false beliefs. As a reply to this, Whiting (2014) considers that final practical actions enhance belief formation and such beliefs are regulated by the 'may' norm.

Thus, Whiting defends a link between beliefs and actions: belief aims at truth, and the truth generated by the belief is a practical reason for the agent's action. Beliefs are states that provide reasons for action. So the believer aims at truth and this provides her with practical reasons to act. Furthermore, if the belief aims at truth the believer needs evidence to form the belief. In this sense, Whiting (2014) is also committed to evidentialism (see section 1.3)¹¹⁴.

This implies that Whiting refuses a pure pragmatic approach -something like 'belief aims at pragmatic outcomes' without the mediation of truth. The believer does not believe what makes her feel comfortable and happy, but she just believes what provides her with reasons and guidance to act in terms of practical outcomes and she forms her belief due to evidence. Whiting (2014) illustrates his ideas with the following case:

(*The Haley Wenders film case*) Suppose that Haley is deciding

113 “Given the assumption that, when one acts, one acts on one's beliefs, this aim generates or incorporates the aim to believe only what is a practical reason, which in turn generates or incorporates the aim to believe only what is true” (Whiting, 2014, 227).

114 “A subject takes something to be a reason for believing that *p* only if it provides evidence that *p*, because only evidence that *p* indicates that, were she to believe that *p*, she would satisfy her aim to believe that *p* only if that *p* is a practical reason” (Whiting, 2014, 225).

whether to go to the cinema. She believes that a new Wenders film is showing. But that believing this makes her happy does not show that what she believes has any real consequences for the decision facing her. Alternatively, believing that a new Wenders film is showing on the grounds that it would make her happy to do so is not a way of pursuing the aim to believe only what is a practical reason. Given that aim, Haley cannot take practical considerations to favour or justify believing.

In contrast, suppose that Haley has read the current film-listing, according to which a new Wenders film is showing. This indicates that she would not conflict with the aim of believing only what is a practical reason if she were to believe that a new Wenders film is showing. If Haley forms this belief, that the film-listings [evidence] state that a new Wenders film is showing indicates that what she believes has real consequences for deciding whether to go to the cinema (225).

For some authors (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 114), this approach supposes that beliefs are not ultimately explained by norms of truth, but by pragmatic reasons for final action, so norms of belief are deflated to action:

if belief is necessary for action, and action is necessary for the satisfaction of desires, then you have to form some beliefs as opposed to forming no beliefs at all. But this is a pragmatic reasons for belief -it is not explained by [the permission norm 2 (see section 3.5)], nor any other truth-related consideration, but by your desires. If this further pragmatic reason is required to explain why should proportion your beliefs to the evidence, the [the permission norm 2] is not explanatorily fundamental (...)

Pragmatic reasons for belief are on a par with evidential reasons, since neither stem from the fundamental truth-norm, but from the need to form beliefs for the sake of action (114).

Whiting (2014) faces five different objections to his approach. The first one relates to this criticism: he explains how the practical aim of action can motivate the epistemic aim of belief. He considers that the concept of belief itself involves that agents act and decide on the basis of what they believe, and agents do not need to appreciate the fact that they act on what they believe. Using Whiting's (2014) terminology, that beliefs aim at truth because truth supposes practical reasoning for actions is not only something *de dicto* but also *de re* (229-30).

Whiting (2014) also considers that the fact that practical aims of action are constitutive of agency can be controversial. He specifies that agents aim to act on practical reasoning and shows how different approaches to the aim of action can accommodate to this view: actions aim at the good, at desire-satisfaction, at a point, at knowledge of what one is doing (Whiting, 2014, 230).

Another possible reply is that the specific view of practical reasoning considered is controversial. More accurately, the assumption that the premises of practical reasoning are provided by the subject's beliefs is controversial. Whiting (2014) replies that belief aims at truth, and this fact gives the agent practical reasoning to act. But he admits that there can be more practical reasoning that is not supplied by beliefs¹¹⁵. For instance, sometimes desires also constitute practical reasoning for further action (see below in this section).

It can be objected that there are beliefs based on evidences that play no role in practical reasoning. In other words, it can be replied that truth does not constitute always a practical reason for action or thought. Let's consider the following case:

(The hated terrorist son case A) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Whiting (2014) takes it difficult to think about beliefs on which agents will not act on or reason in any way from. All beliefs provide practical reasoning to agents. In other words, truths given by beliefs always work as practical reasons for actions or thoughts, even if it is difficult to envisage how a particular belief can provide practical reasoning for action or thought, like in *the hated terrorist son case A*. For these cases,

¹¹⁵ "I claim that belief aims to provide only premises fit for practical reasoning, not that it aims to provide all such premises" (Whiting, 2014, 231).

Whiting (2014) considers a holism about beliefs: even if a given belief seems to provide no practical reason to act or to reason, this belief stands in systematic links with other beliefs. In other words, an apparent useless or bad belief influences many other beliefs. A belief that does not present any practical potential nor theoretical significance for latter action would be the exception, not the rule. In Whiting's (2014) words:

the case which causes problems for my account would be one in which a subject has a certain attitude which she takes to play no role in guiding her action or thought, to be inferentially isolated from any other beliefs on the basis of which she might act, and to play no part in her cognitive in practical life. Viewed in this manner, the attitude does not really look like one of *belief*, properly so called (233).

Finally, Whiting (2014) argues that beliefs aim at truth -being truth practical reasoning for action-, and not directly to practical reasoning -regardless of its truth or falsity- because beliefs are based on evidences. Sometimes, practical reasoning for an action can be different from the practical reasoning given by the belief. Whiting (2014) gives the following case:

(The earning money case) Suppose that one knows that if one were to believe that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money (...) since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing (220).

Whiting (2014) argues that the aim of belief is to provide epistemic reasons *from the available evidence* for acting and reasoning. In cases like *the earning money case*, the truth given by the belief is different from the apparent practical reasoning for action based on no-evidence. Truth constitutes practical reasoning for action, but it is not the only practical reasoning actions may have. Agents may act in terms of their desires. And

beliefs aim at truth as they are based on evidence.

In short, Whiting's (2014) way of accommodating pragmatic and epistemic perspectives relies on (i) making a difference between beliefs as states and the final actions, (ii) considering truth as practical reasoning for actions and (iii) a commitment to evidentialism. Let's consider the following case:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

According to Whiting's (2014) ideas, Paul needs some evidence to develop his belief that Olga loves him too. This belief is false but Paul takes it to be true because of this evidence. And that provides a practical reason that guides his action or thought: it can be argued that even if Paul's belief is false it encourages him. The evidence is likely to be poor. For instance, maybe Paul saw Olga touching her hair the last time she saw him. But it exists. On the contrary, a non-evidentialist philosopher would say that Paul do not need any evidence to develop his belief.

Another possible reply is that Paul's state is not a belief but a desire -or some other state like *schmelief* (see section 2.7): as Paul has no evidence, the requited love is a desire and not a proper belief. There is not any belief on the requited love but just a desire to have this requited love. And this desire can also constitute practical reasoning for further action. Nevertheless, I consider that the state of Paul not only is a desire but also a belief: a false belief but a belief, and to some extent it is also a useful belief.

4.5. BELIEF AIMS AT A DOXASTIC REGULATION OF EMOTIONS

For Owens (2013) 'beliefs aim at truth' means that beliefs are under a norm of truth and thereby beliefs and knowledge regulate agents' emotions. He accepts the distinction between the 'psychological role of belief' that deals with causes and effects of belief, and the 'normative role of belief' that specifies how beliefs should be formed and how agents should feel and act once beliefs are formed, and finally he tries to integrate both the psychological and the normative roles of belief under a common value and function of knowledge: the regulation of agents' emotions.

My hypothesis is that knowledge is valuable for its own sake because knowledge serves a normative interest, namely our interest in being subject to certain norm of emotional aptness (Owens, 2013, 52).

Owens (2013) refuses correctness in terms of truth (see section 3.2) as the final value and function of belief¹¹⁶. Other states like guesses (see section 2.2; also Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 106-7, and Owens, 2003) also comply with this possible norm, so it fails to capture the constitutive normativity of belief. In order to solve this problem a stronger concept of belief based on knowledge may be proposed (see section 2.1):

Believe that *p* only if your belief would constitute knowledge of *p* (Owens, 2013, 40).

Knowledge may apply to belief and it cannot apply to guess. Furthermore, belief implies a plausible value: it is better to know rather than to ignore. But knowledge

116 It should be noted that correctness does not require the agent to develop beliefs: only once beliefs are formed correctness would regulate them, and the agent can conform to correctness developing no beliefs (see section 3.2 and section 3.4).

presents a problem: knowledge is specified by reference to the satisfaction of epistemic norms and the authority of these epistemic norms relies in the value of knowledge. And more needs to be said rather than “agents value truth over falsity” (Owens, 2013, 41). In others words, why is it better to know than to ignore? Why is knowledge better than ignorance?¹¹⁷ Cases like *the hated terrorist son B one* or the *love one* (see below) may contradict this value.

A possible underlying value is the pragmatic one: true -or knowledge- is valuable because it allows practical actions or successful agency (see section 4.4), “[s]o we should add that the function of belief is to constitute knowledge of the truth and the value of knowledge is to be found in its role in motivating action” (Owens, 2013, 42). Owens (2013) defines the 'pragmatic principle' in this way:

(Pragmatic principle) We are entitled to believe that p if and only if we are entitled to act as if p is true (or take p as a reason for action) (42)

This approach solve the previous problem about other states or propositional attitudes that have truth as an aim: guesses aim at truth but they do not have the underlying value of motivating successful agency, so this pragmatic approach based on action makes a difference between beliefs and guesses. When forming a belief, the believer cannot track all the available evidence, but the agent takes her evidence to be enough for her belief when she considers that it ensures successful agency. But this account also presents some problems: it is not clear that agency is successful if the agent acts as if p only because the agent knows p . Owens (2013) offers some examples,

117 “We can't explain the content of our epistemic norms simply by setting up truth or knowledge as a goal; we can't say that the point, purpose or function of belief is just to represent things as they are. To discover what is distinctive about belief, we must ask why people form *beliefs*, why they should want to get at the truth in this *particular way*” (Owens, 2013, 41).

focusing specially on *the parked car case*:

(The parked car case) I have parked my car on the street outside taking the amount of care a reasonably conscientious citizen would to park legally. When I enter the house, my partner informs me that the police have been towing cars on the street this week. Before being told this, I took myself to know that my car was parked legally, that is, I took myself to have evidence sufficient to justify my believing this. And, we may suppose, I did know. But hearing my partner's words, I reluctantly go out and recheck the position of my car and the relevant parking notices. Is this an implicit admission that I no longer know that my car is legally parked (at least until I have completed the checks) because my belief is no longer justified? (44)

Knowledge is such a strong concept that it does not rationally allow for doubting about the proposition taken as known. Owens (2013) do not consider that the partner's information entertained doubts on the agent, because “[e]ven a slight doubt about a crucial matter can be deeply disturbing” (4) and that is not the case. In other words, the agent *fully* considers that she *knows* that her car is legally parked. Sentences like 'I know that *p* though I am not absolutely sure or I might be wrong' do not make sense¹¹⁸. As a solution, pragmatism may change its principle about belief and action into the following 'default pragmatism principle':

(Default pragmatism principle) To be entitled to believe that *p* is to be entitled to use *p* as a default assumption in one's practical reasoning (Owens, 2013, 45).

This reformulation accommodates cases like *the parked car* one. Nevertheless, for Owens (2013) it is not enough as it does not make a difference between belief and acceptances, assumptions or assertions (see section 2.3):

118 A similar criticism is shown by Turp (2013): “Thus, we might be inclined to say that a glance is sufficient to know that I have tied a knot securely if I am tying a parcel, but not if I am a surgeon tying an artery. In fact, from an epistemic perspective -the appropriate perspective from which to judge knowledge claims- one has an equal claim to knowledge in both cases (assuming that a glance is an equally reliable method) (101).

(*The lawyer case*) A lawyer believes that her client is guilty. And she believes so no matter the context: with her partner, her friends and even during the trial. She does it automatically and involuntarily. Nevertheless, during the trial she may assert, accept and assume that her client is innocent in order to obtain the best possible verdict.

The lawyer may have not views about her client's innocence and she even may accept, assume and assert that her client is guilty being with her husband and friends. But she is entitled to accept, assume and assert her client's innocence during trial: to be entitled to accept, assume and assert that her client is innocent is to consider that her client is innocent as a *default* acceptance, assumption or assertion in one's practical reasoning during the trial. Default pragmatism does not make a difference between beliefs and other propositional attitudes like acceptances, assertions and assumptions. Also, taking profit of the concept *default* forces to establish the contexts and situations in which it is practical and successful to give that concept away. Owens (2013) also alarms that default pragmatism opens the door to abandoning any kind of conviction (46).

As a reply to the previous epistemic and pragmatic approaches, Owens (2013) considers that beliefs are under a norm of truth because that helps the agent to regulate her emotions¹¹⁹. In that way, emotions like “regret, resentment, horror, disgust, fury, sorrow, embarrassment, disappointment, shame (...) delight, gratitude, pleasure and pride” (Owens, 2013, 47) are doxastic: they are activated or deactivated once the agent knows its verisimilitude. Other emotions like hope or fear are not doxastic: an agent is hopeful or fearful only when she does not know the final result of the issue to which she is hopeful or fearful.

So agents generally “want to know whether p in order to fix [their] emotional

119 “[T]he function of belief is to regulate our emotional life rather than our agency” (Owens, 2013, 47).

bearings, to avoid having [their] feelings baffled by ignorance. In eliminating uncertainty we learn how to feel, not just how to act” (Owens, 2013, 48). Sometimes agents prefer to stick with non-doxastic emotions -hope, fear- but very often agents prefer to know the truth in order to fix their emotional bearings.

Let's apply Owens (2013) analysis to *the love case*:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

Considering the knowledge final value on beliefs -belief that p only if your belief would constitute knowledge of p (Owens, 2013, 40)- , Paul has to believe that Olga does not love him: it is better to know rather than to ignore, so it is better for Paul to believe that there is no requited love rather than to ignore so. But why? Actually believing that Olga loves him may supply Paul of emotional fitness and if Paul is going through a tough time, it would be better for him to believe the falsity -at least at the very first moment.

Considering the pragmatic final value on true beliefs -to be entitled to believe that p is to be entitled to use p as a default assumption in one's practical reasoning (Owens, 2013, 45)-, Paul has to act believing that Olga does not love him but at the same time the consequences of doing so can be harmful. Furthermore, this approach faces the problems presented above: sometimes knowledge may be not enough for promoting successful agency and the formulation of the pragmatic final value is not exclusive for beliefs.

Finally, the account defended by Owens (2013) based on emotional regulation

defends that it is good for Paul to know that Olga does not love him in order to regulate his emotions. Nevertheless, knowing that there is not any required love can be harmful for Paul, at least at the very first moment. So it is not clear how the emotional regulation given by true beliefs account can accommodate cases of wishful thinking (see section 2.5)¹²⁰. Owens (2013) replies that the value of emotional fitness is not the experience of the agent but the ability to react and to engage emotionally to both good and bad issues. As a result, ignorance is more painful than knowledge¹²¹. In this manner, norms of belief and knowledge -the normative state- are conformed by agents because of the underlying value of emotional regulation -the psychological state. I consider that this conclusion hardly applies to some cases like *the hated terrorist son case B*.

Finally, Owens (2013) replies to some possible objections. First, it can be asked why to focus on knowledge and its value -emotional regulation- and not just on beliefs with the same value of emotional regulation. Owens (2013) recognizes so but he considers that it is better to focus on the stronger concept of knowledge -against ignorance- rather than on beliefs -against agnosticism (53)¹²² (see section 2.1).

Second, there can be beliefs that aim at truth and knowledge that supply no emotional regulation or practical outcome. For instance, an agent can hear on TV that now it is raining in Tokyo and that knowledge does not change her emotions or encourages her to act in any particular way -the agent is not going to travel to Japan and she has no relatives or friends in Japan. Owens (2013) admits this fact but he defends it

120 Owens (2013) is aware of this. He describes the problem with another case: “My friend dies and I am devastated. Clearly I must register this misfortune in my plans: no point going to see her if she won't be there. But wouldn't a quite inappropriate emotional indifference be better, at least better for me? Won't my remaining friends feel more sorry for me should I *feel* my loss and less sorry were I indifferent to it?” (50).

121 “It makes sense to want to know whether you were admired or despised by your long dead brother, whether you are soon going to die yourself and so forth, even if there is little you can or would wish to do about it” (Owens, 2013, 51).

122 “[I]t may be still the case that one is better off knowing than merely believing and that this is so even when one's belief is true and entirely justified” (Owens, 2013, 53).

is not against the general idea that the function of belief is to regulate the emotional life of the believer¹²³: “our functional explanation of those norms [of belief] is in no way undermined by the fact that beliefs are frequently (perhaps even more frequently) formed for some reason quite unrelated to belief's function” (Owens, 2013, 53). Belief is always under doxastic norms, but the value underlying those norms -emotional fitness of the agent- need not necessarily determine the belief formation processes.

Third, wishful thinking cases like *the love case* (see section 2.5) seem to face the epistemic norms of knowledge and belief and the underlying emotional values. Why to follow the epistemic norms of belief when the emotionally valuable sometimes is to avoid truth? As said before, for Owens (2013) the valuable is to get the truth. In cases like the wishful thinking ones, there is a confrontation between norms and values of belief and norms and values of action. For instance, it may be the case that believing the falsity is more practical and ensures a more successful agency than believing the truth. But, in these cases,

[T]he norms determining the rationality of beliefs are not in competition with those that determine the rationality of actions intended to induce belief and so a given value can make sense of the former without also making sense of the latter (Owens, 2013, 53).

Finally, Owens (2013) idea of belief under epistemic norms whose final value and function is to regulate the emotional lives of the believers can be accused of entailing a form of conventionalism about epistemic norms. The author assumes this criticism stating that:

123 “He need not argue that every single belief serves the function of Belief, only that beliefs as such (together with their characteristic norms) would not be a feature of human life unless at least some beliefs performed that function (...) a belief is subject to norms like Knowledge whether or not its subject matter has any emotional significance for us. But that fact is perfectly consistent with the idea that the function of Belief (and thus the source of the authority of its norms) lies in the contribution Belief makes to our emotional lives” (Owens, 2013, 53).

[i]t may well be that different cultures have different standards of evidential adequacy of belief, standards that regulate the mechanisms governing the formation of an individual's beliefs. And the resulting emotional psychologies may, in their different ways, be good for the people in question. Epistemic norms are, at least to this extent, a matter of convention (Owens, 2013, 55).

4.6. ASSERTIONS AND THEIR PRACTICAL REASONS

(The lawyer case) A lawyer believes that her client is guilty. And she believes so no matter the context: with her husband, her friends and even during the trial. She does it automatically and transparently. Nevertheless, during the trial she may assert that his client is innocent in order to obtain the best possible verdict.

I have sketched in section 2.3 the differences between belief on the one hand, and assertions, acceptances and assumptions, on the other hand. Basically, beliefs are passive, involuntary, context-independent and transparent (see section 1.1 and section 1.2), while acceptances, assumptions and assertions are not transparent, they depend on the context, they are active and voluntary. That is what *the lawyer case* shows.

These differences allows to introduce pragmatic reasons for acceptances, assertions and assumptions that are not found in beliefs (Cohen, 1989; Toribio, 2013, 82-3). The lawyer believes that her client is guilty, and she does so with her husband, with her friends and during the trial. But during the trial she will accept, assume and assert that her client is innocent in order to obtain the most positive outcome: that is her job.

However, some philosophers defend an epistemic norm on assertions. While beliefs are usually considered states or propositional attitudes, assertions are usually considered actions. And when a speaker makes an assertion, she as a speaker transmits some information to the listener. In doing so, the listener is likely to presuppose the

truth of that information and that the speaker is verbalizing her true beliefs. Assertions may be false for many reasons, as showed in *the lawyer case*, but agents have a predisposition to consider assertions to be true, at least at the very first moment. And assertions also present 'assertoric force'. As a result of these features of assertion, some philosophers establish that there is an epistemic norm while asserting. If that norm did not exist, assertions would not be valuable.

In words of Jennifer Lackey (2010), some authors consider “epistemic standard of appropriateness”¹²⁴ of actions. Assertions are a kind of action and it is generally admitted that more than only epistemic reasons motivate final actions (e.g. emotional reasons, other practical reasons, etc.). But the same time, these authors try to extract the 'epistemic part' present while asserting and then they try to derive a norm from it. Lackey (2010) calls this norm *the knowledge norm of practical reasoning* and formulate it as follows:

It is epistemically appropriate for one to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning (to act as if p , and to act on p) if and only if one knows that p (361-2).

The lawyer is violating this norm while asserting and acting as if her client were innocent during the trial, so the lawyer's assertions does not fit in 'the knowledge norm of practical reasoning' as it is not epistemically appropriate.

Lackey (2010) refuses this 'knowledge norm of practical reasoning'. For that, she takes the sufficiency claim -It is epistemically appropriate for one to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning if one knows that p - and shows some counterexamples based on what she calls 'isolated secondhand knowledge', that is, knowledge obtained

124 This expression is used by Jennifer Lackey (2010).

from other reliable person without any other direct evidence:

(The oncologist case) Eliza is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has been diagnosing various kinds of cancers for the past twenty years. One of her patients, Lucas, was recently referred to her office because he has been experiencing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. After requesting an ultrasound and MRI, the results of the test arrived on Eliza's day off; consequently, all of the relevant data were reviewed by Anna, a competent medical student in oncology training at her hospital. Being able to confer for only a very brief period of time prior to Lucas' appointment last week, Anna communicated Eliza simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her conclusion. On the basis of the reliable and trustworthy testimony that she accepted from Anna -combined with her background knowledge, that if a patient has pancreatic cancer, a highly aggressive combination of radiation and chemotherapy is the necessary course of action- Eliza decided to schedule this treatment for Lucas, which she began administering to him this morning (Lackey, 2010, 364)¹²⁵

This case shows that knowledge is not sufficient for the epistemic justification of actions and assertions. If Lucas asked for the characteristics and reasons of his diagnosis and treatment, Eliza would have little to say. And there are not any other epistemic reasons available for her action. Eliza knows that Lucas has pancreatic cancer but this knowledge does not imply that it is epistemically appropriate for Eliza to schedule treatment for Lucas. She knows the diagnosis but acting on the basis of this knowledge is incorrect. In short, even if we try to define a knowledge norm of practical reasoning for actions and assertions, that norm presents counterexamples: Eliza knows that Lucas has pancreatic cancer but it is not epistemically appropriate for Eliza to use the proposition that 'Lucas has pancreatic cancer' in practical reasoning (to act as if Lucas has pancreatic cancer, and to act on Lucas having pancreatic cancer).

It can be replied that Eliza did not really know Lucas' diagnosis. In that case, the

125 Lackey (2010) offers two other similar examples: the NASA Engineer studying Space Shuttle Challenger disintegration, and the English student nomination by two professors (364).

definition of knowledge would depend on justification in terms of social acceptances and personal inquiry, and it would not identify straightly with a 'reality reflection' in an external sense. The concept of knowledge would be epistemically deflated (see section 2.1).

The necessity claim of the 'knowledge norm of practical reasoning' (Lacky, 2010) -if it is epistemically appropriate for an agent to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning then the agent knows that p - also presents counterexamples.

(Navigation charts) Sailors have used navigation charts based on a geocentric model during centuries.

For sailors, it has been epistemically appropriate to consider that the Earth was flat and the centre of the Universe and to act as if it were, in order to understand navigation charts. But that does not imply that they knew that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. Again, this case may be replied with deflated concept of knowledge based on justification in terms of social acceptances and personal inquiries. In that case, it can be said that sailors *knew* that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. However, navigation charts have been used after the common acceptance that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe. Sailors indeed have known that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe but it has been epistemically appropriate for them to act as if it were. A possible answer from the promoters of the 'knowledge norm of practical reasoning' is that in this case other practical non-epistemic reasons appear when considering that the Earth is the centre of the Universe while using navigation charts: it is not epistemically appropriate to consider the Earth being the centre of the Universe, but it is still appropriate for other pragmatic reasons.

So far, the 'knowledge norm of practical reasoning' is too strong. But other

norms that reflect the epistemic nature of assertions might be defended. Particularly, the normative defence of assertions given by Goldberg (2015) seems suggesting. He establishes different features for assertions related to its epistemic significance (6-7). Assertions communicate some knowledge from the speakers to the listeners. Even if they are insincere, assertion's belief-worthiness arises in the first place, as it can be seen in *the lawyer case*. Assertions can be challenged by querying. And the speaker's represents herself as knowing or having evidence for what he states. Apart from these epistemic features, assertions present other related features (Goldberg, 2015, 8-9). Assertions generate responsibilities between speakers and listeners. Assertions manifest sincerely express one's belief, so they express what the speaker considers to be true. An agent may retract an assertion when she stops believing its content or when she loses her evidences. And assertions play a prominent role when interpreting languages. Given all these features, Goldberg (2015) defends a normative account of assertions and he gives the following definition of assertion:

Assertions are those speech acts in which a proposition is presented-as-true in such a way as to be presented as backed by that authority (34)

Goldberg analyses three other different accounts of assertions -the attitudinal account, the common ground account and the commitment account. Then he shows different approaches to establish 'a norm of assertions': the knowledge norm of assertion -one must assert that p , only if one knows p or only if it is reasonable for one to regard oneself as knowing that p - that has been criticized by Lackey (2010) as I have previously shown; the epistemic certainty norm of assertion -one must assert that p , only if one is (epistemically) certain that p ; the belief justification norm of assertion

-one must assert that p , only if one is justified in believing that p ¹²⁶; the rational belief norm of assertion -one must assert that p , only if one rationally believes p ; the belief norm of assertion -one must assert that p , only if one believes that p ; the truth norm of assertion -one must assert that p , only if it is true that p . And the norm proposed by Goldberg (2015): one must assert that p , only if one has the relevant epistemic authority with respect to p .

A constitutive norm of assertions forces the speakers to transmit some information as if it were true and force the listeners to consider it true at first. Coming back to *the lawyer case*, the lawyer makes use of assertions as they are supposed to transmit the truth and the judge considers what the lawyer says true at the very first moment. Then, the judge may change her mind due to, for instance, other evidence. The epistemic norm of assertions explains a presupposition of truth in them. In other words, the constitutive norm of assertions presuppose that the sentence asserted is what the speaker truly believes. The evaluative norm judges if the assertion is correct or incorrect. In *the lawyer case*, the evaluative epistemic norm says that the assertion is incorrect.

To sum up, assertions are not transparent nor automatic, and they are voluntary (see section 1.1 and section 2.3). They may incorporate non-epistemic features in a way that beliefs cannot. However, it might be admitted an epistemic norm in assertions, in the sense that agents at the very first moment consider assertions as truth vehicles reflecting what agents believe. But as beliefs are states or propositional attitudes and assertions are actions, the latter may accommodate pragmatic non-epistemic dimension better -or in a simpler way- than the former (see section 4.4). The constitutive norm of assertions -if considered- is weaker than the constitutive norm of beliefs.

126 According to Goldberg (2015), this is the norm defended by Jennifer Lackey.

4.7. REPLACEMENT OF BELIEFS BY ACCEPTANCES

Another pragmatic possibility is to enhance agents to replace beliefs by just acceptances. But both propositional attitudes clearly differ and they are used in different situations for different purposes. The latter are voluntary, mediated and context-dependent, while the former are not (see section 1.1 and section 2.3). This fact allows to easily introduce pragmatic criteria when developing acceptances. Acceptances aim at pragmatically conditioned empirical adequacy while beliefs aim at truth. As a result, the replacement of belief by a weaker attitude like acceptance allows the agent to consider pragmatic considerations in the development of her propositional attitudes and actions. But it is far from clear that such a substitution is possible and, if it is, many disadvantages may appear.

Unwin (2007) delves into this option -at the same time facing scepticism- and he proposes to replace belief by a weaker propositional attitude based on acceptance¹²⁷. For instance, the special theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are usually said to be incompatible, so any scientist *cannot believe* both of them¹²⁸. Scientists just *accept* theories depending on the context. It may be argued that acceptances are reducible to beliefs -an agent accepts p in a context C if and only if she shall believe that p is acceptable in C ¹²⁹- but Unwin (2007) refuses this argument and he prefers to treat acceptance as a distinctive propositional attitude.

127 “[T]here really is a kind of state which resembles belief sufficiently well to be able to replace it, but is nevertheless sufficiently different from it to enable us to avoid scepticism” (Unwin, 2007, 127).

128 People may believe contradictory things but not when they also believe that these things are contradictory.

129 For instance, Unwin (2007) analyses van Frassen's choice in these terms: to accept a theory T is to believe that T is empirically adequate. That is, to consider that a belief p is acceptable is to consider that a belief p is empirically adequate. Unwin (2007) criticizes that believing a theory T in this way implies that there cannot be observations and situations in which believing T is not empirically adequate. A possible solution is to abandon belief and to focus on acceptance: accepting a theory T is accepting that T is empirically adequate in some contexts.

Context-dependency (see section 1.1) makes a difference between acceptances and beliefs (see section 2.3), but it is not enough to explain the whole difference between both propositional attitudes. Imagine a new propositional attitude, *acceptance**, defined as follows (Unwin, 2007, 111):

(Acceptance)* An agent *S* accepts* *p* = An agent *S* accepts *p* in all contexts

An agent can accept* *p* -i.e. accept *p* in all contexts- and at the same time she may not believe *p*. Belief is subject to a doxastic pressure while acceptance* is not. Let's consider the following case:

(The hated terrorist son case A) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Kate intimately believes that her son is a hated terrorist, but she can accept the opposite in all the possible contexts -with her friends, during the trial, facing the media- in order to defend her son.

Beliefs are also said to be involuntary (see section 1.1) while acceptances are voluntary (see section 2.3). Unwin (2007) explores the possibility of involuntary acceptance and incorporates this feature to his new propositional attitude (Unwin, 2007, 117-30):

*(Acceptance**)* An agent *S* accepts** *p* = An agent *S* involuntarily accepts* *p* = An agent *S* involuntarily accepts *p* in all contexts.

For Unwin (2007) acceptances on the most basic perceptual phenomena are also

involuntary even if they do not aim at truth¹³⁰. The involuntariness of acceptance** is not in tension with acceptance.

Acceptance** is close to belief but it does not aim at truth. Unwin (2007) finally adds a universality restricted principle to his proposal in order to solve the deficiencies of giving away truth:

(Acceptance***) An agent *S* accepts*** *p* = An agent *S* accepts** *p* and may do so only if no-one else in *S*'s cognitive group ought to accept** not-*p* = An agent *S* involuntarily accepts *p* in all contexts and may do so only if no-one else in *S*'s cognitive group ought to involuntarily accept not-*p* in all contexts .

In short, Unwin's (2007) pragmatic revisionist account replaces belief by this new propositional attitude¹³¹ in agent's inquiries:

Our account points the way to a solution. Hume assumed that the only alternative to belief was scepticism of the wholly unrealistic Pyrrhonian type. Our view is that a kind of pragmatic acceptance which is non-contextual, involuntary, but not fully truth-aiming remains an adequate alternative (Unwin, 2007, 130).

Unwin (2007) also considers a weakened concept of belief that approximates to *acceptance****. These 'new belief' should aim at knowledge defined as adequately justified belief in what Unwin (2007) calls an ecological model (see section 2.1, and Unwin, 2007, 138-61). This knowledge need not to imply an external truth, and as a result, it is not necessary for belief to extensionally aim at an external neutral universal truth but just to intensionally aim to this contingent knowledge:

130 “[T]his cannot be for the sort of conceptual reasons that we considered earlier, for acceptance does not aim at truth. What we have, rather, is pure psychological compulsion” (Unwin, 2007, 127).

131 Our thesis is that the attitude-concept that we need do not yet exist, and cannot be accurately defined from existing concepts. Moreover, it will only be after a radical change in outlook that we can start to adopt the right attitudes. To ignore this is to ignore the highly revisionist character of our thesis (Unwin, 2007, 137).

Not only can we approach it [the new propositional attitude proposed] very closely from below (via non-contextual, involuntary acceptance) and from above (traditional belief, but with a restricted truth norm), we can also situate it via the ecological model of knowledge (Unwin, 2007, 161).

As contingencies determine our theories and beliefs, and as these theories and beliefs are fallible, this new propositional attitude accommodates the agent's cognitive system nature without falling into scepticism. Unwin (2007) argues that his new propositional attitude proposal can substitute the traditional concept of belief without the disadvantages of traditional belief replacement by mere traditional acceptance.

4.8. FROM DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM TO PRAGMATISM

Reisner (2013) argues that the doxastic aim of belief and the derivative norms of belief may accommodate both non-evidentialism and doxastic voluntarism (see section 1.3.2 for a further analysis of Reisner's ideas). He focuses on two cases or games:

(The numbers game with a single fixed point case) Alice is attached to a mind-reading machine with a screen. Alice is asked to predict what number will appear on the screen. She believes that n will appear. But the number that appears on the screen is $n/2 + 1$. In the case Alice has no beliefs about which number will appear, the number 16 appears.

(The numbers game with multiple fixed points case) The case is very similar to the single fixed point case. If $n > 0$, the formula is still $n/2 + 1$. But if $n < 0$, the formula is now $n/2 - 1$.

The fixed point in *the numbers game with a single fixed point* is 2 and the two fixed points in *the numbers game with multiple fixed points* are 2 and -2. Basically,

these games show that there are epistemic non-evidential reasons to believe¹³² -i.e. there are non-evidential reasons that motivate the belief to aim at truth- and that the agent may voluntarily choose between different true beliefs -this is shown only in *the multiple fixed points numbers case* where there are two true beliefs: 2 and -2.

Reisner (2013) describes these epistemic non-evidential reasons in terms of his 'normative knowledge' and 'reasons' principles:

(Normative knowledge principle) Fact f is a reason for agent a to believe b if f makes it the case that a knows that if a believes b , then a 's believing b will cause b to be true (175).

(Reasons principle) Under normal circumstances, agents involuntarily form beliefs in response to what they take to be their epistemic reasons (176).

Reisner (2013) sums up his analysis in the following account of voluntarism (see section 1.3.2):

Voluntarism: An agent can choose her belief just in case three conditions are met:

- (i) Evidence does not issue a relevant requirement (either for a belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgement).
- (ii) The agent knows that her having the belief will cause the belief to be true.
- (iii) *Normative knowledge* does not issue a reason for just a single belief (179).

From this doxastic voluntarism that is not at odds with the doxastic aim of belief or the derivative norms of belief, Reisner (2013) suggests that the believer can develop a pragmatic encroachment. In *the multiple fixed points numbers case*, there are two true beliefs: 2 and -2. Imagine that Alice will win a prize for believing that the true belief is -2 and she will not receive the prize if she believes that the true belief is 2. Then, there

132 I delve into the debate about the nature -evidential or not- of the reasons of these beliefs in section 1.3.2.

is a pragmatic reason to believe that the number on the screen will be -2.

Interestingly, this pragmatic encroachment does not suppose any doxastic cost: Alice continues believing a true belief (-2), so her belief is under the doxastic aim and the related epistemic norms. And the epistemic -but non-evidential- reasons are not omitted. In other words, for Reisner (2013) in cases where there are more than one true belief and the believer can choose which one to believe, then pragmatic reasons may come into play when forming and adopting beliefs, without undermining the epistemic -non-evidential- reasons to belief. From a non-evidentialist position, Reisner (2013) defends a possible voluntarism on beliefs when there are alternative true beliefs motivated by non-evidential reasons. And from this possible voluntarism, he defends a possible pragmatic encroachment in some beliefs.

4.9. ROBUST PRAGMATISM

Robust pragmatism is the thesis that (i) a pragmatic reason for a belief is always a genuine reason and (ii) the only genuine reasons for beliefs are pragmatic reasons (Rinard, 2015, 217-220). In other words:

(Robust pragmatism) C is a reason to believe p if and only if C is a pragmatic consideration in favour of believing p (Rinard, 2015, 218).

Rinard (2015) demonstrates (i) appealing to the fact that it is always useful to believe in terms of pragmatic reasons¹³³. About (ii), Rinard (2015) admits evidential

¹³³ “The first step is quite simple. The Pragmatist is already convinced that there are *some* cases in which purely pragmatic considerations constitute reasons for belief. For example, according to the Pragmatist, one has a good reason to believe that one will survive a potentially fatal illness simply in virtue of the fact that this belief is likely to make one’s life go better. But it would be ad hoc to hold this view about this case while denying that a pragmatic consideration in some other case constitutes

reasons may be reasons to believe. But this is so because in these cases pieces of evidence constitute pragmatic reasons to believe¹³⁴. Evidentialism is not at odds with pragmatism: many evidential reasons to believe are also pragmatic (see section 1.3)¹³⁵.

Rinard (2015) establishes that

[t]here are of course *some* metaphysically possible scenarios in which evidence for *p* would not constitute a pragmatic consideration in favour of believing *p*. Such cases are rarer than one might think, however. What we have to imagine is a case in which believing the truth with respect to *p* does not make it even a tad bit more likely that your life -or the lives of others- will go well (...) Insofar as I have intuitions about such cases, it seems to me that the verdict of Robust Pragmatism is exactly right. If it really is the case that true beliefs concerning *p* would not make it even the slightest bit more likely that my life, or that of others, will go well; and I am genuinely completely indifferent to whether or not I believe the truth with respect to *p*; then, in my view, evidence in favour of *p* does not give me any reason whatsoever to believe it (220).

Let's consider the following example:

(The hated terrorist son case A) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

Here it is not useful for Kate to believe that his son is a hated terrorist. It is actually very painful. Maybe in the long run this true belief may supply good outcomes in a pragmatic fashion (Haack, 1996, ϕ 10; Unwin, 2007, 178) but Kate has no 'long run'.

a genuine reason for belief. For example, it would be ad hoc for the Pragmatist to deny that the fact that my life will likely go better if I believe that I can jump over this stream is a reason to believe that I can. So the Pragmatist should also be a Partially Robust Pragmatist" (Rinard, 2015, 218).

134 "In most ordinary cases, evidence in favour of *p* constitutes a pragmatic reason to believe it. Typically, evidence that the store is closed now is a pragmatic consideration in favour of believing it, as one would (typically) be inconvenienced by having false beliefs about the store's house. Evidence that one's spouse has pneumonia is (typically) a pragmatic reason to believe it, as one will (ordinarily) be better suited to care for them if one has true beliefs about the nature of their illness" (Rinard, 2015, 219).

135 That is why I prefer to talk of evidential vs. non-evidential reasons to believe.

The possible pragmatic reasons for 'my son is innocent' belief do not work as genuine reasons for so believing. The genuine reason is 'the *evidence* that the son of Kate is a hated terrorist', and it is very difficult to see it as a pragmatic reason to believe, specially when Kate is terminally ill.

Rinard (2015) gives the following answer to these “metaphysical possible scenarios”: “the Robust Pragmatist can simply say that, although the agent does have evidence for *p*, this doesn't give her any reason whatsoever to believe it” (220)¹³⁶. Nevertheless, Kate develops her apparently useless belief that her son is guilty due to the available evidence.

Even if robust pragmatism hardly apply to some specific beliefs that seem not to be useful or that seem not to enhance practical action, Rinard (2015) is right when she argues that opposing evidentialism to pragmatism does no justice to both of them: many times, evidential reasons to believe are pragmatic reasons to believe. That is why I prefer to speak of evidential and non-evidential reasons to believe.

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¹³⁶ Whiting (2014) offers a different answer based on a holism about beliefs: even if beliefs seem not to be practical or to supply practical reasoning for further action, they are connected to other 'useful' beliefs (see section 4.4).

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5. CRITICISMS AND SIMILAR POSITIONS

I defend a doxastic constitutive feature of belief that is not based on the final result of belief -its truth or falsity- but on the attitude of the believer while believing: a believer, when believing, considers what she believes to be true (see section 2.9). This idea is already present in different authors (see section 5.2 and its subsections below) and in this dissertation I state it in a more analytic fashion (see section 3.10). Such statement is what I sometimes call “my proposal”,

for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true (see section 3.10).

This analytical definition supposes the following implications:

- (i) If S believes p , then S considers p to be true
- (ii) If S considers p to be true, then S believes p .
- (iii) If S does not believe p , it is not the case that S considers p to be true¹³⁷.
- (iv) If it is not the case that S considers p to be true, then S does not believe p .
- (iv) If S believes $\neg p$, then S considers $\neg p$ to be true.
- (iv') If S believes $\neg p$, then S considers p to be false.
- (v) If S considers $\neg p$ to be true, then S believes $\neg p$.
- (v') If S considers p to be false, then S believes $\neg p$.
- (vi) If S does not believe $\neg p$, it is not the case that S considers $\neg p$ to be true.
- (vi') If S does not believe $\neg p$, it is not the case that S considers p to be false.
- (vii) If it is not the case that S considers $\neg p$ to be true, then S doesn't believe $\neg p$.
- (vii') If it is not the case that S considers p to be false, then S

¹³⁷ The conditional 'If S does not believe p ' should not be confused with 'If S believe $\neg p$ '. The former implies that 'it is not the case that S considers p to be true' (iii), while the latter implies that ' S considers p to be false' (iv').

doesn't believe $\neg p$.

I defend that this is what 'belief aiming at truth' means. Actually, it defines belief and it differentiates belief from the rest of propositional attitudes¹³⁸. This doxastic constitutive feature accommodates false beliefs that are correct in terms of non-epistemic standards of correctness. In fact, it accommodates all the cases I have shown that are commonly labelled as beliefs (see annex A).

In this chapter I show the possible criticism to this proposal and I relate this approach to similar accounts of belief defended by other authors. The main objection will appear if I take my proposal to be a norm. Some authors would state that my proposal is not a proper norm as it does not guide nor prescribe. That is what I introduce in section 5.1. Among these authors, Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) develop further this criticism (see section 5.1.1).

In section 5.2 I relate my proposal to other authors' ideas. In section 5.2.1 I relate it to Engel's (2013a) psychological regulation of beliefs via transparency. In this section I also show that my proposal also saves Steglich-Petersen (2013) criticism to the traditional notion of transparency. In section 5.2.2 I deal with Papineau's (2013) account of the doxastic aim of belief in terms of underlying non-doxastic values and I show which similarities and differences there are between his account and my proposal. In section 5.2.3 I focus on Wedgwood's (2013) refusal to 'believers considering their beliefs to be false', arguing that this idea may be understood as a consequence of my proposal. In section 5.2.4 I dig deeper into the functionalist account proposed by Glüer

138 It may be argued that the doxastic constitutive link may be applied to other propositional attitudes, specially to *supposition*: for an agent S and a proposition p , S supposes p if and only if S considers p to be true. But this is false, as the epistemic commitment the agent has when supposing is weaker than the epistemic commitment the agent has when believing. For that reason, a more accurate description of supposition is the following: for an agent S and a proposition p , S supposes p if and only if S considers that p is likely to be true.

and Wikforss (2013a) and I show how these authors assume a basic constitutive relationship between belief and truth in order to explain further action and behaviour on the agent -for that, they analyse the concept of 'alief'. In section 5.2.5 I refer to the difference between 'the intensional truth norm' and 'the extensional truth norm' exposed by Unwin (2007). This author defends the former, he considers that it is the believer's attitude and not the belief's content what is important in order to understand belief. In other words, Unwin (2007) focuses on 'aiming at truth' and not only on 'truth' to understand belief.

Finally, in section 5.3 I sum up the similarities between other authors' accounts and my proposal in terms of the analytic formulation I have established: for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

5.1. A POSSIBLE OBJECTION: A CONSTITUTIVE NON-EVALUATIVE NORM IS NOT A NORM

The proposed link between belief and truth may be treated as a norm of belief. However, this norm may be subject to criticism. It can be thought as a constitutive norm that defines belief, but it presents no normative force nor motivating power as it is not prescriptive (see section 4.1; also Engel, 2013a). An evaluative norm judges if a particular belief is true or false, but the proposed constitutive feature only judges if a particular propositional attitude is a belief or not. And it is difficult -or even impossible- to imagine an agent that has a belief aiming at the falsity in this sense -i.e. a belief whose bearer considers to be false. The doxastic constitutive feature of belief I defend describes how beliefs act on agents, but it does not establish a proper standard of correctness and it does not guide the believer. Glüer and Wikforss defend that a genuine

norm must be prescriptive, it must guide agents and the norm proposed does not (see section 4.1 and section 5.1.1).

In a similar vein, Railton (2000) establishes that a norm must present normative freedom: agents may be able to violate norms. But the violation of the constitutive feature of belief I propose -i.e. agents consider their beliefs to be false- supposes that the state would not count as a belief. In other words, if the believer considers false what she believes then her state is not a proper belief.

I admit that the fundamental link between belief and truth I propose is constitutive. It does not tell if a belief is right or wrong in terms of any epistemic standard of correctness, but it establishes if propositional attitudes are beliefs or not. This link may not guide believers when forming beliefs¹³⁹ but it establishes the minimal feature of belief: the believer must consider her belief to be true. If this basic relationship between belief and truth based on the believer's attitude can be treated as a norm is far from my purposes. For that reason I treat it as a constitutive relationship or link between belief and truth and I do not use the concept 'norm'. However, I do not deny another external sources of normativity: as the believer considers her beliefs to be true, she may want her beliefs to be true, so these beliefs can be judged in terms of epistemic standards of correctness. If the belief that the believer considers true is really true, then it is correct. If the belief that the believer considers true turns out to be false, then it is incorrect. But this evaluative normativity of belief is far from my primary purposes.

This is so because I want to analyse the common features of all beliefs, and from that, I want to sketch how pragmatism may accommodate to doxastic accounts of

139 Note that beliefs are transparent and when believers develop them, they do it automatically and involuntarily (see section 1.1 and section 1.2)

beliefs. For that, I establish a doxastic constitutive feature of belief that defines what all beliefs have in common -the believers consider their beliefs to be true- and I do not focus on beliefs specific results and evaluations. After all, history is plenty of examples of beliefs socially evaluated as false that 'apparently' turned out to be true, and of beliefs socially evaluated as true that turned out to be false¹⁴⁰. Some false beliefs are useful and some true beliefs are painful. But all of them have a common feature: their bearers consider them to be true.

5.1.1. THE NO-GUIDANCE ARGUMENT APPLIED TO MY PROPOSAL

Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) criticize normative approaches to belief considering the *no-guidance* argument: “no truth norm can make any difference to belief formation. Consequently, it is at odds with the very basics of any intuitive idea of rule-guidance” (83). Norms guide and the guidance supposes a motivation on agents. Considering the norms proposed for beliefs, the believer can develop their beliefs in accordance with these norms, but she is not guided nor prescribed by these norms. I thoroughly analysed this argument against normative accounts of belief in section 4.1, but as it is really suggesting and it can be applied to my doxastic link proposal of beliefs if such link is taken to be a norm, I refer to it again in this section having in mind such proposal: for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true (see section 3.10).

More specifically, Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) argue that if a norm of truth is considered, the believer must be guided by this norm, so when developing her belief,

140 Like in the *geocentric model case*: Most people believed during hundreds of years that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme in different ages believed the opposite. Their ideas were not accepted.

first she must evaluate it in terms of the norm. But that is not the way beliefs work: first the agent develops her belief and latter she may evaluate if the belief content accommodates the norm¹⁴¹. Let's consider the following case:

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

For normativists, Hugo firstly must evaluate his belief in terms of the considered truth norm. But this is not the way things really go: first, Hugo develops his beliefs without the guidance of any norm -maybe he does it just in accordance with a norm but the norm does not prescribe the initial belief. Only once Hugo has developed his belief, then he can evaluate if its content accommodates the considered norm. This position resembles Engel's (2013b) one when criticizing doxastic relativism and teleologism (see section 4.2.1):

The truth norm does not require us to form a given belief or not to form it. It only requires that *once we deliberate about what to believe, the answer is expected to be true (...)* it is easy to make the confusion between *belief aiming at truth* (or being normed by truth) and *aiming at having true beliefs* (29).

Another strategy for the normativist would be to consider norms of rationality. Normativists consider that these norms guide the believer in the belief formation process: “what is correct according to the norms of rationality is not the true, but the rational” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 89). Two of these norms are the following:

- (i) One ought to believe that p if and only if one has sufficient evidence that p .
- (ii) If one believes that p and believes that if p then q , then one

141 These authors also show this fact in their distinction between 'belief normativity' and 'content normativity' (see section 4.1).

ought to believe that q (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 81).

Both norms are norms of rationality. The norm (i) is an inferential norm of evidence and the norm (ii) is an inferential norm of valid logic. Nevertheless, these norms based on the subjects' attitudes during the formation of beliefs do not guide beliefs directly: believers may develop their beliefs according to norms of rationality, but they are not guided nor prescribed by them. First the belief appears, then the believer can evaluate it in terms of rationality or truth norms. Furthermore, truth is not always rational. It is possible to have rational false beliefs and irrational true beliefs, so it is possible to have correct and incorrect beliefs depending on the considered norm¹⁴².

In short, Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) refuse normative approaches to beliefs because beliefs are not guided nor prescribed by any norm, regardless of the norm being based on objective features -the truth norm- or the norm being based on subjective features -rationality norms. They consider that being guided by a norm is essential to normative approaches. But sometimes they envisage the possibility of normativists abandoning guidance, and in that way it is plausible to consider a normativity of belief:

the normativist could abandon guidance -and thereby genuine prescriptivity- in favour of some other, novel construal of normativity. Since we are only concerned with genuine prescriptivity, that would amount to accepting the conclusion of this chapter (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 82).

The doxastic constitutive link of belief I propose -believers consider their beliefs to be true- relates to this lenient normativity. It does not guide nor prescribe: I just consider it constitutive of belief and it describes how belief relates to truth. For Glüer and Wikforss this norm does not imply a genuine normativity. But I would say that these

142 For an extended analysis of Glüer and Wikforss' ideas, see section 4.1.

authors agree with the basic idea and its consequences, regardless of calling it normative or not. Actually they admit a 'non-normative' essential connection between belief and truth:

the upshot of the no-guidance argument is precisely that the essential connection between belief and truth cannot be construed as one involving norms capable of guiding belief formation -at least not if guidance is understood in anything like the intuitive sense (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 85).

Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) have a similar idea when considering the link between belief and rationality: there is an essential connection between both -and also between rationality and reasons-, but those essential connections are not described in terms of guidance nor prescriptivity (90). However, it is not clear for me that there is always such an essential connection between beliefs and rationality, at least considering Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) notion of rationality (see section 1.5). Sometimes believers seem to develop their beliefs in terms of non-rational reasons. Let's consider the following case:

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidences and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul believes Olga loves him too.

In this case, and in wishful thinking cases in general, even if we consider an evidentialist approach that tells that Paul needed some evidence -bad or poor evidence- for developing his belief, in its formation other non-rational non-evidential reasons come into play. For that, the norm I propose -believers consider their beliefs to be true- just focuses on a basic relation between belief and truth that relies on the believer's

attitude and that does not imply guidance. Beliefs always present this basic connection.

A possible blind rule-following, that is, “a form of rule-following that does not involve any sense of intentionality conforming to the rule” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 96) or other normative approaches to believe that does not suppose an explicit norm-guidance can accommodate to Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) view:

the intuitive, intentional condition appears to be satisfied in all uncontroversial cases of rule-guidedness. Giving it up in precisely certain controversial cases, cases to do with intentional states and their contents, would seem to be a perfectly ad hoc move, simply intended to save a normativists theory under severe pressure. If belief normativism requires endorsing quietism about rule-guidance, so much the worse for belief normativism (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 96).

Other authors also consider and defend this no-guidance objection, although they do not develop this idea in the same way as Glüer and Wikforss (2013a). For example, Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) talk of a *deflationary* notion of normativity for the accounts that defend a lenient normativity of belief based on just 'being in accordance with a doxastic norm', and at the same time they consider that

normativists are not deploying such a deflationary notion of normativity, for no one would deny that true beliefs are normative in the sense that they accord with the standard of truth. For normativist, to say that *Doxastic Correctness* has normative implications is to say that it entails that a true belief is something we *ought* to have, are *permitted* to have, are *rationally committed* to have, or something that would be *good* to have (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 103).

For these authors, the doxastic constitutive feature of belief I am considering -agents consider their beliefs to be true- is not properly normative or it only defends a 'deflationary notion of normativity'. As I stated before (see section 5.1), I just want to focus on a basic relationship between belief and truth regardless if it is normative: I

want to show that this basic relationship defines and describes belief, it differentiates belief from other propositional attitudes, it can be applied to all the cases I have been considering and pragmatic approaches can be applied without denying this basic doxastic nature of belief.

5.2. SIMILARITIES IN OTHER AUTHORS' POSITIONS

5.2.1. THE REGULATION OF BELIEFS VIA TRANSPARENCY

Engel (2013a) defends the existence of a norm of belief: 'agents ought to believe p if and only if p is true' (see section 3.4). He considers that this norm is constitutive of beliefs and he explains the regulation produced by the norm in the agents via the transparency phenomenon (see section 1.2). On the other hand, teleological accounts are considered better suited than doxastic norms to analyse the regulative role of truth in beliefs (see chapter 3 and section 4.2): it is more difficult for the latter to explain how and why beliefs emerge and comply with these norms (see section 4.1) and to explain why there emerge counter-examples -like *the love case*. Values may provide an easier way to connect truth as the aim of belief with its regulative role on agents (see section 4.2.2).

For Engel (2013a), the doxastic norm of belief is constitutive and it does not motivate the agent to generate beliefs. That can explain the incapacity of believing every available truth -i.e. the omniscience problem (see section 3.4). But for other philosophers the constitutive normativity of belief may not be understood as a proper normativity: there is no normative freedom -agents cannot choose what to believe-

(Railton, 2000) and it does not motivate agents to believe.

In order to solve these concerns, Engel (2013a) makes a distinction between “the correctness-making feature of the norm of truth from its regulation” (53). That is, he makes a distinction between the evaluation of a belief and how that belief regulates the agent's mental states. While the norm of belief relates to the correctness condition of beliefs, its regulation is different and it relies on psychological states in the mind of the subjects. And the psychological fact that explains the regulatory aspect of the norm of belief is transparency (see section 1.2): “So we can say that the norm both governs (through the application of the concept of belief) doxastic deliberation and that this norm *regulates through* transparency” (Engel, 2013a, 54). So Engel (2013a) states that his constitutive norm of belief is nevertheless regulatory and this regulation is done via transparency -the fact that if an agent asks herself whether to believe that p , she is automatically asking herself if p is true (see section 1.2). Let's consider the following cases:

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

For Engel (2013a), if Hugo really sees a pig, his belief is correct. However, Paul's belief is incorrect. Neither Hugo nor Paul are free to decide what to believe and the norm of truth does not motivate agents to believe -actually, Paul is motivated to believe the falsity and Hugo may see also some ferns and that does not force him to

develop the correspondent beliefs. But the transparency of beliefs regulates both beliefs: if both Hugo and Paul ask themselves whether to believe what they believe, they are asking themselves if their respective beliefs are true¹⁴³.

In terms of the norm I am considering, I do not evaluate these beliefs as correct or incorrect. I admit that other non-epistemic reasons and standard of correctness may appear. But I establish that both Hugo and Paul consider their beliefs to be true while believing, and this relates to the transparency of belief and to what Engel (2013a) calls 'the regulatory aspect': if an agent that believes p considers p to be true, then while asking herself if she believes p , she is asking herself if p is true. In a very similar way, Adler and Hicks (2013) state that not all norms are prescriptive, that belief is under a constitutive norm¹⁴⁴, and this constitutive norm is reflected in “the observation of that you can be asked a justification-seeking 'Why'-question for what you believe”. In other words, the constitutive norm of beliefs is reflected in the transparency phenomenon (see section 1.2).

Steglich-Petersen (2013) criticizes this treatment of transparency. This author

143 The paragraph that Engel (2013a) dedicates to false beliefs and its relation with the epistemic norm of belief and transparency is very suggesting:

“Should we say that transparency does not apply and that these are not regulated by the norm of truth? Certainly the wishful thinker, for instance someone who believes that he is going to pass his driver's licence by reading the Koran, does not care for the norm of truth and does not consider it. Neither does the man who is under the delusion that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, or that she is dead. Certainly there can be exceptions to the norm. But does it mean that these people do not have the concept of belief and that they are unable to recognize the norm? Hardly. Even though these people obviously do not reason consciously with and form their beliefs in accordance with norms of evidence, it is less clear that they have no understand at all of what a proper belief should be. The wishful thinker is wrong when he believes that reading the Koran will help in his getting his driver's licence. But he is at least conscious of the fact that he needs a reason to believe that he will pass his exam, and even if he is wrong about the reason, he has some dim idea of what it might be. There are degrees here, obviously. The self-deceived wife may forget, or pass under silence for herself the evidence that she has that her husband cheats on her. But the very fact that she reasons to the contrary shows that she is aware of some evidence that her husband is unfaithful, and that attending to evidence is relevant to her believing. *So it is not clear that the norm of truth does not in such cases regulates thinking tacitly*” (56, italics added).

144 Interestingly, in their footnote 30, Adler & Hicks (2013) state that “if belief is subject to norms they must be non-prescriptive. While we are committed to the claim that there are non-prescriptive norms of belief, we do not have settled views on how this fact interacts with the literature of normativity” (144).

considers that transparency is framed in terms of the very concept of belief and that is what makes transparency an argument for normativist positions. Nevertheless, he defends that philosophers can deal with transparency out of the framework supplied by the concept of belief offering a new definition and treatment of transparency independent of the concept of belief and out of the normative accounts (see section 1.2).

For doing so, he criticizes the traditional concept of transparency:

If an agent asks herself whether to believe p , she is automatically asking herself if p is true.

First, Steglich-Petersen (2013) argues that agents may develop non-doxastic questions when asking about their beliefs. For instance, an agent may deliberate about believing in life after death and she may finally think that it is better to believe in life after death regardless of evidence and the truthfulness of the proposition believed. In this case, the agent asks herself whether to believe p but that deliberation does not drive the agent to ask herself whether p is true, being p 'life after death'. Deliberation about beliefs does not need to imply deliberation about the truth of those beliefs, but at the same time these deliberations -like believing in life after death- cannot directly result in belief (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 65). Not all deliberations about beliefs drive to the deliberations about the truth of the propositions believed, but these non-doxastic deliberations do not drive to the formation or adoption of beliefs. The reformulation of transparency proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2013) establishes that deliberations about beliefs *in order to adopt or to form those beliefs* implies deliberation about the truth of those beliefs. Deliberation about beliefs *in order to adopt or to form those beliefs* implies transparency.

Second, considerations that are not relevant to the veracity of beliefs may

determine belief adoption and formation, like in wishful thinking cases as *the love case* where there is weak evidence or no evidence at all (see section 1.3). Steglich-Petersen (2013) formulates this constraint as follows:

The explanation of transparency must be compatible with the fact that, subconsciously, one can be caused to form a belief as to whether *p* on the basis of considerations that are not relevant to the truth of *p* (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 66).

This author (2013) argues that even if the considerations for belief formation or adoption are not relevant to the truth of the belief, the agent *takes* them to be epistemically relevant, something that can be applied to wishful thinking cases like *the love case*.

Considering the two previous objections to the traditional treatment of transparency, Steglich-Petersen (2013) offers the following treatment [T]:

[T] One can consciously decide [whether to believe that *p*] in a way that issues directly in forming a belief as to whether *p*, only on the basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to [whether *p* is true] (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 66).

Then, in order to demonstrate that transparency does not need to be framed in terms of the concept of belief, Steglich-Petersen (2013) introduces a very similar principle that he calls transparency* [T*]:

[T*] One can consciously decide the question [whether *p* is true] in a way that issues directly in forming a belief as to whether *p*, only on the basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to [whether *p* is true] (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 67).

Transparency* [T*] also deals with both the first and the second objections. That

is, [T*] is applied when deciding if p is true and by considerations the agent takes to be relevant to the truth of the statements. [T] and [T*] are very similar but not equal: in [T] the agent decides 'whether to believe that p ' while in [T*] the agent decides 'whether p is true'. [T] is framed by the concept of belief and [T*] is not. But they both result in 'forming a belief as to whether p '"

Steglich-Petersen (2013) explains [T*] without invoking the concept of belief and then he explores if the explanation given can be applied to [T]. For doing so, he considers that [T*] is an instance of the following general principle of aim-directed activities [G]:

[G] It is not possible to \emptyset with an aim A while being aware that \emptyset -ing will not further A (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 68)¹⁴⁵.

While it is immediately obvious that [T*] is an instance of [G], it is not immediately obvious that [T] is an instance of [G]. The agent who decides 'whether p is true' is aware that his considerations are relevant to the truth of p [T*], but the agent who decides 'whether to believe p ' is not necessarily aware that his considerations are relevant to the truth of p [T]. It is immediately obvious that 'to decide the question whether p is true' directly refers to 'whether p is true' [T*], but it is not immediately obvious that the question 'whether to believe p ' directly refers to 'whether p is true' [T]. That is what the first criticism to the traditional definition of transparency and the deliberation of the belief about 'life after death' showed.

Steglich-Petersen (2013) proposal to accommodate [T] into [T*] refers to default or *paradigmatic* cases in which the deliberative question 'whether to believe p ' moves

¹⁴⁵ “[T]ransparency* concerns a relation between deciding whether p is true, and being moved to settle this question on the basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to settling that very question (i.e. whether p is true), thus making it immediately obvious how it is an instance of [G]” (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 69).

directly to 'whether p is true': in short, *paradigmatic* cases of [T] coincides with [T*]. Ultimately, these paradigmatic cases are not framed in terms of belief but only in deliberation about the truth of the propositions, something that is *often* expressed with the *term* belief. In paradigmatic cases, beliefs do not frame the phenomena of transparency but it is deliberation about truth that frames transparency and this deliberation about truth is often linguistically expressed with the term belief¹⁴⁶.

The doxastic constitutive link of belief I propose -believers consider that their beliefs are true- is compatible with the analysis of transparency offered by Steglich-Petersen (2013) and solves the two objections this author shows against the traditional treatment of transparency.

The first objection establishes that deliberation about beliefs does not necessarily imply deliberation about the truth of those beliefs. It is deliberation about beliefs *in order to adopt or to form those beliefs* what implies transparency. In terms of the doxastic constitutive link of belief I propose -believers consider their beliefs to be true- the objection is solved as the beliefs considered are the beliefs *already formed or adopted* by the believers. The objection applies to cases like the belief in 'life after death', but from the doxastic link I suggest, if the belief is already formed and adopted then the believer considers true that there is 'life after death', and if it is not formed nor adopted, then the link I suggest does not say anything.

The second objection establishes that beliefs may be motivated by considerations that are not relevant to the truth of the belief itself. Steglich-Petersen (2013) argues that even if the considerations for a belief are not doxastically relevant, the agent *takes* them to be doxastically relevant. The doxastic constitutive link I propose

146 Other times 'belief' is linguistically used to express trustworthiness in other agents (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, 72; see section 1.3 and *the teacher case*). In these cases, belief usually refers also to deliberation about truth.

-believers *take* their beliefs to be true- is clearly in the line of the solution offered by Steglich-Petersen (2013). Actually, both Steglich-Petersen (2013) argument and my constitutive relationship proposal are applied in a similar manner to wishful thinking cases like *the love case*: even if the considerations to develop the belief of the required love are not epistemically relevant, Paul takes them to be epistemically relevant, and even when Paul's belief is false, he takes it to be true.

As a result, the doxastic constitutive feature of belief I suggest -believers consider their beliefs to be true- is compatible with the definition of transparency given by Steglich-Petersen (2013). For this author, transparency refers to the process of belief formation or adoption, while the doxastic constitutive relationship of belief I defend refers to beliefs already formed or adopted. Both the definition of transparency based on the decision of 'whether to believe that *p*' [T] and the definition of transparency based on deciding 'whether *p* is true' [T*] result in 'forming a belief as to whether *p*', and the doxastic constitutive link of belief I suggest -believers consider their beliefs to be true- precisely affects the already formed belief.

5.2.2. PAPINEAU AND THE VALUES MOTIVATED BY BIOLOGICAL DESIGN

Papineau (2013) explains belief and its relation with truth in terms of values -personal, moral or aesthetic values (see section 4.3)- and finally establishes that the link between belief and truth can be explained via *biological design*. While considering if this biologicist approach can be treated as a normative approach, he defends that it does not have any prescriptive form (73). In that way, he recognizes that there is an intrinsic relation between truth and belief, but it does not imply a prescriptive norm¹⁴⁷.

147 "Some readers might be wondering whether this kind of biological account is really an alternative to

In the terms proposed, it can be said that believers aim at truth when believing, and they do it due to their biological design. But that does not force their beliefs to be true.

(The love case) Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

Paul considers that his belief is true, although it is false and he has available evidence that demonstrate its falsity. But when believing, he considers his belief to be true. Following Papineau's (2013) ideas, it can be said that his biological human design forces Paul to consider true what he believes, even if it is false. But Papineau (2013) seems to think something different as he refuses that a possible constitutive norm of belief must be always complied. He admits that sometimes believers can believe what they take to be false¹⁴⁸. All humans have is a “established practice of pursuing the truth” (76). Agents have a tendency to aim at truth when believing, but it is not mandatory for believers to aim at truth. Even more, beliefs are not objects of evaluation if they do not present any moral, personal or aesthetic values.

the view that the nature of belief depends on norms. After all, biological functions can be equated with activities that are 'designed' or 'supposed' to occur, and to this extent can be viewed as specifying 'norms' of functioning. However, while I have no great objection to this kind of terminology, it is not the kind of norm that is at issue in this paper. We are here concerned with norms that have prescriptive force -that indicate what *ought* to be done. Purely biological 'norms' have no such implications” (Papineau, 2013, 73).

148 “The only option here seems to be to posit a more intimate connection between belief and a norm of truth than that this norm *applies* to believers. The idea would be that, in order to be a believer, you must be *guided* by a norm of truth. The norm must make a difference to your intellectual practice, and it is this difference that makes it the case that your attitude is one of belief.

We don't have to understand this as requiring that believers always conform to the relevant norm. By way of analogy, note that someone is still playing chess even if they cheat a bit. Similarly, we might allow that someone is still a believer even if they are occasionally indifferent to the demands of truth. Still, consistently with this we can require that they at least be *sensitive* to the norm, in the sense that they are aware of it and have some inclination to conform to it. Someone who doesn't know the rules of chess or blatantly ignores them just isn't playing chess” (Papineau, 2013, 74-5)

I agree with Papineau (2013) that beliefs can be evaluated in terms of different values and not only in terms of epistemic norms, but I defend that there is a fixed relation between belief and truth that defines belief -believers consider their beliefs to be true-, something that Papineau does not admit. He just speaks of established practices and biological design. But, interestingly, he states that it is constitutive of beliefs that they are controlled by relevant evidence. Papineau (2013) is committed to a constitutive non-prescriptive evidentialism about beliefs. Even if he does not accept a strong norm that relates belief and truth, he admits that evidences are in the nature of beliefs due to biological reasons:

Evolution has instilled in us the habit of matching our beliefs to the evidence (...) We have no choice but to match our beliefs to the evidence. But this doesn't mean that we *ought* so to match our beliefs. If nothing of moral or personal or aesthetic value would be lost, then there would be nothing wrong with ignoring the evidence, *even if we can't*" (Papineau, 2013, 78-9; italics added).

5.2.3. AN AGENT CANNOT FALSELY BELIEVE A VERY PROPOSITION

Wedgwood (2013), when analysing the criticism to normativism of Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013) based on blindspot cases, mentions an interesting case: "I falsely believe this very proposition" (Wedgwood, 2013, 137).

In the terms I am proposing, believers consider their beliefs to be true. So agents cannot 'falsely believe': agents only can *truly* believe propositions. The case "I falsely believe this very proposition" cannot be believed (Wedgwood, 2013, 137). Wedgwood (2013) points that "the only way to have a perfectly correct doxastic attitude towards [it] in that possibility is by *disbelieving* it" (137) and he makes a difference between this case and blindspots (see section 1.4): neither of them can be believed, but the former cannot

be true and the latter can be true -if they are not believed.

In his brief analysis about this issue, Wedgwood (2013) is assuming that believers consider their beliefs to be true, they cannot 'falsely believe', they just 'truly believe'. Believers can also believe that 'some of their beliefs are false', but it does not suppose any problem for my account: it is just the case that believers may *truly* believe that sometimes they believe some false beliefs. In other words, believers can assume that sometimes their beliefs are mistaken, but it does not mean that they falsely believe very propositions: it just means that they are aware that sometimes they are mistaken and they truly believe false propositions.

5.2.4. THE FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF BELIEF AND BELIEVER'S DOXASTIC COMMITTAL ATTITUDE

Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) try to accommodate “the doxastic essence of belief” and “its first-order role or function” refusing the difference made by both teleologists and normativists philosophers (see section 2.8). For doing so, they analyse the concept of alief introduced by Gendler (2008a, 2008b): “[a] cognitive mental state, a mental state like belief in being action motivating, but unlike belief in being largely evidence-immune (...) Aliefs are mental states with [representational] *content*, but they are *not* propositional attitudes [of acceptance]” (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b, 150). To illustrate aliefs, Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) introduce the next cases:

(The cliff and the bottle of sugar cases) In what we shall call “the cliff case”, a subject tries to walk onto the Grand Canyon Skywalk, a semi-circular glass bridge hanging over the edge of the canyon. He is completely convinced that the bridge is perfectly safe. Nevertheless, he is trembling and anxiously recoils. The reaction is so strong that the subject does not manage to walk out the bridge. The second example, let's call it “the poison case”,

involves experiments with subjects who see two glass bottles being filled with sugar from the very same box. Then, they themselves label one of the bottles 'sugar' and the other 'sodium cyanide'. And subsequently, they show reluctance to consume the sugar from the second bottle (150).

Beliefs are evidence-sensitive while aliefs are not. In that way, beliefs aims at truth while aliefs do not. But aliefs also can motivate and explain behaviour, so they can cause intentional actions “or at least *sufficiently similar to intentional actions* to allow for explanation by means of cognitive states with representational content” (152). Here is the alief-dilemma:

Either alief-explanation is recognizably intentional. Then alief becomes too much like (irrational) belief. Or alief is sufficiently different from (irrational) belief. Then alief-explanation is no longer recognizably intentional -not even in a wide sense (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b, 155).

Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) defend that aliefs are intentional and also that they have representational propositional content that leads to action. Furthermore, this content also has to represent the world as it obtains (see section 1.3). Interestingly,

what connects a truth-conditional content to the actual world, what makes a state into a strongly representational state is not the content itself, but the state's 'mode' or attitude component (...) the only kind of attitude that can make the right kind of difference to the explanation of behaviour is a strongly representational or 'committal' attitude (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b, 154).

As a result, Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) defend that alief is not so different from belief¹⁴⁹: both imply a representational propositional state that leads to action not in terms of their content but in terms of the 'mode' or attitude component on the believer¹⁵⁰.

149 For Glüer and Wikforss (2013a), aliefs can actually be considered “irrational beliefs”.

150 The difference between alief and belief relies on the evidence-sensitivity.

This idea is in line with the constitutive link between belief and truth that I propose. Beliefs lead to action not because their content being true, but because believers take their content to be true: it is the believer's doxastic committal attitude that defines the constitutive relationship between belief and truth and, for Glüer and Wikforss (2013b), this believer's doxastic committal attitude leads to further behaviour and action.

5.2.5. THE INTENSIONAL AND EXTENSIONAL READINGS OF 'BELIEF AIMING AT TRUTH'

Unwin (2007) considers the difference between an intensional reading and an extensional reading of the doxastic aim of belief. The latter is focused on an external neutral universal reality while the latter is based on the believer's attitude. Formally,

(The Intensional Truth Norm) The organism should aim that (it has belief p only if p is true).

(The Extensional Truth Norm) (The organism should aim that it has belief p) only if p is true (Unwin, 2007, 151; see also 32 and 215 for the equivalent for assertions¹⁵¹).

The intensional reading is weaker than the extensional reading. Actually, the intensional reading focuses on what the agent should aim to assert or believe while the extensional reading focuses on what the agents should assert or believe. Unwin (2007) defends the intensional reading of the doxastic aim of belief and he refuses the prior role of -universal neutral- truth when believing derived from the extensional reading. He focuses just on the propositional attitude of the believer: "It is not the content but the attitude that is important" (Unwin, 2007, 19). Different agents may have different local truths but all of them aim at truth when believing, so they want their beliefs to be true.

151 Unwin (2007) considers that assertions are the linguistic expression of beliefs (see section 2.3).

From this approach, different believers may aim at different local truths¹⁵². Obviously, these truths are not equal from an external point of view, but the hotspot is that believers internally consider them to be true. However, even when different perspectives may enhance different local truths, “we should not conclude, as it is tempting to do, that we are aiming at different truths. We should not confuse intensionally aiming at *X* with aiming at an intensional *X*” (215)¹⁵³. Truth is just one, even if agents may access to it in different ways developing their 'local truths' -that sometimes can be false. In words of Unwin (2007), “[t]ruth is connected to normative and epistemological claims only indirectly, and is in itself an insubstantial concept. Aiming at truth, however, is a rich and controversial notion that links together many important issues” (37).

More specifically, belief's aim can be reduced to believer's aim. An agent may fail to believe the truth but her belief still -and always- aim at truth. This is very similar to the constitutive link I propose -the believer considers her beliefs to be true:

we can still reduce belief-aims to believer-aims if 'believers' include these 'sub-believers'; and we have already agreed that our motivational systems are complex. The person may thus fail to aim at gaining true beliefs even though, thanks to sub-personal activity, his beliefs still aim at truth; and this gives us the contrast we want (Unwin, 2007, 123).

This attitude-reduction retains local legitimacy of alternative -even incompatible- local truths, and for Unwin (2007) it allows agents to avoid relativism (201).

Furthermore, when choosing her theories and beliefs, the agent uses non-

152 “It was always slightly odd to say that beliefs aim at truth, since that suggests that the beliefs themselves have aims, objectives or other conative attitudes -which, of course, they do not. Rather, it is the believers who have the aims, and they are believers by virtue of having them” (Unwin, 2007, 121).

153 “we should not confuse that intensionally aiming at truth means aiming at some sort of intensional truth -or internalist truth, pragmatist truth, truth in the world of appearances, or whatever else one wishes to call it. There is no such thing, and there does not need to be” (Unwin, 2007, 215).

evidential cognitive dispositions. Many of them are pragmatic dispositions -e.g. simplicity- that are needed for cognition. These pragmatic dispositions are necessary for the intensional reading of the doxastic aim of belief¹⁵⁴. Also, truth as a concept presents two pragmatic consequences. First, it enhances social cohesion¹⁵⁵. Second, it helps the agent to represent her environment¹⁵⁶. The notion of truth is still needed, being an external truth that accompanies the intensional reading of the aim of belief:

What we appear to have, rather, is a situation where a desire for truth has a central role within our belief-desire web, and it is primarily the presence of this particular node in the system which ensures that pragmatic considerations do not lead us to engage in wishful thinking -at least not too much. It would be nice, perhaps, if we could find something a bit less contingent to support the truth-seeking enterprise and the orthodox distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning. However, given that our whole cognitive structure has been shown to be full of contingencies, it may not matter too much if no such additional support can be found (Unwin, 2007, 184).

My position is very similar to Unwin's (2007). The constitutive relationship between truth and belief I propose -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true (see section 3.10)- can be interpreted in terms of Unwin's (2007) 'intensional truth norm'. Furthermore, it is not the case that agents should aim (at believing p if p is true -i.e. if they take their belief to be true) but it is the case that agents do aim (at believing p if p is true -i.e. if they take their belief to be true).

154 “We just cannot abandon certain ways of discriminating between theories, for cognition would not be possible if we did so. It is for this reason that we classify these discriminatory dispositions as cognitive, even though they are non-evidential (...) we can still be said to be *aiming* at truth in an intensional sense if we rely only on such pragmatic considerations that are utterly indispensable (as well as essential to our natures). Remove the indispensability clause, however, and this is no longer the case” (Unwin, 2007, 174).

155 “We might wonder why anyone should *ever* accept what anyone else says in such an environment, but there is surely nothing which inevitably prevents local truth-aiming contracts from arising as and when it is pragmatically desirable. The thought that social cohesion requires universal truthfulness perhaps hinges too much on our own contingent social arrangements (or a rosy picture of them)” (Unwin, 2007, 176).

156 “Any attempt to navigate around life's obstacles demands accurate representations of our environment; so if we get things wrong, then our projects are less likely to succeed” (Unwin, 2007, 177).

I do not focus on an external or extensional approach to truth even though I do not deny the existence of such fundamental truth, and I do not focus on how beliefs are formed and which cognitive and conative features come into play. I just focus on believer's internal doxastic attitude when believing. This internal attitude provides belief with an essential connection to truth.

5.3. HOW THESE IDEAS RELATE TO MY PROPOSAL

I explain in section 3.10 my proposal:

For an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

With this proposal, I try to formalize a doxastic attitude on believers: the believer, when believing, considers her belief to be true (see section 2.9). If S believes p then S considers p to be true and if S does not believe p then it is not the case that S considers p to be true -if preferred, if S considers p to be true then S believes p . And if S believes $\neg p$ then S considers p to be false and if S considers p to be false then S does not believe p and furthermore S believes $\neg p$.

In section 5.2 and the correspondent subsections, I relate this proposal to different already existent approaches. Specially Engel's (2013a) approach, Papineau's (2013) ideas, Wedgwood's (2013) analysis, Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) functionalist account of belief and finally Unwin's (2007) ecological and intensional account of belief.

Engel (2013a) defends normativism and he explains belief psychological regulation on agents in terms of transparency: the fact that when the agent asks herself

whether to believe p , she automatically asks herself whether p is true (see section 1.2). And transparency relates to my proposal: if an agent believes p if and only if she considers p to be true, then she asks herself if she believes p if and only if she asks herself whether p is true. A second inference is added in my proposal: if the agent asks herself if p is true then she asks herself if she believes p (see section 5.2.1). Glüer and Wikforss (2013a; see section 5.1.1 and section 4.1) would argue that first belief emerges and then the agent evaluates it. So the latter inference -and the conditional 'if the agent considers p to be true then she believes p '- does not happen. Even if it were true that the agent have first developed her belief about p , the agent may consider p to be true and she may ask herself if she considers p to be true. As a result, both the conditional and the latter inference -i.e. 'if the agent considers p to be true then she believes p ' and 'if the agent asks herself if she considers p to be true then she asks herself if she believes p '- are sound. My proposal also accommodates Steglich-Petersen (2013) analysis of transparency (see section 5.2.1): it refers to already formed or adopted beliefs in terms of what the believer takes to be epistemically relevant -even if it turns out not to be.

Papineau (2013; see section 5.2.2) admits that belief presents a tendency to track the truth and he explains it in terms of biological design: the agent's biological design and her established practices enhances her to track the truth when believing. Truth is valuable because of other -moral, personal or aesthetic- underlying values. Similar to Glüer and Wikforss (2013a; see section 5.1.1) this fact does not establish a prescriptive normativity -i.e. biological design does not prescribe nor guide agents to believe the truth. This position is very similar to the one I defend. However, for Papineau (2013) even if biological design and established practices enhance the believer to track the truth, sometimes this aim may fail and agents may believe what they do not take to be

true¹⁵⁷ (see section 5.2.2). All the believer has is a tendency to track the truth when believing or an “established practice of pursuing the truth” (Papineau, 2013, 76) but this tendency or established practice does not always happen. As a result, Papineau (2013) denies a constitutive norm or a constitutive relationship between belief and truth in the terms I propose: even when it is the most common situation, it cannot be assured that this basic constitutive relationship always happens. For this author, the only constitutive feature of belief is that agents take some kind of evidence to form their beliefs.

Contrary to Papineau's (2013) position, Wedgwood (2013; see section 5.2.3) establishes that believers cannot falsely believe a very proposition (Wedgwood, 2013, 137). In other words, agents cannot believe what they consider to be false. This approach is very similar to my proposal. Actually it is a consequence of the treatment of belief I propose in terms of a doxastic constitutive feature of belief based on the believer's attitude: agents believe what they consider to be true. More specifically, I state that

for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true.

This treatment of belief implies that

for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, if it is not the case that *S* considers *p* to be true then *S* does not believe *p*.

And as a specific case of the later,

for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, if *S* considers *p* to be false then

¹⁵⁷ “we might allow that someone is still a believer even if they are occasionally indifferent to the demands of truth” (Papineau, 2013, 75).

S does not believe p .

This must not be confused with believers considering that 'some of their beliefs may be false'. Believers can be aware of the fact that some of their beliefs can be mistaken (see section 5.2.3) but it does not imply that believers consciously believe the falsity: it means that believers may realize and admit that some of their beliefs may be mistaken, so it means that believers may *truly* believe false propositions without knowing that they are false.

Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) criticize some normative approaches using the 'no-guidance argument' (see section 5.1.1 and section 4.1). In terms of this criticism, my proposal cannot be considered a proper norm as it does not imply any guidance nor prescription on believers. I have already argued (see section 3.10 and section 5.1) that what I want is to establish a basic constitutive relationship between belief and truth that defines the former in terms of the believers' attitudes and commitments, that differentiates belief from other propositional attitudes and that permits an analysis of different pragmatic accounts of belief preserving a basic doxastic feature, regardless if this constitutive relationship is a norm or not. Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) accept that believers present this basic doxastic committal attitude, so they accept this basic constitutive link between belief and truth. Furthermore, for these authors this believer's doxastic committal attitude enhances further action and behaviour on the agent (see section 5.2.4).

Finally, Unwin (2007) talks of 'the intensional truth norm' and 'the extensional truth norm' (see section 5.2.5). The former focuses on what the agent *should aim* to believe -i.e. it focuses on the agent's attitude- while the latter focuses on what the agent *should* believe -i.e. it focuses on the external content. Unwin (2007) defends the former:

“[i]t is not the content but the attitude that is important” (19). All the believers aim at truth when believing and even if *their* truths are different they consider them to be true¹⁵⁸. For Unwin (2007) 'aiming at truth' and not just 'truth' is the important notion when dealing with belief.

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6. ON THE NATURE OF BELIEF IN PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

6.1. INTRODUCTION TO PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

Pluralistic ignorance is a recurrent topic in Sociology, and it is also treated in Cognitive Sciences and Philosophy of Social Sciences. Firstly mentioned by Katz and Allport (1931), it refers to social norms or behaviours in which every agent privately refuses such norm or behaviour but believes that most other agents assume and follow it. Since then, many studies about this phenomenon have appeared. Most of them are practical applications to different attitudes and behaviours: teenagers drinking alcohol, classroom habits, top managements attitudes, racist attitudes, revenge and infidelity behaviours, etc. Nevertheless, theoretical accurate approaches to the phenomenon, its definition and treatment are scarce. In section 6.2 I introduce the accurate treatment of the phenomena recently given by Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014). Although this chapter is a theoretical approach, here I work with the three main examples found in the literature: the classroom case, the college drinking case and the Emperor's case.

On the other hand, Williams' (1973) statement 'belief aims at truth' is the base of recent epistemic approaches that study the links between belief, truth and pragmatic considerations, as already seen in the previous chapters. In this chapter I consider three main positions: an epistemic one -beliefs aim at truth: agents consider their beliefs to be true- (section 6.3.1), a pragmatic one -beliefs aim at pragmatic considerations: beliefs are considered to be practical- (section 6.3.2) and a third one that try to coordinate both

previous positions in some way -beliefs aim at truth, truth is practical, so beliefs aim at pragmatic considerations (section 6.3.3).

In this chapter I apply the philosophical developments on the study of belief, truth and pragmatism to the social phenomena of pluralistic ignorance, analysing how the three main alternatives I have mentioned can be applied (section 6.4.1, section 6.4.2 and section 6.4.3). For that, I take Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) definition of the phenomenon based on agents beliefs and actions. I also consider their theoretical study about it, as it introduces the dichotomy between the epistemic and pragmatic positions (section 6.2).

In section 6.5 I conclude that this theoretical study of pluralistic ignorance is useful to model it. Furthermore pluralistic ignorance phenomena can offer some clues and arguments in the debate between pragmatism, doxasticism and the nature of belief. I defend that pluralistic ignorance can be better understood if we take a pure epistemic position about beliefs, accepting that final behaviours and actions depend not only on beliefs but on other elements and attitudes, like the pragmatic ones. Nevertheless, the pragmatic position may offer a coherent complex analysis that does not need the concept of truth.

6.2. BJERRING, HANSEN AND PEDERSEN'S (2014) APPROACH TO PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

One of the best recent approaches to pluralistic ignorance has been done by Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014). They also address the rationality of the phenomena and introduce the debate between epistemic and pragmatic analyses of these beliefs systems.

They start saying that

“[r]oughly put, a social situation is a situation of pluralistic ignorance when a group of individuals all have the same attitude towards some proposition or norm, all act contrary to this attitude, and all wrongly believe that everyone else in the group has a certain conflicting attitude to the proposition or norm” (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2446).

Then they introduce three of the most popular examples in the pluralistic ignorance literature are the classroom case, the college drinking case and the Emperor's case:

(The classroom case) A professor asks her students if they have any doubt when finishing a -particularly difficult- lesson. Everybody doubts but nobody raises hands: each student *believes* the rest of students have understood the lesson and, as nobody wants to be publicly displayed as the only ignorant, nobody asks.

(The college drinking case) Hardly any teenager likes alcohol but each teenager *believes* the rest like alcohol. To avoid being publicly displayed as the strange or boring, all of them decide to drink alcohol.

(The Emperor's case) Taken from Christian Andersen's tale “The Emperor's New Clothes”, two impostors sell the emperor some imaginary clothes that cannot be seen by stupid nor disloyal people. As nobody -including the Emperor- wants to be considered a stupid nor a disloyal and as everybody *believes* the rest can see the imaginary clothes, all the people assume and assert they see them -except for the kid who finally cries out that the emperor has no clothes.

Different causes may be argued to explain this phenomenon. There is an interpretation difference: every agent considers more important others' beliefs about her own action than her own belief about others' actions -i.e. there is a self-other difference (Bicchieri, 2006, 183, 184, 186-189; Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin & Southwood, 2013,

106). As a result, the agent fails to interpret others' behaviour as incorrect or misleading -only the kid in the Emperor's case does not fall into the trap and she considers her belief more important than others' belief. Agents assume that even though others act similarly they do not have the same initial beliefs. There is also an encoding difference: the agent's behaviour feeds the established social false belief (Prentice & Miller, 1993; Brennan & co., 2013, 183). Furthermore, there may be a minority influence in setting and keeping the false belief -the clever students who have no doubts, the popular teenagers accustomed to alcohol and the impostors. Another cause may be the desire to maintain a social identity -it is common in the college drinking case (Brennan & co., 2013). “[T]he lack of transparent communication (...) among individuals” is said to be another reason for pluralistic ignorance emergence and persistence, although there is an extensive flow of information derived from mutual observation (Bicchieri, 2006, 187-189).

To analyse the phenomenon, I use the accurate definition of pluralistic ignorance given by Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) based on the concept of belief:

“Pluralistic ignorance” refers to a situation in where the individual members of a group

- (i) all privately believe some proposition p ;
- (ii) all believe that everyone else believes $\neg p$;
- (iii) all act contrary to their private belief that p (i.e. act as if they believe $\neg p$); and where
- (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their private beliefs about p (2458)

Bjerring and co. (2014) obtain this definition after a rigorous analysis of the different definitions of pluralistic ignorance recently given. They refuse some of them because of their individuality -they only focus on one particular agent having a different belief and being pressed by the rest of agents (Halbesleben & Buckley, 2004; Prentice &

Miller, 1993)- or because they do not take into account the social and factual components, paying attention only to (i) and (ii). And it is possible to find cases complying (i) and (ii) that do not develop pluralistic ignorance false beliefs and actions: everybody may believe having Facebook is a bad idea (i), everybody may believe that everyone else believes having Facebook is a good idea (ii), but this does not encourage the agent to create a personal Facebook account (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2455). In other words, “pluralistic ignorance is a genuine social phenomenon” (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2458).

Interestingly, (ii), (iii) and (iv) are connected. We may consider that (ii) is caused by (iv): particular agents believe that everyone else believe $\neg p$ because these particular agents take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their private beliefs about p . Particular agents believe everyone else understands the lesson because nobody raises hands; particular agents believe everyone else likes alcohol because particular agents see everyone else drinking alcohol; particular agents believe everyone else sees the Emperor's clothes because nobody laughs at the naked Emperor. As a result, every agent acts contrary to her initial personal belief (iii): no agent raises hands, every agent drinks alcohol and no agent laughs at the naked Emperor -except for the kid. So (ii) causes (iii) and we may argue a pragmatic reason: the desire to fit into the social group and not to be marginalized. Then, all the agents consider every agent particular actions (iii) as strong evidence for their private beliefs (iv, and then ii). In short, (iv) is caused by (iii) and (iv) causes (ii). Nobody raises hands (iii) and then we all privately believe everyone else understands the lesson (ii) as they do not raise hands (iv). Everyone drinks alcohol (iii) and then we all believe everyone else likes alcohol (ii) as they drink alcohol (iv). Nobody laughs at the Emperor being nude (iii) and then we all believe everyone else

sees the Emperor's clothes (ii) as they do not complain nor laugh (iv). There seems to be a circularity in this schemata. But from my point of view an *improper* initial evidence in the process is mandatory¹⁵⁹ in order to develop the common false belief: although there is some circularity in the pluralistic ignorance process, if we analyse it from scratch it is necessary an evidence to begin -so (ii) is firstly caused by an initial improper evidence. Every agent considers everyone else understands the lesson because *from the beginning* nobody raises hands. Every agent considers everyone else likes alcohol not because every agent sees the rest drinking alcohol from scratch –who starts drinking alcohol and why?- but because it is a quite popular thinking to assume teenagers drink alcohol -there is previous social or cultural evidence in this case. Every agent considers everyone else sees the Emperor's clothes because the impostors and latter the king spread this thinking -there is no epistemic nor general social evidence, but just the evidence given by two false sailors and the king: three people out of hundreds.

For Bjerring and co. (2014) “people form their (false) beliefs about other people's beliefs about *p* based on *observations* of their behaviour in the group” (2457). So, in the classroom case agents initially observe that the other agents do not ask any question and “[b]ased on this observation, they form the false belief” (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2456) -I agree-, in the college drinking case agents observe other agents drinking alcohol as it is supposed and “[b]ased on this observation, they form the false belief” (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2456) -I do not agree: who starts drinking alcohol? Why does such agent start?-, and in the Emperor's case “agents observe that the other agents in the group act as if the emperor is dressed. Based on this observation, they form the false belief” (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2456) -I do not agree: the initial step is caused by the impostors. So something more than observational interaction is needed in order to

159 It does not need to be direct perceptual evidence.

develop pluralistic ignorance false beliefs. Initial evidence is needed, but it is not necessary for this initial evidence to be 'observational': it can be other social, cultural or even personal evidence gotten throughout life. Observational interaction is only needed in the circularity process. At the end of their paper, Bjerring and co. (2014) recognize that

Throughout the paper we have assumed that all agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance interact with and observe each other's behaviour. But it has been documented that pluralistic ignorance can arise in more complex social networks structures, where only some agents in the structure interact with each other (2467).

In a similar vein, Bicchieri (2006) establishes that “[o]bservability may not be that direct; sometimes media reports will do, and sometimes a few active and vocal individuals suffice to create the illusion that they represent the majority opinion” (185), and Brennan and co. (2014) consider that

it is the perception of compliance levels that influences people's behaviour. Each of us observes some compliance with and violation of norms, but most of our impression *in toto* depends on information given by newspapers and other media, and from ordinary conversation (117).

In short, observation and behaviours are useful to explain pluralistic ignorance persistence but they do not always explain pluralistic ignorance emergence. It can be explained by evidence in a broader sense, including personal knowledge gotten over the life, media influence, cultural and social habits. Apart from this aspect, I consider the definition of Bjerring and co. (2014) the most accurate I have worked with.

Interestingly, the authors consider that the norms developed into the pluralistic ignorance phenomena are fragile. They are informational and acting cascades that can

be reverted once a few contrary pieces of information and actions happen (Bicchieri, 2006, 181, 197, 207-8; Brennan & co., 2013, 190). In the classroom case, once one or a few students raise hands, many other hands usually raise. In the Emperor's case, once the child cries out the Emperor is naked, everybody else recognizes it. Some strategies on controlling alcohol consumption between teenagers offer leisure alternatives that are popular among teenagers. Nevertheless, the first steps are hard and costly, and the first non-compliers often are severally sanctioned (Brennan & co., 2013, 181-2). That is because pluralistic ignorance usually has an associated hypocritical enforcement (Bicchieri, 2006, 192; Brennan & co., 2013, 183).

In their article, Bjerring and co. (2014) explore the rationality of pluralistic ignorance phenomena, linking the pluralistic ignorance analysis to the belief analysis I do in the next section. They distinguish between two kinds of rationality -into a consequentialist notion of rationality-, the pragmatic one and the epistemic one. For the epistemic position truth is the final goal, while for the pragmatic position “[a]n action or belief is valuable to the extent that it promotes practical interests or goals” (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2460; see also Bicchieri 2006, 181a).

In light of the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic value and rationality, a number of interrelated points or issues rise to the surface. First, beliefs and actions can possess two different types of value, and each type marks a comparison of normative evaluation. That is, beliefs and actions can qualify as more or less rational -along the pragmatic as well as the epistemic dimension- depending on the extent to which they promote the relevant kind of value. This point immediately raises a second issue: is it possible to compare the two kinds of value and rationality, or weigh them against each other? This would seem necessary in order to speak generally of the *overall* value or rationality of a given belief or action -or of its value or rationality, *all things considered* (Bjerring & co., 2014, 2460-1).

Comparison of both epistemic and pragmatic positions in the pluralistic

ignorance phenomena is precisely the goal of this chapter. Bjerring and co. (2014) consider that a combination of a pragmatic and an epistemic condition explains pluralistic ignorance phenomena. In that way they try to conciliate both pragmatic and epistemic dimensions.

In (iii) every agent decides to act as if $\neg p$ even when she privately believes p because of the practical outcome of being into the community avoiding social exclusion and enforcing social identity. It does not matter if the agent acts contrary to her beliefs because she gets a practical and useful result (Bicchieri, 2006, 188, 193, 204). The student doubts but not asking doubts avoids her being considered a stupid. The teenager does not like alcohol but by drinking alcohol she avoids being isolated. Every agent in the Emperor's case does not see the clothes but nobody says it -except the kid- in order to avoid being considered a stupid nor a disloyal. Nevertheless (iii) is not epistemic: in all the cases the agent finally acts in terms of beliefs that she privately does not have.

In (iv) the agent takes the actions of others (iii) as epistemic evidence for her beliefs about the rest (ii). Everybody takes the actions of the rest as evidence, but this is not practical: the agent does not solve her doubts, the teenager drinks alcohol even though she does not like, the king lives in an illusion and the villeins waste time seeing no clothes.

For Bjerring and co. (2014), there are two conditions that make possible pluralistic ignorance:

- (Con 1) It is pragmatically rational for agents to coordinate their behavior with the social group and the pragmatic advantages of doing so outweigh the epistemic disadvantages of doing so; and
- (Con 2) it is epistemically rational for agents to believe that the observed group behavior reflects what each individual agent in fact believes and the epistemic advantages of doing so outweigh the pragmatic disadvantages of doing so (2465).

This position is problematic. When talking about epistemic advantages (Con 2), they only think of the ones given by personal beliefs about the rest beliefs (ii), but they do not take into account the epistemic advantages of following the initial privately beliefs (i). And in pluralistic ignorance cases, it is epistemically better to follow our initial private belief (i) than to follow our belief about the rest beliefs (ii).

If we focus on (Con 1), it is not clear that in the final action (iii) pragmatic social outcomes outweigh pragmatic personal ones. What is more useful: to learn the lesson or not to solve the doubts in order to be included in the group? Bjerring and co. (2014) know the problem and offer this argument based on hypothetical cases:

[w]e must show only that there need not be any error of rationality, all things considered, involved with respect to (iii) in a case where the pragmatic payoff associated with conforming to (iii) exceeds the epistemic disadvantage of doing so. But here it is easy to see that there are many more fully specified versions of the Classroom Case that would do -just consider a case in which the subject matter is highly esoteric, or in which the teacher will not be helpful or informative at all if he finds out that someone did not understand the material. If so, there is no strong reason to doubt that pluralistic ignorance can be a rational phenomenon even in cases like the Classroom Case (2466).

The authors assume a consequentialist notion of rationality and they consider that an irrational behaviour is a bad one -pragmatically speaking- or false one -epistemically speaking-, and from that view, they defend that *in some cases*, pluralistic ignorance can be rational -i.e. the outcomes are good¹⁶⁰. I consider that the final outcomes are not practical nor true in most of cases. Nevertheless, pluralistic ignorance is still a phenomenon guided by rationality (see section 1.5). The outcomes of these cases of pluralistic ignorance are not practical nor true, but the way we got them is rational. We can consider that agents' beliefs rationally aim at truth or that agents'

160 It must be noted that Bjerring and co. (2014) do not want to demonstrate that pluralistic ignorance is *always* a rational phenomenon, but only that *sometimes* it is.

beliefs rationally aim at pragmatic considerations, and that a conflict between beliefs about ourselves and beliefs about the rest's beliefs finally develops into a bad final action, probably because in the final action other non-epistemic considerations come into play or because different pragmatic considerations confronts. But that does not imply an error of rationality. It is not necessary to admit a consequentialist notion of rationality in order to defend that pluralistic ignorance is a rational phenomenon.

In the next section 6.3, I introduce different positions about the nature of belief. I focus on the epistemic and the pragmatic perspectives, to finally apply them to this definition of pluralistic ignorance (see section 6.4).

6.3. ON THE NATURE OF BELIEF

How belief, pragmatic considerations and truth relate is a recurrent topic in epistemology. Some authors are exploring them following Williams' (1973) popular statement *belief aims at truth* that links both belief and truth. For the current analysis of pluralistic ignorance, I consider three alternatives: the epistemic one -belief aims at truth: agents consider their beliefs to be true-, the pragmatic one -belief aims at pragmatic considerations: beliefs are considered to be practical- and an alternative of the epistemic one that relates truth to pragmatic considerations -belief aims at truth, truth is practical, and as a result, belief aims at pragmatic considerations (see section 4.4).

6.3.1. BELIEF AIMS AT TRUTH: AGENTS CONSIDER THEIR BELIEFS TO BE TRUE

The normativist analyses of William's (1973) sentence defend that agents are

under a norm that judges beliefs in terms of truth, so there is a standard of correctness in beliefs: the norm of truth (see chapter 3). On the other hand, teleologists consider the link in terms of values: the value of belief lies in its aiming at truth (see section 4.2). While normativism usually refers to an external concept -the norm-, to a strong rationality (see section 1.5) and sometimes to a metaphysical motivational internalism, teleologism just considers the relationship itself with no external concepts or realities -teleologists usually explain the link emergence in terms of evolution or training. If a belief does not aim at truth, normativists would say that it is an irrational belief while teleologists would say that there has been a mistake in belief formation. Anyway, the differences between both approaches are not important in the analysis of belief on pluralistic ignorance: the point is the link between belief and truth, something assumed by both normativists and teleologists.

It must be noted that there are false beliefs, as pluralistic ignorance and others phenomena like wishful thinking (see section 2.5) show. For instance, I can wrongly believe that the girl I love she also loves me -sometimes even with a strong opposite evidence (see *the love case*). Even if a belief turns out to be false, the agent really considers his belief to be true and that establishes a basic constitutive relationship between belief and truth that is complied for all beliefs (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5). We can easily find beliefs that are not true. These beliefs have just failed in getting their goal but such goal of truth is always there. When the agent believes something, she considers it to be true. Why has the belief failed in getting their goal of truth? Several reasons can be given, among them poor evidence and emotional -or other non-epistemic- reasons coming into play when forming the false belief. So the basic doxastic feature of belief focuses on the nature of the aiming process and not directly on

the results of the beliefs: even if the wishful thinker has a false belief -he believes the girl loves him but she does not-, his belief is under such doxastic constitutive feature: he considers his belief to be true (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5). Engel (2013a) explains it:

Now what about the troublesome cases where we do not deliberate explicitly and consciously about whether to believe that p , such as wishful thinking, self-deception, and other kinds of irrational beliefs? (...) Even though these people obviously do not reason consciously with and from their beliefs in accordance with norms of evidence, it is less clear that they have no understanding at all of what a proper belief should be (...) So it is not clear that the norm of truth does not in such cases regulate thinking tacitly (56).

In this vein, Engel (2013a) states that “[t]he right kind of reason for a belief is an epistemic reason [truth], and the wrong kind of reason is a pragmatic one” (23); in other words, that “[Beliefs] are governed, normally, by only one kind of reason, namely those which are epistemic -truth and evidence” (Engel, 2013b, 51). More accurately,

[w]e take directly the belief to be correct because it is true or based on appropriate evidence, and we do not evaluate its correctness with respect to other criteria, such as the belief's utility, or conforming character, or pleasantness, and the like. In other words the epistemic reasons for belief seem to be the *only* kind of reasons that one considers, and ought to consider, when one forms a belief (2013a, 28)

It must be pointed out that beliefs are formed in a transparent manner (see section 1.2), involuntarily and independently of the context (see section 1.1). We cannot instantly decide at will what to believe or how to believe it. I defend that the key point in this position -belief aims at truth- is that the agent automatically considers her belief true when forming it, no matter how good the evidence is (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5). The final action is another issue (see section 4.4).

In this analysis I do not focus on the distinction between truth and knowledge (see section 2.1). For some authors like Gibbons (2013, 2014), belief is not the only state that aims at truth. Guesses also do (see section 2.2). The difference is the grade of commitment the agent assumes. So when an agent believes something, she is committed to considering it true. When an agent guesses something, that guess aims at truth but the agent is not committed to considering it true. This difference on epistemic commitment is what makes a difference between knowledge -strong commitment- and truth -no so strong. That is why this author finally states that 'belief aims at knowledge'. This is not the main issue here, but it should be noted that pluralistic ignorance phenomena quickly can be reverted once a few contrary actions and pieces of information happen (Bicchieri, 2006, 181, 197, 207-8; Brennan & co., 2013, 190), and as a result we can state that the grade of commitment of the pluralistic ignorance beliefs is not very strong even though we cannot consider these cases to be mere guesses.

6.3.2. BELIEF AIMS AT PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS: BELIEFS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE PRACTICAL

Contrary to the previous position, other philosophers refuse a privileged status for truth. They do not accept a constitutive link between belief and truth and they consider other options like a link between belief and pragmatic considerations like justification. In this vein, Rorty (1998) talks of 'justified beliefs' and he refuses speaking of truth: “[t]he fact that beliefs can be justified without being true does not entail that two norms are being invoked” (27). When believing, the agent wants to justify her option to as many and large audiences as possible, and all the justifications are temporary: objectivity is just extended intersubjectivity, different communities may

have different beliefs pointing just at justification. While truth implies some kind of metaphysical reflection -neutral fundamental principle-, justification does not. In Rorty's words:

[w]hat about the claim that all human beings desire truth? (...) [t]he claim that all of them desire to justify their beliefs to some, though not necessarily all, other human beings, and the claim that they all want their beliefs to be true. The first claim is unobjectionable, and the second dubious (Rorty, 2000, 4).

Pragmatists think that if something makes no difference to practice, it should make no difference to philosophy. This conviction makes them suspicious of the distinction between justification and truth, for that difference makes no difference to my decisions about what to do. If I have concrete, specific doubts about whether one of my beliefs is true, I can resolve those doubts only by asking whether it is adequately justified (Rorty, 1998, 19)

In short, Rorty considers a relationship between belief and justification. Justification is given in terms of use and usefulness into the community and its context. Papineau's thinking sometimes seems quite similar (see section 4.3): “[i]t is not always of personal, moral, or aesthetic value to avoid false belief (...) I therefore accept that there are cases where there is nothing at all wrong with believing falsely” (Papineau, 2013, 68). But it is indeed different: Papineau assumes an external reality that judges beliefs -“believing falsely”.

Davidson (1974, 1990, 1996, 2000) argues that concepts like belief and truth are not independent of other attitudes or states like desire. That is useful in order to interpret false beliefs like wishful thinking cases: I believe the girl loves me because it makes me feel good and to some extent because I desire it, it suppose an emotional fitness. But this option has to deal with other counterexamples: imagine believing falsity would reward the agent who has to form the belief. For instance, imagine winning 1000\$ for believing

today is not Sunday when it is and the agent knows it. It is practical and justified for the agent to believe that today is not Sunday, nevertheless she cannot do it (see *the earning money case* and *the hated terrorist son case A*). We can accept or assume something false, but as belief is transparent (see section 1.2), automatic, involuntary and context-independent (see section 1.1), we cannot do the same when believing -for instance, a lawyer can believe that her client is guilty and she will believe it at home, with her friends and during the trial; nevertheless, she can assume, assert and accept that her client is innocent during the trial (see section 2.3 and *the lawyer case*). It can be replied that believing the truth is also practical (see section 4.4): knowing today is Sunday allows the agent to spend time with her children and avoids her to go to work. But many times believing the falsity seems to be more practical.

In a similar vein, in some contexts it is useful to adopt a particular belief while in other contexts it is more useful to adopt another belief. Rorty (1996) faces the case of a Christian evolutionary biologist who believes in evolution when working and believes in Genesis when being at church. Rorty (1996) states that: “[A]ll religious pragmatists need to do is to be reasonable, to keep their religion out of their scientific and political activities (...) reconciliation would only be necessary if belief in both led to some form of social awkwardness”. Nevertheless belief is context-independent: it is not possible to change beliefs automatically from one context to another (see section 1.1). Rorty's previous statement can be applied to other propositional attitudes like assertions, acceptances or assumptions, but not to beliefs.

6.3.3. BELIEF AIMS AT TRUTH, TRUTH IS PRACTICAL, SO BELIEF AIMS AT PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

Other authors relate truth and pragmatic considerations (see section 4.4). David Owens (2013) explains that “[t]he function of belief is to be true and the value of true belief lies in its motivating successful agency, agency that achieves its objectives” (42), being the final function of belief “[t]o regulate our emotional lives” (37). But if both epistemic and pragmatic considerations are at odds, the epistemic one prevails: “[i]n general things will go better when we base our plans on knowledge rather than on ignorance” (Owens, 2013, 50).

Similarly, Whiting considers that belief aims at truth in a constitutive way and belief aims at pragmatic considerations in an evaluative way. Making an analogy with the chess game (Whiting, 2010, 2013b), we only can move the pieces in the specific ways previously stated in the rules of chess -that is constitutive of the game-, but that does not guarantee the player to win. She should use the best movements to obtain the victory -that is the evaluative of the game. Whiting considers that *belief may aim at truth* and *belief should not aim at falsity* and that describes the constitutive nature of belief: there is a previous acceptance of truth when believing. But that does not allow the agent to get the best final outcome: other non-doxastic considerations like the practical ones come into play (Whiting, 2013a, 194; 2013b, 131). In short, for Whiting belief should not aim at falsity and pragmatic considerations are important when acting.

Recently, Whiting (2014) has gone deeper into the relationships between belief, truth and pragmatic considerations: “[G]iven that we have practical as well as epistemic aims, why do the latter dominate when it comes to believing?” (6). Whiting (2014) answers the question considering that both epistemic and pragmatic considerations are related and not confronted: “[t]he aim to believe only what is a practical reason generates an aim to believe only what is true” (9), because what is true, is practical.

More explicitly,

[c]onsiderations to provide reason for believing only the true because subjects aim to believe only what is a practical reason because subjects aim in action and decision to be guided only by practical reasons. The epistemic perspective is not in tension with the practical perspective but dictated and contained within it (Whiting, 2014, 21-22).

Nevertheless, in some cases we have a practical perspective that is not true, other times we have truths that are not practical. As I previously said, being rewarded with 1000\$ for believing today is not Sunday -generally speaking, being wealthy rewarded for believing something false- is usually practical, but we cannot believe something false at will (see *the earning money case*). Here what is false is practical and what is not practical is true, but we cannot deliberately believe the practical falsity (see section 1.1). What is practical does not need to be true: in those cases the belief aims at truth and not at the pragmatic considerations. Also, truth is not always practical. For instance, imagine a terminally ill mother whose child is a hated terrorist: believing the truth is not practical for the mother (see *the hated terrorist son case A*). It can be said that in the long run it is always useful to know the truth (Haack, 1996, Φ 10; Unwin, 2007, 147), but in this case the mother has no long-run. These cases are considered by Owens (2013) -“[S]ince feeling devastated as such has no advantages over feeling peace of mind, how can knowledge derive its value from the fact that it requires this of us?” (51)-, and he explains them in a normative manner: “[t]he authority of the Knowledge norm and thus of the epistemic norms” (52). Whiting (2014) admits that not only beliefs provide practical reasoning for further action: “I claim that belief aims to provide only premises fit for practical reasoning, not that it aims to provide all such premises” (Whiting, 2014, 231).

6.4. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF BELIEF APPLIED TO PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

As I show in section 6.2, the most accurate definition I find of pluralistic ignorance phenomena is the one recently given by Bjerring and co. (2014):

“Pluralistic ignorance” refers to a situation in where the individual members of a group

- (i) all privately believe some proposition p ;
- (ii) all believe that everyone else believes $\neg p$;
- (iii) all act contrary to their private belief that p (i.e. act as if they believe $\neg p$); and where
- (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their private beliefs about p (2458)

In this section I take this definition of pluralistic ignorance, I separately consider the three characterizations of belief explained in section 6.3 -belief aims at truth: agents consider their beliefs to be true (see section 6.3.1); belief is related to pragmatic considerations: beliefs are considered to be practical (see section 6.3.2); and belief aims at truth, truth is practical, and as a result, belief aims at pragmatic considerations (see section 6.3.3)- and I apply these characterizations to the pluralistic ignorance definition.

6.4.1. THE EPISTEMIC CHARACTERIZATION OF BELIEF APPLIED TO PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

Considering that belief aims at truth in (i), if we take the Emperor's case, every agent privately believes the Emperor has no clothes means that every agent considers true that the Emperor has no clothes. It does not make any problem. If we take the other cases -the classroom and the college drinking cases- the application of pluralistic ignorance definition seems to be more strange: in the former case every agent has doubts while in the latter every agent does not like alcohol. More than beliefs, it seems

that they are straight personal skills, attitudes or characteristics. Although this question has to be faced in the pluralistic ignorance definition, I do not find any problem in treating it in terms of beliefs if we consider that belief aims at truth: I believe I doubt because I consider true that I doubt and I believe I do not like alcohol because I consider true that I do not like alcohol. Another less rude alternative would be to consider that every agent privately believes that the lesson is difficult -so every agent privately considers true that the lesson is difficult- and that every agent privately believes that drinking is unpleasant -so every agent privately considers true that drinking is unpleasant.

In (ii) -every agent believes that the rest of agents believe the falsity- we have two different beliefs: every agent's belief and the belief of the rest of agents. Considering that 'belief aims at truth', we do not have any problem with both the agent's belief and the belief of the rest of agents: they both aim at truth, because every agent considers *true* that the others *consider something to be true* -it does not matter if the agent initially believes that such "something" is false. In the Emperor's clothes case, every agent *considers that it is true that the others consider true* that the Emperor is naked. In the classroom case, every agent *considers that it is true that the others consider true* that they understood the whole lesson. In the teenagers college case, every agent *considers that it is true that the rest of teenagers consider true* that they like alcohol. As I said in section 6.3.1 (see also section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5) it must be noted that 'belief aiming at truth' does not need all the beliefs to be true, but just that the believers consider their beliefs to be true: believers can fail, but the key point of the approach is that believers consider their beliefs to be true.

(iii) does not suppose any problem for this approach: the final action does not

depend only on beliefs (see section 4.4). Papineau (2013) clearly says that “[b]eliefs have no results to call their own. Their function is not to produce specific results, but to help whichever desires are active to select actions that will conduce to their satisfaction” (73). When acting, “[i]t is not at all clear how much importance should be assigned to truth-seeking” (Unwin, 2007, 184). Belief aims at truth, but belief is not the only thing to consider when acting (Whiting, 2014, 231). Other non-epistemic factors like emotional or moral ones come into play when considering how to act: in the case of pluralistic ignorance, it is very important to avoid ostracism or being marginalized by the community. Pragmatic considerations may also come into play here, as Bjerring and co. (2014) defend, not into the nature of belief but in the final action.

'Belief aiming at truth' allows us to analyse (iv) properly. In the course of pluralistic ignorance phenomena, we reaffirm our false beliefs -aiming at truth- that everyone else believes the falsity -i.e. we reaffirm (ii)- because we take others' actions (iii) as strong evidence (iv). So every student believes the rest of students understand the lesson because they do not raise hands. Every teenager believes the rest of teenagers like alcohol because they drink alcohol. Every villein believes the rest of villeins see the Emperor's clothes because nobody says nothing. At the same time, as I said in section 6.2, the fact that every agent accepts the false belief due to these improper pieces of evidence reinforces these improper agential and social actions, promoting some kind of circularity between (ii), (iii) and (iv). Nevertheless, an initial evidence is necessary to form the initial false belief about the rest that finally develops the pluralistic ignorance phenomena: a perceptual evidence like seeing nobody raising hands or other evidence like a cultural assumption that teenagers drink alcohol or just two impostors lying and a king believing them (Bicchieri, 2006, 186; Brennan & co., 2013, 117). Anyway, all of

this does not pose any difficulty to the 'belief aiming at truth' approach: the agent mistakenly believes that everyone else believes $\neg p$, but when doing so, the agent considers his false belief about the rest to be true and everyone else considers the rest's false beliefs to be true, forming a closed-loop system of expectations (Brennan & co., 2013, 106).

'Belief aiming at truth' supposes treating pluralistic ignorance phenomena as an erroneous phenomenon -the agents finally act in terms of the falsity- developed from rational beliefs aiming at "different truths" -one about the agent's own truth and other about what the agent takes to be the truth of the rest of people- that are confronted. About (iv) I consider that the initial evidence is responsible for forming a false belief -that if socially fed, can develop into a pluralistic ignorance phenomenon-, but that false belief still aims at truth (ii). In (iii) I accept the role of other considerations -pragmatical, emotional. Nevertheless they do not influence beliefs -belief just aims at truth-, but pluralistic ignorance development and final actions. In pluralistic ignorance, all we need is to make a difference between beliefs and actions: the former aims at truth -in the sense that an agent believes p if and only if she takes p to be true-, the latter aims at being socially accepted -a pragmatic outcome. The confrontation between two different beliefs aiming at different truths, favouring the incorrect social one, is what enhances pluralistic ignorance.

6.4.2. THE PRAGMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF BELIEF APPLIED TO PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE

(i) does not suppose any problem for the 'belief aiming at pragmatic considerations' characterization. We face the same problem as in section 6.4.1: 'all

privately believe some proposition p is easy to apply to the Emperor's case -all privately believe the Emperor is naked-, but it seems strange in the college drinking case and in the classroom case. Nevertheless, as in section 6.4.1, we may state that 'all privately believe they individually do not like alcohol' and that 'all privately believe they individually doubt', or if preferred, 'all privately believe that alcohol is unpleasant' and 'all privately believe that the lesson is difficult'. From a pragmatic point of view, these beliefs point at pragmatic considerations: it is practical for the agent to believe she does not understand the lesson in order to solve her doubts and it is practical for the agent to believe she does not like alcohol in order to avoid it -at least at the first moment. Nevertheless, this characterization of (i) in terms of the pragmatic position of belief clashes with (iii). In (iii) the agents act contrary to their private beliefs due to pragmatic considerations: agents do not raise hands for not being considered stupid by the rest of agents and for being socially accepted, agents drink alcohol for not being considered bizarre and for being accepted by the group and agents do not confess they see the Emperor naked for not being taken as stupid nor disloyal. But if we consider that every agent acts in terms of pragmatic considerations, the pragmatic reasons for their beliefs emergence in the classroom and the college cases are completely different: to solve doubts, not to drink what they do not like. In short, if we adopt the pragmatic characterization of belief we have that agents develop their beliefs according to some pragmatic considerations but finally act according to completely different pragmatic considerations. If we focus on the Emperor's case we may develop an alternative analysis: the pragmatic consideration for the agent is to accept and to act as if she sees the Emperor's clothes and it is less practical -or not practical at all- to believe that the Emperor is naked. But the agent believes the Emperor is nude -she cannot avoid such

belief- and in that case belief is not aiming at pragmatic considerations!

A possible answer from the pragmatic account is that the final action (iii) motivated by pragmatic considerations is different from the private belief (i) also motivated by pragmatic considerations, because it is developed not only on private personal beliefs (i) but on beliefs about others' beliefs (ii). If the agent privately believes that she has not understood the lesson, she privately believes she does not like alcohol and she privately believes the Emperor is naked, but finally acts on the contrary, that is because she believes everyone else understands the lesson, she believes everyone else likes alcohol and she believes everyone else sees the Emperor naked. These beliefs about everyone else (ii) aim also at pragmatic considerations because they are based on evidence (iv): it is practical for the agent to consider everyone else understands the lesson because nobody raises hands, it is practical for the agent to consider everyone else likes alcohol because everyone else drinks alcohol and it is practical for the agent to consider everyone else sees the Emperor's clothes because nobody says nothing when the naked Emperor appears.

More accurately, if we consider (ii), the pragmatic characterization may present some problems: if we consider the first belief of (ii) -every agent *believes* that (everyone else believes $\neg p$)-, we have that it is not practical: it is precisely the fact that every agent has a wrong belief about the rest' beliefs what allows the reinforcement of pluralistic ignorance phenomena whose outcomes are bad for everybody. It is the fact that every agent believes everyone else understands the lesson what causes that nobody raises hands and solves the doubts, it is the fact that every agent believes everyone else likes alcohol what causes that everybody drinks alcohol and it is the fact that every agent believes everyone else sees the Emperor's clothes what causes that nobody tells the truth

and in that way they cannot catch the impostors. All these final outcomes are negative. Nevertheless, it can be replied that the key of pragmatic accounts of belief is not the final outcome to be practical, but that belief points at the practical. Or it can be argued that the personal beliefs about the rest allows the agent to be socially accepted into the group, so they are useful. In that sense, the supporter of the pragmatic position would say that every agent develops the false belief to avoid being socially disgraced. The final result is negative for everybody, but when developing her belief about the rest and acting in terms of such belief, the agent obtains a benefit. What about the second belief of (ii) -every agent believes that everyone else (believes $\neg p$)? From a pragmatic point of view, every agent considers that the rest of agents develop their beliefs in terms of practical reasons. So, when considering the rest believing $\neg p$ -contrary to herself-, the agent should consider that everyone else considers practical to believe $\neg p$. Every agent considers that everyone else believes they understand the lesson because it is practical for them, every agent considers that everyone else believes they like alcohol because it is practical for them and every agent considers that everyone else believes the Emperor's is dressed because it is practical for them. But what is practical for the rest does not need to be practical for the agent and the agent can be aware of that. If it is the case, the agent may consider that p is practical, she may consider that it is practical for herself to believe that the rest of people believe $\neg p$, she may consider that the rest takes $\neg p$ to be practical for themselves, and she finally go on acting as if $\neg p$, because it is more practical to fit into the group -even if she considers p to be practical for her.

If there is a tension between 'the agent's belief in terms of pragmatic considerations' and 'the agent acting in terms of other pragmatic considerations' thinking in any particular agent, we do not have this tension when considering the rest of agents'

beliefs (ii, second belief), because the agent considers the rest of agents' beliefs (ii, second belief) and actions (iv) in terms of the same pragmatic considerations. Why is it practical for the rest of agents to believe something that does not happen? It does not matter, because the analysis of (ii) in pluralistic ignorance does not focus on the rest of agents' particular beliefs, but on what any particular agent believes about the rest of agents, and the particular agent believes the rest of agents believe $\neg p$ without considering that they really believe p and act as if $\neg p$.

In short, if we assume the pragmatic characterization, there seems to be a tension between (i) and (iii): every agent develops some beliefs in terms of pragmatic reasons but finally act on the contrary in terms of pragmatic reasons. It can be explained if we argue that the belief the agent develops in (ii) points at more powerful pragmatic considerations than the ones enhanced by her belief in (i). And the more powerful pragmatic consideration of (ii) over (i) can be explained in terms of (iv): the evidence the social actions of everyone else offers to the agent. So at the end, a pragmatic characterization can be supported only if we consider that social evidence is more important than direct empirical evidence for every agent, if there is a self-other difference (Bicchieri, 2006, 183-184, 186-189, 193, 204). A pragmatic characterization can be supported only if we consider that the pragmatic outcomes of accepting and imitating nobody else raising hands, of accepting and imitating everybody else drinking alcohol and of accepting and imitating nobody else laughing at the Emperor are expected to be more powerful than the pragmatic outcomes given by directly considering that we do not understand the lesson, that we do not like alcohol and that we see the Emperor naked.

We cannot explain pluralistic ignorance as a positive phenomenon from a

pragmatic point of view because the final outcome is not practical, but we can state that the beliefs developed and involved in it are rational from a pragmatic position. We may consider pragmatism the thesis of our web of beliefs maximizing the final practical outcomes, allowing personal 'direct' beliefs to confront 'personal beliefs about others beliefs', and acting in terms of the latter beliefs because they provide a better practical outcome. For that, the pragmatic characterization needs the agent to give more importance to social actions than to her private experience, but I strongly doubt that this finally supposes the most practical outcome. The final result is bad and if we consider a consequentialist notion of rationality, pluralistic ignorance is irrational. But as I see it, pluralistic ignorance is developed from rational beliefs -both from epistemic and a pragmatic perspectives (see section 1.5)- and we may consider that all these beliefs aims at practical considerations. I defend that, from a pragmatic point of view, we can consider pluralistic ignorance a bad phenomenon developed from rational beliefs aiming at pragmatic considerations.

6.4.3. 'BELIEF AIMS AT TRUTH, TRUTH IS PRACTICAL, SO BELIEF AIMS AT PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS' CHARACTERIZATION

As I show in section 6.3.3 this characterization tries in some way to join both the epistemic and the pragmatic characterizations of belief (see section 4.4).

If we apply this characterization to pluralistic ignorance phenomena, (i) is perfectly explained as it also happened with both the epistemic and the pragmatic accounts. All the agents privately believe p means that all the agents consider p to be true and this consideration is practical. In the classroom case, every agent believes that she does not understand the lesson because she truly considers she does not understand

the lesson and this is practical in order to solve the problem -e.g. asking the professor. In the college drinking case, every agent believes that she does not like alcohol because she truly considers she does not like alcohol and this is practical to avoid drinking alcohol. In the Emperor's case, every agent believes the Emperor is naked because she truly considers she sees the Emperor naked and this is likely to be practical.

Nevertheless, as it happened in section 6.4.2, the fact of considering that the truth is practical in (i) is at odds with (iii). In (iii) 'all act contrary to their private believe that p ': even if all consider their private beliefs to be true and as a result all consider their private beliefs to be practical, they finally act contrary to such beliefs.

When analysing the pragmatic characterization in section 6.4.2 the answer we had is that the agent had other more powerful beliefs -of course, also aiming at pragmatic considerations- given by (ii). But here we do not have only a struggle between different pragmatic considerations given by different beliefs (*i* and *ii*), we also assume that agents consider their private beliefs to be true. In the classroom case, the agent considers true that she does not understand the lesson and that consideration is practical in order to solve the problem. Nevertheless, if we take (iii) the agent finally acts contrary to that belief, she acts as if she understands the lesson even when *she privately considers that it is false*. In the college drinking case, the agent considers true that she does not like alcohol and that consideration is practical in order not to drink alcohol. Nevertheless, if we take (iii) the agent finally acts contrary to that belief, she drinks alcohol even when *she privately does not like alcohol*. In the Emperor's case, the agent considers true that she does not see the Emperor's clothes and that consideration might be practical. Nevertheless, if we take (iii) the agent finally acts contrary to the belief, she acts as if she sees the Emperor's clothes even when *she considers it to be true*

that the Emperor's has no clothes.

In the different cases we have that 'every agent privately believes p ' means that 'every agent considers p to be true and that is practical' (i). Nevertheless, agents finally act contrary to that belief: so they act following the falsity (iii). The only possible reason is that the final outcome of such action is even more practical than the outcome given by believing the truth -that is, that the given by (i). In other words, acting following the falsity is more practical. What is true is practical, but falsity is more practical.

What makes the falsity to be more practical? As happened in section 6.4.2, we need to go to (ii) to find the answer. Remind that in (ii) we have two different beliefs: 'all believe that everyone else believes $\neg P$ '. If we take the first one, we have that 'every agent believes (the rest of agents believe $\neg P$)'. In the classroom case, 'every agent believes the rest understand the lesson' means that every agent takes it to be true and *it is also practical for her*. In the college drinking case, every agent considers true that everybody else likes alcohol and *such consideration is also practical for her*. In the Emperor's case, every agent considers true that everybody else sees the clothes and *that is also practical for her*. Turning to the issue, what makes it practical to consider true that everyone else believes $\neg p$ in these cases? The answer refers to the social inclusion of the particular agent into her community (Bicchieri, 2006, 183-184, 186-189, 193, 204). If we take the second belief, 'every agent believes that the rest of (agents believe $\neg P$)', that would mean that every agent believes that the rest of agents consider $\neg p$ to be true and, as a result, they consider that $\neg p$ is *practical for them*. In the classroom case, every agent believes that the rest consider true that they understand the lesson and that is practical for them. In the college drinking case, every agent believes that the rest considers true that they like alcohol and that is practical for them. In the Emperor's case,

every agent -except for the kid- believes that the rest considers true that the Emperor has new clothes and that is practical for them. Although the belief about what the rest believe is false -i.e. the rest believe p and not $\neg p$ - it does not suppose a problem to this characterization, because as I said in section 6.4.1, the key is not if the belief is true or false, but just if it aims at truth: so when the agent considers that the rest of agents believe they understand the lesson, they like alcohol and they see the Emperor's clothes, the agent considers that the rest of people consider such things to be true -and in this characterization, also practical.

The next question is: why every agent believes that everyone else believes the falsity? (so, why (ii)?). As it happened in section 6.4.2, we need to go to (iv) to find a reason: we take actions, attitudes or behaviours of the rest of people as strong evidence for their private false beliefs. But contrary to section 6.4.2, every agent takes them not to be reasons for acting according to pragmatic outcomes, but as reasons for acting according to truth: when the agent sees nobody else raising hands, he considers it to be true that the rest of students understand the lesson *and that is practical for them*; when the agent sees everybody else drinking alcohol, he considers it to be true that the rest of people like alcohol and *that is practical for them*; when the agent sees nobody else laughing at the Emperor, he considers it to be true that the rest of villeins see the clothes and *that is practical for them*.

In short, as it happened in section 6.4.2, in order to apply this characterization we need to consider that there are different pragmatic considerations associated to the different beliefs (*i* and *ii*), and the agents finally act (iii) considering more important the social considerations (ii) -based on the behaviour and attitude evidences from the rest (iv)- to their private ones (i). It is more difficult to assume this characterization than the

one given in section 6.4.2, because we not only need to admit a social evidence prevalence, but we also need to admit and assume that this evidence and the final action goes against every agent private beliefs, beliefs that are considered to be true and also practical by the agents themselves. In this characterization the personal waiver is stronger: not only the agent renounces to her practical considerations -because she considers it is more practical to follow the rest of agents' actions and beliefs (see section 6.4.2)- but she also has to renounce to guide her action according to what she considers to be true (see section 6.4.1).

6.5. CONCLUSIONS

The application of the latest philosophical researches on belief, truth and pragmatism is useful in order to understand pluralistic ignorance phenomena. Also, this application is useful in order to get some cues of this traditional debate.

In this chapter I show that a pure epistemic characterization of belief applies simpler to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, taking the definition given by Bjerring and co. (2014). The key point when applying this definition is to admit that private beliefs and final actions may differ due to non-epistemic reasons, like pragmatic ones. It should be noted that the degree of commitment of the agents in their actions and beliefs is lower than the generated in other beliefs (Gibbons, 2013, 2014).

The pragmatic characterization also may be applied: in that case we need to assume that different pragmatic considerations are encountered and that finally the social evidence is more powerful than the private direct evidence when deciding how to act. Social pragmatic considerations prevail over personal pragmatic considerations. On

the other hand, we need no concept of truth in order to justify pluralistic ignorance.

The third characterization -truth is practical- is more difficult to apply: we need to assume that when finally acting, what is practical is not true, and that we act against our private beliefs even when we consider them true and practical. This characterization sums up the problems of both the pure epistemic and the pure pragmatic characterizations.

While Bjerring and co. (2014) defends that pluralistic ignorance can be sometimes a rational phenomenon -considering rational as presenting good outcomes-, I consider that it is always rational because its development is caused by rational beliefs of agents, no matter if we consider epistemic or pragmatic rationalities. Nevertheless, in most cases the outcomes are bad. That is because the confrontation between the agential and the social -the personal truth and the social truth, or the personal private pragmatic outcomes and the personal social pragmatic outcomes- results in the latter being more important than the former.

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ANNEX A. INDEX OF CASES

This annex is an index of the main cases exhibited during the dissertation. They are listed in alphabetical order and they show the main features and debates about belief and the related concepts. At the end of each case I show how my proposal of a doxastic constitutive feature of belief applies (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5): for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true.

The two archetypical cases of belief are *Hugo's pig case* (section A.12) and *the teacher case* (section A.27). Both are very similar but they differentiate on the kind of evidence they take to be formed: *Hugo's pig case* uses direct perceptual evidence and *the teacher case* uses the evidence given by an expert testimony.

That beliefs are automatic, involuntary and context-independent (see section 1.1) is specially shown in *the lawyer case* (section A.15) and *the numbers games cases* (section A.20). While the latter supports a limited voluntarism on beliefs, the impossibility of voluntary beliefs is defended in *the earning money case* (section A.5). And transparency of belief is accurately explained in *Bob's deliberation case* (section A.1). These features make a difference between beliefs, on the one hand, and assertions, assumptions and acceptances, on the other hand (see section 2.3). This topic is specifically addressed in *the lawyer case* (section A.15) and *the oncologist case* (section A.21).

Belief's rationality (see section 1.5), the norms introduced by this rationality and how beliefs are justified (see section 1.6) are topics addressed in *the geocentric model*

case (section A.8) and *the mirage in the dessert case* (A.17). More accurately, the latter refers to delusions in which the agent develops a false belief in terms of what she takes to be correct evidence and in terms of correct inferential rules.

Belief emergence in evidential terms (see section 1.3), different kinds of evidence and how different agents deal with the same evidence in different ways are topics addressed in many of the analysed cases, but an accurate study is specially done in *the grue user case* (section A.9), *Hugo's pig case* (section A.12) and *the teacher case* (section A.27). Furthermore, that evidence may work as an epistemic reasons for belief suspension is shown in *the skin cancer case* (section A.25) and that probabilistic evidence may face and overcome direct perceptual evidence -allowing for beliefs more likely to be true but less justified- is addressed in *the screen's colours case* (section A.24).

How beliefs are cognitive and how conative features may influence beliefs is shown in a wide range of cases (see section 2.4). The basic differences between belief and desire are shown in *the spacewoman case* (section A.26) and *the Wenders film case* (section A.28). Many other cases show how conative reasons may influence belief formation and adoption and the majority of them can be considered 'wishful thinking' cases (see section 2.5): *the cake case* (section A.2), *Chicago Bulls supporter case* (section A.3), *the hated terrorist son case B* (section A.11), *Jimmy's lottery case* (section A.13) and specially *the love case* (section A.16). Each of them introduces slight differences about different features -the available evidence, the conative influences, the possibility of probabilistic measurement, etc.- and the most accurate analysis is done in *the love case* (section A.16). At the same time, that conative reasons do not influence all beliefs even when these reasons are likely to provide emotional fitness is shown in *the*

hated terrorist son case A (see section A.10).

Another propositional attitude or mental state that seems to represent the world and enhances further action is *alief*. Some authors consider aliefs to be irrational beliefs (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b). I analyse the following aliefs: *the cliff and the bottle of sugar cases* in section A.4 and *the parked car case* in section A.22. And I defend that they are not beliefs as the current use of the concept belief does not apply to these cases. Furthermore, aliefs do not match my proposal.

Finally, how belief relates to truth -generally as an internal and intensional concept- and to knowledge -generally as an external and extensional concept- (see section 2.1), and then how the externalist treatment of knowledge strengthens a difference between guess -aiming at truth- and belief -aiming at knowledge- is showed in *the elections case* (section A.6), *Stanley's lottery case* (section A.14) and *the monarchs dates case* (section A.18). *The gambler case* (section A.7) digs deeper into the nature of guessing and its differences with believing (see section 2.2). *The navigation charts case* (section A.19) and *the oncologist case* (section A.21) delves into the relationship between knowledge and epistemic appropriateness. Specifically, *the oncologist case* (section A.21) introduces the idea of secondhand knowledge. Finally, the possibility of having knowledge without believing the known is shown in *the quantum mechanics case* (section A.23).

A.1. BOB'S DELIBERATION CASE

Bob is pondering the finitude of life. He entertains the dreadful thought that it may well be all over much sooner than he cares to think about. Being a philosophical sort of guy, he asks himself if it, all things considered, might be a good idea to adopt belief in an afterlife, despite the lack of evidence (Steglich-Petersen, 2013b,

71).

This case analyses the possibility of adopting non-evidential reasons for the development of a belief (section 1.3). Nevertheless, contrary to wishful thinking cases like *the love case*, it is not possible for Bob to adopt a specific belief about an afterlife because beliefs are involuntary and automatic (section 1.1). But the case is useful to show that agents can deliberate about beliefs in non-doxastic terms -e.g. pragmatic reasons like emotional convenience.

Steglich-Petersen (2013b) uses this case to defend that transparency should focus on the impossibility of some deliberations to *result* directly on beliefs. Deliberation about beliefs does not necessarily imply deliberation about the truth of the content of these beliefs -Bob deliberates about a belief in an afterlife and he is not deliberating about the truth of the content of such belief, but just about its convenience. Only deliberation about beliefs *to develop or to adopt* these beliefs necessarily implies deliberation about the truth of their content. That is, transparency applies to the deliberation of belief formation and adoption, not to deliberation of belief itself (see section 1.2).

This criticism to the traditional definition of transparency does not affect my proposal, because it refers to beliefs already former or adopted: for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. Bob may think about the convenience of believing in an afterlife, but he may have already formed his belief that there is no afterlife. And that he believes it means that he considers it to be true. Regardless of the convenience of believing in an afterlife and the correspondent deliberation, if Bob believes that there is no afterlife then he considers true that there is no afterlife. And if Bob considers true that there is no afterlife then he believes that

there is no afterlife.

A.2. THE CAKE CASE

Andrew loves cakes, but his diet does not allow him to eat cakes. But he believes that just one small piece per week will not be a problem (although it actually is, because that outweighs any gain of the diet).

This case illustrates beliefs based on poor or no evidences that are not practical (see section 1.3). It is a wishful thinking case (see section 2.5) in which pragmatists may say that in the short run the belief that 'one small piece of cake will not be a problem' is useful even though in the long run it is not (Haack, 1996, ϕ 10; Unwin, 2007, 147).

There seems to be no evidence to develop the belief but evidentialists are likely to establish that there actually is (see section 1.3), so maybe Andrew watched some similar piece of information on TV or on the Internet. Anyway, even if there is such a weak evidence for the belief, other non-evidential conative reasons come into play to develop the final belief.

This case -and wishful thinking cases in general- accommodates my proposal: for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. If Andrew believes that eating a small piece of cake will not be a problem, then he considers true that eating a small piece of cake will not be a problem -even though it turns out to be a problem. And if Andrew considers true that eating a small piece of cake will not be a problem -even though it actually is a problem-, then he believes that eating a small piece of cake will not be a problem.

A.3. CHICAGO BULLS SUPPORTER CASE

Matt is a supporter of Chicago Bulls basket team. All Chicago Bulls' stars are injured, they play against LA Lakers in Los Angeles -the best team at the moment-, and Chicago Bulls performed very bad recently. Despite of the evidence, Matt believes that Chicago Bulls are going to win.

This case of wishful thinking (see section 2.5) is shown in section 3.6 to illustrate the 'ought to want' norm of belief: the agent ought to want her beliefs to be true. Matt ought to want his belief that Chicago Bulls are going to win to be true, even if this belief is developed under poor or null evidence and it is likely to be a defective belief.

It can be replied that sometimes agents do not want their beliefs to be true (see *the hated terrorist son case B*) and in those cases it is hard to establish that the agent ought to want her beliefs to be true. Horwich (2013) argues that the 'ought to want' norm should be understood in an epistemic sense (see section 3.6).

My proposal accommodates this case -and wishful thinking cases in general. For Matt and the proposition 'Chicago Bulls are going to win', Matt believes that 'Chicago Bulls are going to win' if and only if Matt considers 'Chicago Bulls are going to win' to be true. If Matt believes that 'Chicago Bulls are going to win' then he considers true that 'Chicago Bulls are going to win'. And if Matt considers true that 'Chicago Bulls are going to win' then he believes that 'Chicago Bulls are going to win'.

A.4. THE CLIFF AND THE BOTTLE OF SUGAR CASES

In what we shall call “the cliff case”, a subject tries to walk onto the Grand Canyon Skywalk, a semi-circular glass bridge hanging

over the edge of the canyon. He is completely convinced that the bridge is perfectly safe. Nevertheless, he is trembling and anxiously recoils. The reaction is so strong that the subject does not manage to walk out the bridge. The second example, let's call it "the poison case", involves experiments with subjects who see two glass bottles being filled with sugar from the very same box. Then, they themselves label one of the bottles 'sugar' and the other 'sodium cyanide'. And subsequently, they show reluctance to consume the sugar from the second bottle (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b, 150).

These cases illustrate alief and its differences with belief (see section 2.8; also section 5.2.4). Alief is "[a] cognitive mental state, a mental state like belief in being action motivating, but unlike belief in being largely evidence-immune: Alief (...) Aliefs are mental states with [representational] *content*, but they are *not* propositional attitudes [of acceptance]" (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b, 150). Aliefs motivate agents' avoidance to walk out the bridge and agents' avoidance to consume sugar from the sodium cyanide bottle. These mental states are not based on proper evidence -which is available and demonstrates that both the bridge and the 'sodium cyanide' bottle of sugar are safe. Moreover, new evidence may change beliefs but do not change aliefs. Similar to wishful thinking cases and to schmeliefs, aliefs are not based on proper evidence and they are influenced by non-cognitive issues. But if conative reasons like desires influenced wishful thinking, here what influences aliefs are other reasons like fear¹⁶¹. Moreover, if people commonly use the concept of belief in wishful thinking -e.g. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too in *the love case*-, people hardly state that they believe the bridge is not safe or that they believe there is not any sugar but sodium cyanide in the bottle.

Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) criticize aliefs. For that, they argue that aliefs motivate actions, they are intentional, attitudinal and their contents need to be propositional and not merely representational. In that way aliefs seem very similar to

161 It should be noted that fear may be reformulated in terms of desires: the desire not to fall off the bridge and the desire not to get poisoned.

-irrational- beliefs. Like in wishful thinking cases and schmeliefs, beliefs and aliefs differ in their emerging reasons. Furthermore, for Glüer and Wikforss (2013b) beliefs -and aliefs- are representational propositional states that lead to action in terms of the 'mode' or attitude of the believer (see section 5.2.4). This idea is in line with the doxastic constitutive feature of belief I propose (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5): believers consider their beliefs to be true. Beliefs lead to action not because of their content being true, but because believers take their content to be true: believers' doxastic attitude explains the constitutive relationship between belief and truth¹⁶² and, for Glüer and Wikforss (2013b), this fact leads to further behaviour and action.

Specifically about these cases, aliefs do not comply with my proposal -i.e. for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, it is not the case that (*S* alieves *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true). The agents alieve that the bridge and the bottle of sugar labelled as 'sodium cyanide' are dangerous -and as a result they act as if they were dangerous- but they do not consider that they are really dangerous. Nevertheless, I consider that beliefs are different from aliefs and what the agents really believe is that the bridge and the bottle of sugar labelled as 'sodium cyanide' are safe. That means that they consider true that the bridge and the bottle of sugar are safe, regardless of the final action: “He is completely convinced that the bridge is perfectly safe (...) subjects who see two glass bottles being filled with sugar from the very same box”.

In short, I defend that aliefs are different from beliefs and that the beliefs in these cases are (i) the bridge is safe and (ii) the bottle of sugar labelled as 'sodium cyanide' is safe. If the agent believes that the bridge is safe then she considers true that the bridge is safe. If the agent believes that the bottle of sugar labelled as 'sodium cyanide' is safe

162 Furthermore, this relationship defines and describes belief, and differentiates it from other propositional attitudes (see section 2.9, section 3.10 and chapter 5).

then she considers true that such bottle is safe. And if the agent considers true that the bridge is safe then she believes that the bridge is safe. Consequently, if the agent considers true that the bottle of sugar labelled as 'sodium cyanide' is safe then she believes that such bottle is safe. Final action depends not only on beliefs (see section 4.4) and that explains agents' reluctance to walk out the bridge and to consume sugar from the bottle labelled as 'sodium cyanide'. In terms of the common usage of the word 'belief', I argue that the vast majority of people would not consider these 'aliefs' to be beliefs: for most people, in the bridge case the agent believes that the bridge is safe -but she alieves it is not-, and in the sugar bottle case the agent believes that the sugar bottle labelled as 'sodium cyanide' is safe -but she alieves it is not.

A.5. THE EARNING MONEY CASE

Suppose that one knows that if one were to believe that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money (...) since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing (Whiting, 2014, 220).

This case shows that belief is involuntary (see section 1.1): even if there are extrinsic reasons for believing, only constitutive reasons to belief enhance belief emergence (Adler & Hicks, 2013). The agent cannot believe at will that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head, even when that would give him a generous amount of money. The involuntariness of belief is an argument against pragmatic approaches to belief: voluntary behaviours and propositional attitudes are responsive to practical reasons while involuntary behaviours and propositional attitudes may not be. But the supporter of a pragmatic position can reply that not knowing that

David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs on his head can be also useful if we consider this particular belief into a bigger web of beliefs and other propositional attitudes for further action and reasoning. In this way the pragmatists may reply that involuntariness of belief is not at odds with practical outcomes. Another option for the pragmatist is to defend that even if beliefs are formed involuntary, they are mechanisms developed by evolution to manage the environment and to obtain successful and useful outcomes (Unwin, 2007).

This case also argues in favour of evidentialism: even if believing that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 on his head gives the believer a generous amount of money, the agent cannot develop this belief as she does not have the proper evidence to develop this belief (see section 1.3 and specially 1.3.1)¹⁶³.

Whiting (2014) shows this case in order to criticize a pure pragmatic account of belief's aim. This author defends that belief aims at truth, that truth provides practical reasoning for further action and because of that beliefs are formed evidentially (see section 4.4). But this does not mean that beliefs aim directly at practical outcomes. In this case, the agent cannot believe that David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head even though this seems to be the most practical belief. The agent need evidence to develop a belief aiming at truth, and this belief provides practical reasoning for further action. It must be noted that practical reasoning may be provided by other propositional attitudes, states or facts different to belief, like desires (see *the Haley Wenders film case*). Truth provides practical reasoning for further action but truth does not need to be the only source of practical reasoning.

In terms of my proposal -for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true-, that the agent does not believe that 'David Cameron's

163 Other cases like *the Jimmy's lottery case* may argue in favour of non-evidentialism.

doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head' means that the agent does not consider true that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head'. More specifically, if the agent does not believe that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head' then it is not the case that the agent considers true that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head'. And if it is not the case that the agent considers true that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head' then the agent does not believe that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head'. This should not be confused with the agent believing that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head' is false. In that case, the agent considers that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head' to be false. Consequently, if the agent considers that it is false that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head', then she believes that it is false that 'David Cameron's doctor's uncle has 132.487 hairs in his head'. In other words, '*S does not believe that p if and only if it is not the case that S considers p to be true*' must not be confused with '*S believe that p is false [S believes $\neg p$] if and only if S considers p to be false*'.

A.6. THE ELECTIONS CASE

Suppose David asks, 'Who do you believe will win the next election?' Kelly might reply, 'The Republicans'. It would be very odd for David to reply, 'You don't know that!' And it would be entirely appropriate for Kelly to reject this challenge by saying, 'I never said that I did' -I was only telling you what I believe'. Note that David might be right that Kelly does not know this but, still, his remark seems out of order (Whiting, 2013, 186).

This case shows the difference between knowledge and truth, being knowledge a stronger concept that accommodates the external neutral universal reality and belief in

terms of a strong epistemic commitment of the believer (see section 2.1). Kelly believes that the Republicans are going to win the elections, but she admits that she does not know that, so her epistemic commitment is not strong enough to state that her belief aims at knowledge. It can be argued that her belief aims just at truth -as a concept that demands a weaker stronger commitment than knowledge- or it can be replied that she is not really believing but just guessing that the Republicans are going to win the elections (see section 2.2). The latter supposes that belief always aims at knowledge and as a result it implies a strong epistemic commitment on beliefs based on accurate evidence.

Kelly's belief -or guess- can be explained in terms of poor evidence -but evidence- or in terms of conative features, like her political and ideological leanings (see section 1.3). The latter option opens the door to non-epistemic reasons for the development of beliefs -if Kelly's state is considered a belief and not a guess. The supporters of the knowledge aim of belief consider that Kelly's guess is formed in terms of these non-epistemic options as accurate evidence form beliefs with a strong epistemic commitment of the believer.

I prefer to consider Kelly's propositional attitude a belief rather than a guess -I also admit that it can be considered a belief compatible with a guess. That is because it responds to the currently usage of the word and the concept 'belief' by the vast majority of people. In our daily life, it is not strange or unusual to consider Kelly's propositional attitude to be a belief and I do not want to be a revisionist about beliefs. If Kelly's attitude is a belief, then it accommodates my proposal: for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. If Kelly believes that the Republicans are going to win the elections -as she states- then she considers true that the Republicans are going to win the elections even if she does not know it. And if Kelly

considers true that the Republicans are going to win the elections, then she believes that the Republicans are going to win the elections. And not all guesses accommodate this doxastic constitutive feature: an agent may guess that the next die roll will be 5 but she may not consider it to be true. Even guesses with some reliable but insufficient evidence or suppositions do not accommodate my proposal. In these cases, the agent considers p to be *likely to be* true, but she does not consider p to be true as such.

A.7. THE GAMBLER CASE

A gambler will receive a 1.000.000\$ if she guesses that next car she sees is green. There is only one green car in the city. So, the possibilities of wining are very small. On the contrary, if she guesses than the next car she sees is not green, she will receive 0.10\$.

This case is useful to show the differences between guess and belief (see section 2.2). The evidence -there is only one green car in the whole city- induces the belief that the next car the gambler will see is not green. Guesses usually aim at truth, so the gambler is likely to guess that the next car she will see is not green. But, as she can win 1.000.000\$ for guessing that the next car she will see is green and she will get only 0.10\$ for guessing the opposite, she is likely to bet that the next car she will see is the only green car there is in the city. Although guesses also aim at truth, they can be influenced by pragmatic considerations more easily than beliefs. Contrary to beliefs, guesses can be voluntary, active and context-dependent (see section 1.1).

In this case, some philosophers would say that the agent really believes that the next car she will see is not green. But as the probabilistic evidence also establishes that there is a small possibility of seeing the green car, other philosophers would say that

what the agent really believes is that there is a very small possibility of seeing the green car and that the most probable outcome is to see a non-green car (see section 1.6.1).

I consider that in these case there are two different beliefs: (i) there is very small probability of seeing the green car and (ii) the next car will not be green. Some authors may defend that these beliefs are incompatible (see section 1.6.1 and Steglich-Petersen, 2013a). Nevertheless, I deny such incompatibility: probabilistic belief (i) is a belief about what is happening at the present moment and belief (ii) is a belief about what will happen in the future. And my proposal -for an agent S and a believe p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- can be applied for both beliefs: (i) the agent believes 'there is very small probability of seeing the green car' if and only if the agent considers 'there is very small probability of seeing the green car' to be true, and (ii) the agent believes 'the next car will not be green' if and only if the agent considers 'the next car will not be green' to be true.

A.8. THE GEOCENTRIC MODEL CASE

Most people believed during hundreds of years that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme in different ages believed the opposite. Their ideas were not accepted.

The geocentric model case illustrates how rationality differs from correctness (see section 1.5). Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme's beliefs are now considered correct and rational beliefs, but in their ages these beliefs were considered incorrect beliefs. As both authors aim at truth when believing the Earth was not the centre of the Universe, their beliefs have always been rational beliefs -even if many people of their ages considered them irrational beliefs.

The case also jeopardizes the idea of justification as a means to obtain truth when believing (see section 1.6). Most people believed that the Earth was the centre of the Universe and this belief was justified in terms of the available evidence -only few facts like the planets movement could work as evidence and justification for the true belief but few people like Eratosthenes and Nicole Oresme could understand it. People were justified to believe that the Earth was the centre of the Universe even though such a belief was false.

While *the mirage in the dessert case* (see below) is an incorrect rational belief taken to be correct by the believer due to his defective evidence, in *the geocentric model case* the belief that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe is a correct rational belief taken to be incorrect -even irrational- by many people to their defective evidence. Cohen (1989) defines knowledge in external terms (see section 2.1), so agents only have knowledge when they realize that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe even though during centuries the best available evidence showed the opposite.

In this case there are two different beliefs: (i) Eratosthenes and Oresme's belief that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe and (ii) the vast majority of people's belief that the Earth is the centre of the Universe. And both beliefs accommodate my proposal -for an agent [or a group] S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true. Eratosthenes and Oresme believed 'the Earth was not the centre of the Universe' if and only if they considered true that 'the Earth was not the centre of the Universe'. The rest of people believed 'the Earth was the centre of the Universe' if and only if they considered true that 'the Earth was the centre of the Universe'. It is clear that (i) Eratosthenes and Oresme considered true that the Earth was not the centre of the Universe and that (ii) the vast majority of people considered true that the Earth was the

centre of the Universe.

A.9. THE GRUE USER CASE

Let us suppose we have an ordinary person *A* and a grue-user *B* who both have access to all the data there could possibly be about the world before midnight tonight. If *H* is the hypothesis that emeralds will be green after midnight, then *A* will assign a very high probability to *H* even though *B* will assign a very low probability to it [*B* assigns a very high probability to emeralds being blue after midnight]. The divergence is not resolvable by appeal to any further pre-midnight *evidence*, in any useful sense. Even if we insist that *A*'s evidence is not strictly the same as *B*'s evidence (since they are conceptualized differently), both *A* and *B* will still have all the evidence that could conceivably be available to each of them -and yet will still assign very different probabilities to the same hypothesis. Moreover, this is exactly what both *A* and *B* *ought* to do. Their local inductive norms demand it. (Unwin, 2007, 134-5).

This case is one of the main cases supplied by Unwin (2007). The author wants to illustrate that the same evidence does not force agents to form the same beliefs. Agents can develop different beliefs from the same evidence. Furthermore, Unwin (2007) adds that agents may process the same in-put data in different ways: from the same in-put data agents may develop different evidence. And obviously, if the evidence is different beliefs developed from this evidence do not need to be identical nor similar. In short, the same in-put data may induce different evidence and, as a result, different beliefs. And even if the evidence is the same in different agents, so formed beliefs may still be different. *A* and *B* are exposed to the same in-put data and to the same evidence but their beliefs are different.

This position is against subjective or Bayesian theories of belief that are based on the probabilities agents give to the same events and not on the probabilities of the very events (see section 3.1). Agents may give different probabilities to the same events

even if they obtain the same evidence, so it is not possible to develop a universal subjective or Bayesian theory of belief to be equally applied to every agent's beliefs.

In terms of the constitutive doxastic feature of belief that I propose -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true-, it accommodates both A and B beliefs. If A believes that 'the emerald will be green after midnight' then she considers true that 'the emerald will be green after midnight'. If A considers true that 'the emerald will be green after midnight' then she believes that 'the emerald will be green after midnight'. Consequently, if B believes that 'the emerald will be blue after midnight' then she considers true that 'the emerald will be blue after midnight'. If B considers true that 'the emerald will be blue after midnight' then she believes that 'the emerald will be blue after midnight'.

A.10. THE HATED TERRORIST SON CASE A

Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

This case is useful to show that beliefs clearly based on reliable evidence need not to be practical. Kate suffers knowing that her son is a terrorist hated by the whole country: knowing this truth provides no benefit to her but pain. It can be argued that in the long run it is practical to know the truth, so it is practical to form beliefs in evidential terms (Haack, 1996, ϕ 10; Unwin, 2007, 147). But as Kate has no long run, this argument cannot be applied. Some beliefs based on evidence are useful and it can be stated for these beliefs that the evidential reason is also a pragmatic reason (see section 4.4), but this does not work for all beliefs as *the hated terrorist son case A*

illustrates (see section 4.9).

The hated terrorist son case A also provides an argument to support normativist positions against teleologist ones (see section 4.2.1). For normativists, Kate is under a doxastic norm that evaluates her belief and this norm in some way enhances Kate to develop her belief in terms of truth. For teleologists, the doxastic value prevails over other non-epistemic values like comfortability. But it is difficult to establish that it is more valuable for Kate -who is terminally ill- to believe that her son is a hated terrorist rather than to believe that her son is innocent. The same teleologist logic applied to wishful thinking cases (see section 2.5) cannot be applied to this case.

More generally, this case shows the differences between pragmatic and evidentialist positions when dealing with belief emergence (see section 1.3). Both positions are not at always at odds. Often to develop beliefs in terms of good evidence is practical, and the practical beliefs are those that are formed in terms of reliable evidence. However, in *the Kate's hated terrorist son case A* evidence helps to develop a non-practical belief. In wishful thinking cases non-evidential reasons help to form false beliefs that may be emotionally practical.

Some philosophers argue that beliefs promote further action or reasoning (see section 4.4). This case may work as a counter-example, as Kate's belief about her son's culpability does not seem to enhance further action or reasoning. The promoters of this position may defend a holism about beliefs and they may reply that even if it is sometimes difficult to see how beliefs promote further action or believing, beliefs must always be considered in connection with other beliefs and propositional attitudes or mental states. An apparent useless belief may influence many other useful beliefs (Whiting, 2014, 233).

The hated terrorist son case A also illustrates an argument against the 'ought to want' norm of belief proposed by Horwich (2013; see section 3.6). The 'ought to want' norm states that the believer ought to want her belief to be true. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish that Kate ought to want her belief that her son is guilty to be true. Horwich (2013) argues that the 'ought to want' must be understood in an epistemic sense or under epistemic pressure: even if Kate ought not to want to believe that her son is guilty, once she believes so, she is epistemically committed to consider that it is true that her son is guilty.

This case also shows why belief cannot be substituted by a broader concept of acceptance based on adding context-independence to the traditional concept of acceptance (see section 4.7 and Unwin, 2007). It is not the case that Kate necessarily accepts her son's culpability in all contexts. Even if she believes that her son is guilty, she may accept her son's innocence in all possible contexts -being with her friends, talking to the media or during the trial- for her son's defence.

Finally, this case accommodates my proposal: for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true. For Kate and the belief that her son is innocent, if Kate believes that her son is innocent then she considers true that her son is innocent. And if Kate considers true that her son is innocent then she believes that her son is innocent. Kate, when believing that her son is innocent, considers true that her son is innocent.

A.11. THE HATED TERRORIST SON CASE B

Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole -or almost the whole- country, but she believes her son is innocent despite the reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

This case of wishful thinking (see section 2.5) shows that even if beliefs are involuntary and automatic (see section 1.1), agents can bring about the specific evidence or the appropriate circumstances to develop a false belief. And Kate's belief about her son's innocence is false but it is far from being pragmatically incorrect: Kate obtains a emotional benefit for believing that her son is innocent.

Normative accounts of belief state that Kate's belief is irrational (see section 1.5), as it is based on poor or no evidence (see section 1.3) and incorrect (see section 3.2). Some teleological accounts may state that the value of truth is weaker than other values like happiness and emotional fitness (see section 4.2 and specially subsection 4.2.1) which is troubling for the account that reduces the value of truth to other possible values like moral, personal or aesthetic ones (see section 4.3). Pragmatic accounts may establish that the costs of believing the truth are higher than the costs of believing the falsity, so Kate finally believes the falsity. Adler and Hicks (2013) establish that in these cases agents are not fully aware of the evidential basis for their beliefs, they form them via self-deception and this self-deception is explained in terms of previous irrational commitments (Adler & Hicks, 2013, 164). Kate is not fully aware of the evidence that shows that her son is guilty, she forms her belief via self-deception and this is explained in terms of an irrational commitment to her son's innocence (see section 1.3 and section 1.5).

Some formulations of the 'ought' norm (see section 3.4) establish statements like 'if p is false then the agent ought not to believe p '¹⁶⁴ or 'if p is false then it is not the case that the agent ought to believe p '¹⁶⁵ are not easy to assume. Even if Kate's son innocence

164 The narrow 'ought' norm 3: If an agent considers p , and p is *truly believable*, then: if p is true, the agent ought to (believe that p) and if p is false, the agent ought not to (believe that p) (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 110; see section 3.4).

165 The wide 'ought' norm: the agent ought to (believe that p if and only if p is true). See section 3.4.

is false, it is hard to state that Kate ought not to believe her son's innocence. It is also the case that Kate believes her son's innocence and it is false. Norms based on values like goodness are also difficult to assume¹⁶⁶ (see section 3.7): it is hard to establish that Kate's false belief is a bad one and it is hard to assume that the good belief for Kate is the true one, that is, the belief of her son's culpability.

Anyway, this case accommodates my proposal: for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. Kate considers her belief to be true, so Kate believes that her son is innocent if and only if she considers her son's innocence to be true. If Kate believes that her son is innocent, then she considers true that her son is innocent. If Kate considers her son's innocence to be true, then she believes that her son is innocent.

A.12. HUGO'S PIG CASE

Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

This case is archetypical to illustrate how beliefs are formed due to evidential reasons (see section 1.3). Hugo develops his belief that he sees a pig because he has enough evidence: the animal he sees has a pig tail, pig ears, it smells like a pig and it snores like a pig. Nevertheless, not all beliefs are formed in terms of such good evidence (see section 1.3).

Doxastic norms of belief easily apply to this case. Hugo's belief that he sees a pig is correct if and only if he truly sees a pig (see section 3.2). Hugo also ought to

¹⁶⁶ (*Doxastic value norm 2*) Your belief that *p* being true is good (equivalently, the state of affairs that *S* believes *p* and *p* is good). Your belief that *p* being false is bad (equivalently, the state of affairs that *S* believes *p* and *p* is bad). (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 120).

believe that he sees a pig if and only if he truly sees a pig (see section 3.4)¹⁶⁷. Hugo may believe that he sees a pig if and only if he sees a pig, i.e. Hugo is able to believe that he sees a pig if he sees a pig and Hugo ought not to believe that he sees a pig if he does not see a pig (see section 3.5). Hugo ought to want -under an 'epistemic pressure'- his belief that he sees a pig to be true, even if belief firstly emerges automatically and involuntarily (see section 3.6). It is also possible to analyse this case in terms of a value of truth reduced to other possible values like moral, personal or aesthetic ones (see section 4.3). From this analysis, the true belief that Hugo sees a pig is valuable because of other underlying values: maybe Hugo is hungry and knowing that there is a pig allows him to hunt the pig, or maybe Hugo is scared of pigs and knowing that there is one allows him to run away.

This case also illustrates the criticism against a deflationist interpretation of belief in terms of the correctness norm (see section 3.2 and Horwich, 2013). For this interpretation, the agent first judges if the proposition considered is true and, if it is, then the agent takes her attitude to be correct in terms of the correctness norm and finally she forms the correspondent belief. But this is not the way things happen: the agent first develop her belief and then, once it is formed, she may investigate and decide if it is a correct true belief or not. It is not the case that Hugo sees the pig, then he judges if it is true that there is a pig and finally he develops his belief. Rather, Hugo first develops his belief and then he may investigate and decide if it is correct and true that there is a pig.

A similar reasoning is exposed by Glüer and Wikforss (2013a, see section 4.1 and section 5.1.1) to argue in favour of the no-guidance argument to refuse a genuine

¹⁶⁷ There are two main ways of dealing with the 'ought' norm. The 'narrow ought' norm establishes that 'Hugo ought to (believe that he sees a pig) if and only if he truly sees a pig'. The 'wide ought' norm establishes that 'Hugo ought to (believe that he sees a pig if and only if he sees a pig)'. See section 3.4 for further analysis.

normativity of beliefs. For these authors there is not any norm that guides belief formation: beliefs first come to agents and then agents can judge them. First, Hugo comes to believe that there is a pig. Then, he may judge if his belief is correct and true. It is not the case that Hugo first evaluates his attitude and then he decides if such attitude is a belief -being guided by a norm to take the decision. Norms do not provide any reason for belief formation, beliefs come first. All norms can do is to evaluate beliefs already formed, but norms do not guide agents when forming their beliefs.

Glüer and Wikforss (2013a) criticism against normative approaches to believe is explicitly explained via the 'regress of motivation' provoked by norms (see section 4.1 and section 5.1.1). The authors state that normative approaches to belief generate syllogisms of this form:

- (P₁) I want to believe what is in accordance with [the rule] *R*.
- (P₂) To believe that *p* is in accordance with *R*.
- (C) I want to believe that *p* (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a, 94).

The syllogism requires the believer 'to believe that believing that *p* is in accordance with the norm' and this new belief in turn would be motivated by a further belief, generating a vicious regress of motivation. In *the Hugo's pig case*, Hugo wants to believe what is in accordance with the norm of truth. But that generates the 'belief that believing that there is a pig is in accordance with the norm of truth', and this new belief in turn would be motivated by a further belief, thus generating the vicious regress of motivation.

Hugo's pig case is also useful to illustrate the possibility of belief degrees (see section 3.1). Imagine a similar case in which Hugo just sees the pig, but he does not smell it nor listen to it snoring. Hugo is likely to develop the same belief -he sees a pig-

but the degree of such belief is lower than the degree he has if he also smells and listens to the pig.

This case clearly exemplifies the transparency feature of beliefs: if Hugo asks himself if his belief that he sees a pig is true, he automatically asks himself if he sees a pig (see section 1.2 and section 5.2.1). It also illustrates how beliefs may enhance further action, that is, how beliefs supply practical reasoning for action (see section 4.4). Hugo's belief that he sees a pig reflects Hugo's reality and this is useful to promote further action and reasoning: Hugo may be hungry and believing that there is a pig is useful in order to hunt it or Hugo may be scared of pigs and believing that there is a pig allows him to avoid it and run away.

Finally, this case also illustrates quite well a link between belief and truth I defend: Hugo, when believing, considers his belief to be true. In a more analytic fashion, for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true. For Hugo and the proposition 'there is a pig', if Hugo believes that 'there is a pig' then he considers true that 'there is a pig', and if Hugo considers true that 'there is a pig' then he believes that 'there is a pig'.

A.13. JIMMY'S LOTTERY CASE

Jimmy decides to play the lottery. The probability of winning the lottery is 0.0001, but he believes that today he is going to win the lottery. Intuition or something like that tells him it. He believes he is going to win the lottery today.¹⁶⁸

This case of wishful thinking illustrates how beliefs can be formed in terms of small evidence (see section 1.3). It is quite similar to *the love case* (see below), but the

168 Similar cases of 'motivational pragmatic' beliefs are shown by Rinard (2015, 210-1).

difference here is that the evidence for the belief is measured: 0.01%. The non-evidentialist may state that beliefs can be formed in terms of small, poor or even null evidence, while the evidentialist may defend that beliefs need evidence to be formed, even if it is small or weak. The problem will only exist if there is no probability of winning the lottery.

Like in *the love case* (see below), from an epistemic standard of correctness the belief is incorrect as it is very unlikely. Nevertheless, from a pragmatic standard of correctness the belief may be correct, as Jimmy feels happy -so he obtains an emotional benefit- believing that he is going to win the lottery, at least while he does not know the final lottery result -if Jimmy did not win the lottery.

It must be noted that Jimmy really believes that he is going to win the lottery, so this propositional attitude should not be confused with a conscious guess (see section 2.2) or 'the belief that there is a 0.01% probability of winning the lottery'¹⁶⁹. Anyway, both beliefs accommodate my proposal -for an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. If Jimmy believes that he is going to win the lottery, then he considers true that he is going to win the lottery. And if Jimmy considers true that he is going to win the lottery, then he believes that he is going to win the lottery. Consequently, if Jimmy believes that 'there is a 0.01% probability of winning the lottery' then he considers true that 'there is a 0.01% probability of winning the lottery'. And if he considers true that 'there is a 0.01% probability of winning the lottery', then he believes that 'there is a 0.01% probability of winning the lottery'.

169 That situation would be similar to *the gambler case*.

A.14. STANLEY'S LOTTERY CASE

Suppose that Stanley has a ticket in a lottery. The chances of winning the lottery are, as Stanley is aware, $1/1.000.000$. Stanley has yet to hear the results of the lottery, which was drawn earlier in the day. He asserts flat-out: 'My ticket didn't win'. Assume that it is true. Despite this, and despite the extremely strong probabilistic grounds in support of this, intuitively Stanley should not assert this. Instead, he should only conjecture that his ticket didn't win, or assert that his ticket probably lost (Gibbons, 2014, 191).

Similar to *the elections case*, the agent -Stanley- believes that his ticket did not win the lottery but he does not know it. Again, the proponents of the truth aim of belief consider that Stanley takes his belief to be true, but his epistemic commitment is not the strongest one. The proponents of the knowledge aim of belief consider that Stanley is not believing but just guessing that his ticket did not win the lottery, as his epistemic commitment is not the strongest one. Otherwise, if Stanley really believes that his ticket did not win the lottery, he would throw it away (see section 2.1 and section 2.2).

This case can also be used to argue that justified beliefs need not to be true beliefs (see section 1.6 and specially 1.6.1). Stanley is probabilistically justified in believing that he did not win the lottery, but this belief is not true. Actually the true belief is that 'the chances of winning the lottery are $1/1.000.000$ ' and he may have won the lottery. A proposition may have a high probability and yet not be true.

In this case there are two possible different beliefs: (i) Stanley has a 0.0001 probability of winning the lottery and (ii) Stanley did not win the lottery. Similar to *the gambler case*, it may defended that these beliefs are incompatible (see section 1.6.1 and Steglich-Petersen, 2013a). Nevertheless, I do not agree with such incompatibility: probabilistic belief (i) is about what is happening at the present moment and belief (ii) is

a belief about what will happen in the future¹⁷⁰. Furthermore, my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- applies to both beliefs: (i) Stanley believes 'there is 0.0001 probability of winning the lottery' if and only if Stanley considers 'there is 0.0001 probability of winning the lottery' to be true, and (ii) Stanley believes 'he did not win the lottery' if and only if Stanley considers 'he did not win the lottery' to be true.

A.15. THE LAWYER CASE

A lawyer believes that her client is guilty. And she believes so no matter the context: with her partner, her friends and even during the trial. She does it automatically and involuntarily. Nevertheless, during the trial she may assert, accept and assume that her client is innocent in order to obtain the best possible verdict.

This case shows that beliefs are context-independent, involuntary, automatic (see section 1.1) and transparent (see section 1.2) and these features make a difference between beliefs and other states or propositional attitudes like acceptances, assumptions and assertions (see section 2.3).

Some authors (Cohen, 1989) relates assertions with acceptances -the agent asserts what she accepts, and not what she believes- and he establishes that acceptances and assertions imply commitment and responsibility. So when the lawyer accepts and asserts 'my client is innocent' during the trial, she is doing more than just saying 'my client is innocent'. Furthermore, as acceptances and assertions are voluntary, the agents' responsibilities for their acceptances and assertions are stronger than the responsibilities generated by their beliefs. Cohen (1989) also states that beliefs may present degrees (see

170 Even if the lottery was drawn earlier in the day (past), Stanley does not know the results and he will know them in the future.

section 3.1) while acceptances do not: the lawyer may believe more or less the culpability or the innocence of her client, but once the lawyer accepts her client's innocence during the trial she wholly accepts it.

This lawyer case also shows how acceptances and assumptions do not face problems with Moorean cases -like 'it is raining but I do not believe it is raining'. The lawyer, during the trial, may accept and assume¹⁷¹ something like 'My client is innocent but I do not believe she is innocent'. Beliefs have more difficulties to face these cases (see section 1.4).

If Cohen (1989) relates assertions to acceptances, Unwin (2007) discriminates between assertions and acceptances and he relates assertions to beliefs. For Unwin (2007) assertions are the linguistic expressions of beliefs. So the lawyer can accept that her client is innocent during the trial, even though she believes the opposite, but she cannot assert that her client is innocent. The statement 'my client is innocent' made by the lawyer during the trial is not a proper assertion. Unwin (2007) recognizes that this is problematic and he finally admits that assertions are voluntary, but at the same time he states that assertions and beliefs "run together" under the same doxastic norm or goal (18). This author also establishes a difference between assertions and beliefs in terms of the 'assertoric force' present in assertions and not in beliefs. In this line, a possible epistemic norm of assertion is taken into account in section 4.6.

Velleman (2000) considers there are first-order attitudes pragmatically adopted and second-order attitudes adopted "with the aim of thereby accepting the truth" (see section 2.8; also Glüer & Wikforss, 2013b). Acceptances are among the former and beliefs are among the latter. He tinges that belief's doxastic aim does not belong to the believer but to his cognitive mechanisms. So the lawyer's first-order attitude is the

171 The lawyer may also assert it, even though it sounds stranger.

acceptance of her client's innocence while her second-order attitude is her belief aiming at truth in terms of her cognitive system.

Owens (2013) criticizes a possible 'default pragmatism' on beliefs (see section 4.5) -“[t]o be entitled to believe that p is to be entitled to use p as a default assumption in one's practical reasoning” (Owens, 2013, 45)”- arguing that this 'default pragmatism' can be equally applied to acceptances, assumptions and assertions. Being with her friends and her partner, the lawyer may assume, accept and assert that her client is guilty, but during the trial the lawyer is entitled to assume, accept and assert that her client is guilty as a default assumption in order to obtain the best verdict. In general, 'default pragmatism' opens the door to abandoning convictions (Owens, 2013, 46) and to consider that beliefs may be context-dependent.

This case shows how my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- defines belief and differentiates it from other propositional attitudes or states. If the lawyer believes that her client is guilty, then she considers true that her client is guilty. And if the lawyer considers true that her client is guilty, then she believes that her client is guilty. Nevertheless, this proposal cannot be applied to assertions, acceptances and assumptions. The lawyer assumes and accepts her client's innocence during the trial, but she does not consider true that her client is innocent. Similarly, the lawyer asserts her client's innocence during the trial, but she does not consider true that her client is innocent. Even if a norm of assertions is considered (see section 4.6) this norm tells us something like 'for an agent S and a proposition p , S should assert p if and only if S considers p to be true' or 'S must assert that p , only if one has the relevant epistemic authority with respect to p ' (Goldberg, 2015). But this kind of evaluative norms tell us how the agent should act and what the

agent should assert in epistemic terms, not what they really do. Actually agents can assert false propositions in awareness of their falsity, as *the lawyer case* shows. In other words, it is not constitutive of assertions to be considered true by their bearers, while it is constitutive of beliefs to be considered true by their bearers.

A.16. THE LOVE CASE

Paul is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Olga does not love Paul, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Paul's friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Paul has himself seen Olga dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Paul, Olga is just playing hardball with him. Paul *believes* Olga loves him too.

This case of wishful thinking shows that agents do not need to take the most reliable available evidence in order to form their beliefs. Non-evidential reasons may influence belief formation and some philosophers may argue that sometimes evidence is not necessary to develop beliefs but there can be other non-evidential -sometimes conative- reasons (see section 1.3). Specifically, wishful thinking challenges the view that conative attitudes like desires (see section 2.4 and specially section 2.5) cannot form nor determine beliefs. But even if they do, these beliefs are involuntary and automatic (see section 1.1). Sometimes it is argued that non-evidentialist philosophers focus on the agent's insights to justify her beliefs while evidentialist philosophers focus on an external truth (Adler & Hicks, 2013). Some evidentialists may also argue that there is always some evidence into play -e.g. Paul saw Olga touching her hair the last time they met- even if it is weak: they may defend that there is always some present evidence even though non-evidential considerations come into play when forming these beliefs.

It should be noted that there is no need to assume a probabilistic belief in *the love case* and in many other wishful thinking cases: it is not the case that Paul assumes that Olga loves him with a high probability, he completely believes that his love is requited -i.e. Paul assigns probability 1 to his belief (see section 1.6.1). Also, even if non-doxastic features may influence Paul's belief formation, this belief is under the transparency condition: if Paul asks himself whether to believe that Olga loves him (in order to form or to adopt such belief), he automatically asks himself if Olga loves him (see section 1.2).

Belief evaluation in terms of doxastic norms states that *the love case* -and generally speaking, wishful thinking cases- is incorrect (see section 3.2). Nevertheless, if other criteria -like pragmatic emotional ones- are adopted to evaluate beliefs, then these beliefs are likely to be evaluated as correct -at least in the short run (Haack, 1996, ¶10; Unwin, 2007, 147): Paul is happy believing that Olga loves him. For this reason, some authors consider wishful thinking cases like *the love case* to be other states or propositional attitudes like *schmeliefs* or *delusions* (see section 2.6 and section 2.7). *Schmeliefs* are governed by non-doxastic aims or by a doxastic aim but not being incorrect if they turn out to be false (see section 2.7). Delusions are irrational beliefs or other states different to beliefs (see section 2.6). But in both cases to state that wishful thinking cases and many delusions are not beliefs contradicts the common use of these concepts: actually people currently refer to them as beliefs.

Normativists consider these cases to be irrational beliefs or states other than beliefs because they do not accommodate the norm of truth (see chapter 3). Teleologists establish that in these cases the doxastic value is confronted with other values like comfortability and self-motivation (see section 4.2). Many of them also argue that

beliefs are formed by some -generally biological- mechanisms developed by evolution or training. These mechanisms work as tools whose function is to track the truth but sometimes they may fail. Wishful thinking cases like *the love case* also contradict doxastic norms of belief based on goodness¹⁷² (see section 3.7): it is not easy to assume that Paul's false belief is always a bad one -e.g. it can provide emotional benefits. Owens (2013) considers that beliefs aim at truth because truth provides emotional regulation (see section 4.5). So it is better for Paul to believe that Olga does not love him to obtain emotional regulation. But this conclusion is not clear. Owens (2013) replies that emotional regulation is not based on the agent's experience but on the agent's capability to react to both good and bad issues -i.e. ignorance is worse than knowledge to get emotional regulation. But this sounds strange for some wishful thinking like the love case and specially *Kate's hated terrorist son cases*.

Anyway, beliefs may be formed due to poor or null evidence and they may be positively evaluated regardless of their falsity, but the constitutive link between belief and truth is still there: once Paul believes that Olga love's him too, he considers the fact that Olga love's him too to be true. For an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, *S* believes *p* if and only if *S* considers *p* to be true. If Paul believes that Olga loves him then Paul considers that Olga loves him to be true. If Paul considers that Olga loves him to be true then Paul believes that Olga loves him.

A.17. THE MIRAGE IN THE DESSERT CASE

Joe is in the desert. He sees a woman in front of him. So he believes there is a woman in front of him. But it turns out to be a

172 (*Doxastic value norm 2*) Your belief that *p* being true is good (equivalently, the state of affairs that *S* believes *p* and *p* is good). Your belief that *p* being false is bad (equivalently, the state of affairs that *S* believes *p* and *p* is bad). (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, 2013, 120).

mirage.

This case shows that rationality must not be identified or confused with correctness (see section 1.5 and *the geocentric model case*). Joe's belief is incorrect from an epistemic perspective as it is a false belief. But his belief may be taken as rational as he forms it in terms of what he takes to be true evidence -even if it externally¹⁷³ is false evidence and other people realize. And internal true evidence works as a rational reason to belief.

If both objective epistemic norms and subjective rational norms are considered, this case is both correct and incorrect at the same time: it is objectively incorrect as the final belief is false but it is subjectively correct as the Joe develops it in a rational manner -in terms of the available evidence, even though it is defective evidence (Glüer & Wikforss, 2013a).

In a similar manner, it can be argued that a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic norms of belief can also deal with these cases (see section 3.8): the belief is false but it can be considered correct as Joe virtuously developed it. He trusted the only available evidence in terms of his personal epistemic virtues and these virtues were not mistaken. The only problem is that evidence is defective.

Finally, Joe's delusional belief accommodates my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true: if Joe believes that there is a woman in front of him then he considers that 'there is a woman in front of him' to be true. And if Joe considers that 'there is a woman in front of him' to be true then he

¹⁷³ In these terms, Cohen (1989) takes knowledge to be an external concept. So in *the mirage in the dessert case*, knowledge is that Joe sees a mirage. If he rationally believes that he sees a woman then the belief does not relate to knowledge. If he finally accepts that he sees a delusion then such acceptance relates to knowledge (see section 2.1 and section 2.6). Knowledge usually relates to correct evidence but sometimes what the majority takes to be correct evidence turns out to be bad evidence (see *the geocentric model case*).

believes that there is a woman in front of him.

A.18. THE MONARCHS DATES CASE

[imagine] the possible case of someone who answers a string question about, say, the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs correctly but very hesitantly, so that the answerer may be said to have the relevant knowledge even though he does not really believe what he says (Cohen, 1989, 384)

Similar to *the elections case* and *Stanley's lottery case*, this case is useful to show the differences between knowledge and truth, being knowledge a concept that relates to an external universal reality and truth a weaker epistemic concept. The supporters of the knowledge aim of belief (see section 2.1) establish that the agent is not believing but just guessing, as she is not sure about the answers and she does not have reliable evidence for her answers. Other authors would say that the agent is believing and not guessing, and that she previously had enough evidence to develop her belief: otherwise, it would be impossible for her to give the correct answer.

In this case, the agent considers her belief to be true but she is not completely sure, and as a result she cannot establish that she knows the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs. In terms of my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- if the agent believes some specific dates to be the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs, then she considers true that some specific dates are the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs. And if the agent considers true that some specific dates are the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs, then she believes some specific dates to be the dates of Tudor and Stuart monarchs.

A.19. THE NAVIGATION CHARTS CASE

Sailors have used navigation charts based on a geocentric model during centuries.

This case is also interesting to analyse the concept of knowledge and its relation with belief and truth (see section 2.1). At the beginning, sailors believed that the Earth was the centre of the Universe, they considered their belief to be true but they did not know that the Earth was not the centre of the Universe -if knowledge is taken to correspond to an external universal reality.

It may be considered that the sailors' belief aimed at truth and also at knowledge. Sailors believed that the Earth was the centre of the Universe, that belief aimed at truth and it also aimed at knowledge. So sailors thought that they knew that the Earth was the centre of the Universe but such knowledge was finally mistaken: the Earth turned out not to be the centre of the Universe. Also a concept of knowledge based on justification in terms of personal inquiries and social acceptances can be applied. In that case, it can be said that sailors *knew* that the Earth was the centre of the Universe.

This case also works as a counterexample to 'the knowledge norm of practical reasoning' for actions (see section 4.6). This 'knowledge norm of practical reasoning' establishes that "[i]t is epistemically appropriate for one to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning (to act as if p , and to act on p) if and only if one knows that p " (Lackey, 2010, 361-2). Specifically, the inference 'if it is epistemically appropriate for an agent to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning (to act as if p , and to act on p) then the agent knows that p ' turns out to be false. Even when sailors knew that the Earth was not the centre of the Universe, they continue using navigation charts based on this theory as they were useful. Thus, it is appropriate for sailors to use navigations

charts based on a geocentric model and to act in their terms but sailors know that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe. It may be replied that other practical non-epistemic reasons appear when using navigation charts: it is not epistemically appropriate to take the Earth being the centre of the Universe but it is still appropriate to use navigation charts based on this theory for other pragmatic non-epistemic reasons.

In short, this case works as a historical Gettier case in which a justified true belief -the Earth was considered to be the centre of the Universe due to defective evidence- does not correspond to knowledge. This belief aimed at truth, some philosophers would say that it also aimed at knowledge -and that it constituted knowledge at its time- but it turned out to be false. When the belief was operative, my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- applies: if the sailors believed that 'the Earth was the centre of the Universe', then they considered true that 'the Earth was the centre of the Universe', and if the sailors considered true that 'the Earth was the centre of the Universe' then they believed that 'the Earth was the centre of the Universe'.

A.20. THE NUMBERS GAMES CASES

(The numbers game with a single fixed point case) Alice is attached to a mind-reading machine with a screen. Alice is asked to predict what number will appear on the screen. She believes that n will appear. But the number that appears on the screen is $n/2 + 1$. In the case Alice has no beliefs about which number will appear, the number 16 appears.

(The number game with multiple fixed points case) The case is very similar to the single fixed point case. If $n > 0$, the formula is still $n/2 + 1$. But if $n < 0$, the formula is now $n/2 - 1$.

These cases are shown and analysed by Reisner (2013) to defend that non-

evidential reasons and a limited voluntarism may determine belief emergence, permitting a pragmatic encroachment for these beliefs without denying a doxastic aim of belief and normative accounts (see section 1.3.2).

In *the single fixed point case* the only true belief is 2 while in *the multiple fixed point case* both 2 and -2 are true beliefs. Reisner (2013) talks of “complex kind of evidence” (171) to deal with the former case (see section 1.3.2): “*p* is evidence for *q* if *p* entails that any belief but *q* will be false and that *q* would be true” (Reisner, 2013, 170). Nevertheless, this complex evidence so defined cannot be applied to *the multiple fixed point case* as there is not a unique *q* and Alice may believe 2 or -2 -both true beliefs- in non-evidential terms¹⁷⁴.

It can be thought that *q* in his definition of complex evidence can be identified with both solutions 2 and -2 at the same time in *the multiple fixed point case*. So Alice may believe both 2 and -2 at the same time. However, Alice does not need to believe both 2 and -2 to have the correct belief: with just one of both answers she has the correct belief. To force *q* to be 2 and -2 at the same time is too demanding.

Reisner (2013) then establishes a 'normative knowledge principle' for *the single fixed point case*:

Fact *f* is a reason for agent *a* to believe *b* if *f* makes it the case that *a* knows that if *a* believes *b*, then *a*'s believing *b* will cause *b* to be true (Reisner, 2013, 175).

Reisner (2013) defends that this principle is in tune with the doxastic aim of belief and with belief norms. However, the normative knowledge principle does not imply evidentialism: the reason *f* does not need to be evidential to acquire the true belief

¹⁷⁴ “Alice cannot have evidence for any belief in the multiple fixed-point numbers game” (Reisner 2013, 171).

b. Only if Alice believes 2, then 2 will be true and there is not any evidential way to provide the correct outcome. The reason f turns out to be an epistemic non-evidential reason. In this way Reisner (2013) demonstrates that not all doxastic beliefs -even if they are considered under norms of truth- need to be form in terms of evidential reasons. Reisner (2013) points out that non-evidential reasons to belief and this normative knowledge principle come into play only when there are not evidential reasons to believe.

The normative knowledge principle does not apply to *the multiple fixed points case*, because there are two correct answers (2 and -2). Epistemic reasons -regardless of their evidential or non-evidential basis- are not enough to deal with *the multiple fixed points case* and doxastic voluntarism “looks like the right cognitive capacity for this job” (Reisner, 2013, 178). That is, doxastic voluntarism would allow Alice to choose between 2 and -2. Furthermore, this doxastic voluntarism is not at odds with belief aiming at truth and its doxastic norms as Alice choose only between different correct answers. Reisner (2013) summarizes this doxastic voluntarism as follows:

Voluntarism: An agent can choose her belief just in case three conditions are met:
 (i) Evidence does not issue a relevant requirement (either for a belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgement)
 (ii) The agent knows that her having the belief will cause the belief to be true.
 (iii) *Normative knowledge* does not issue a reason for just a single belief (179).

This voluntarism defends that an agent can choose a belief between different true beliefs when she is aware of their truthfulness. And evidence does not determine belief's choice. It is not based on conative attitudes, but just on choosing between different true options. Furthermore, this voluntarism opens the door to a pragmatic encroachment of

belief for these specific cases (see section 4.8).

Finally, my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- applies to these cases as Alice forms her belief before knowing if it is true or false -i.e. Alice forms her belief before any number appears on the screen¹⁷⁵. So if Alice believes that 'the number that will appear on the screen is 2 (or -2, or whatever other number)' then she considers 'the number that will appear on the screen is 2 (or -2, or whatever other number)' to be true. And if Alice considers 'the number that will appear on the screen is 2 (or -2, or whatever other number)' to be true, then she believes that 'the number that will appear on the screen is 2 (or -2, or whatever other number)'.

A.21. THE ONCOLOGIST CASE

Eliza is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has been diagnosing various kinds of cancers for the past twenty years. One of her patients, Lucas, was recently referred to her office because he has been experiencing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. After requesting an ultrasound and MRI, the results of the test arrived on Eliza's day off; consequently, all of the relevant data were reviewed by Anna, a competent medical student in oncology training at her hospital. Being able to confer for only a very brief period of time prior to Lucas' appointment last week, Anna communicated Eliza simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her conclusion. On the basis of the reliable and trustworthy testimony that she accepted from Anna -combined with her background knowledge, that if a patient has pancreatic cancer, a highly aggressive combination of radiation and chemotherapy is the necessary course of action- Eliza decided to schedule this treatment for Lucas, which she began administering to him this morning (Lackey, 2010, 364)¹⁷⁶

This case is supplied by Lackey (2010) to refuse 'the knowledge norm of

175 Remind that if she does not form any belief, the number 16 appears on the screen.

176 Lackey (2010) offers two other similar examples: the NASA Engineer studying Space Shuttle Challenger disintegration, and the English student nomination by two professors (364).

practical reasoning' for actions on what she calls 'isolated secondhand knowledge' (see section 4.6). This 'knowledge norm of practical reasoning' establishes that “[i]t is epistemically appropriate for one to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning (to act as if p , and to act on p) if and only if one knows that p ” (Lackey, 2010, 361-2).

The oncologist case refutes the sufficiency claim of the norm: ' if one knows that p , then it is epistemically appropriate for one to use the proposition that p in practical reasoning (to act as if p , and to act on p)'. Eliza knows that Lucas has pancreatic cancer but it is not epistemically appropriate for her to use the proposition 'Lucas has pancreatic cancer' in practical reasoning and to act as if Lucas had pancreatic cancer -i.e. to schedule the aggressive treatment for Lucas. Furthermore, if Lucas asked for more characteristics of his cancer, Eliza would have little to say. She just relies on the isolated secondhand knowledge given by Anna.

This case analyses knowledge and its implications, and it does not directly address beliefs. It is not clear if Eliza believes that Lucas has pancreatic cancer on the basis of the information supplied by Anna or if Eliza does not develop such belief. But in both cases, my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- applies. If Eliza believes that Lucas has pancreatic cancer, then she considers 'Lucas has pancreatic cancer' to be true. And if Eliza considers 'Lucas has pancreatic cancer' to be true, she considers that Lucas has pancreatic cancer. If Eliza, on the basis of Anna's report, believes that Lucas is likely to have pancreatic cancer but she is not completely sure, then she considers true that Lucas is likely to have pancreatic cancer but she is not completely sure. And if Eliza considers true that Lucas is likely to have pancreatic cancer but she is not completely sure, then she believes that Lucas is likely to have pancreatic cancer but she is not completely sure.

A.22. THE PARKED CAR CASE

I have parked my car on the street outside taking the amount of care a reasonably conscientious citizen would to park legally. When I enter the house, my partner informs me that the police have been towing cars on the street this week. Before being told this, I took myself to know that my car was parked legally, that is, I took myself to have evidence sufficient to justify my believing this. And, we may suppose, I did know. But hearing my partner's words, I reluctantly go out and recheck the position of my car and the relevant parking notices. Is this an implicit admission that I no longer know that my car is legally parked (at least until I have completed the checks) because my belief is no longer justified? (Owens, 2013, 44).

Owens (2013) provides this case to illustrate that a pragmatic principle on beliefs -agents are entitled to believe that p if and only if agents are entitled to act as if p is true (or take p as a reason for further action)- does not fit (see section 4.4 and specially section 4.5). In terms of this pragmatic principle on beliefs, if the agent is entitled to believe that p then she is entitled to act as if p is true (or take p as a reason for action). In *the parked car case*, the agent is entitled to believe that she legally parked the car, but once her partner informs her that the police have been towing cars on the street, the agent is not entitled to act as if she had legally parked the car and she rechecks her car's position. This case can be considered an alief like *the cliff and the bottle of sugar cases* (see section 2.8; also section 5.2.4).

It must be noted that the agent fully believes that she had legally parked the car: she knows that she had legally parked the car, however she rechecks it. And my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- can be applied to this case: the agent believes that he has legally parked the car, then he considers true that he has legally parked the car. And the agent considers true that he has legally parked the car, then he believes that he has legally parked the car.

Even if final action differs from the developed belief, the belief is already formed and the agent considers his belief to be true. In short, final action not only depends on beliefs.

A.23. SCHRÖDINGER'S CAT CASE

After studying the quantum mechanics and after having done the Schrödinger's cat experiment, Mary knows that the cat is alive and dead at the same time, as electrons can be in two different positions at the same time. But she cannot believe it.

The debate in the *the elections case*, *the monarchs dates case* and *the Stanley's lottery case* is if these cases should be considered beliefs or guesses as there is a clear difference between what the agents take to be true and what they know. But it must also be noted that agents may know something without believing it. *Schrödinger's cat case* shows that it is possible for an agent to know something -the cat is dead and alive at the same time- and not to believe it.

As a result, in terms of my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true-, that Mary does not believe that 'the cat is alive and dead at the same time' implies that it is not the case that Mary believes that 'the cat is alive and dead at the same time'. And if it is not the case that Mary believes that 'the cat is alive and dead at the same time', then she does not believe that 'the cat is alive and dead at the same time'. But from the quantum mechanics perspective, Mary establishes that she knows that 'the cat is alive and dead at the same time'.

A.24. THE SCREEN'S COLOURS CASE

Bob has configured his computer screen such that, whenever it is turned on, the background colour is determined by the following random selection mechanism: 0.999999 chance of the screen being blue and 0.000001 chance of the screen being red. Then Bob turns on the screen, leaves the room and Bruce enters the room. Bruce sees that the screen is blue (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a, 218).

This case of *modal condition* illustrates a defence of justified false beliefs (see section 1.6.1 and *the geocentric model case*). Specifically, Bruce is perceptually better justified than Bob to believe that the screen is blue, but as his perceptual systems may fail with a probability higher than 0.000001, Bob is probabilistically better justified than Bruce. However, as Bruce wholly relies on his perceptual evidence and Bob is conscious that his evidence is not complete but highly probable, Bruce will be more surprised if the screen turns out to be red. Bruce's belief is more likely to be mistaken but it seems to be more justified than Bruce's belief. The latter is less likely to be mistaken but it seems to be less justified.

Both Bob's belief and Bruce's belief accommodate my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true: once Bob or Bruce believe that the screen is blue then they consider true that the screen is blue, and once Bob or Bruce consider true that the screen is blue then they believe that the screen is blue.

Specifically, Bob's belief can be analysed in probabilistic terms (see section 1.6.1). Similar to *the Stanley's lottery case* and *the gambler case*, two different beliefs can be considered: (i) Bob believes that there is a 0.999999 probability of having the blue screen, and (ii) Bob believes that the screen is (is going to be) blue. I do not consider both beliefs to be incompatible (Steglich-Petersen, 2013a): probabilistic belief

(i) talks about what is happening at the present moment and belief (ii) talks about what will happen in the future¹⁷⁷. Anyway, my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- accommodates both beliefs: (i) Bob believes 'there is 0.999999 probability of having the blue screen' if and only if Bob considers 'there is 0.999999 probability of having the blue screen' to be true, and (ii) Bob believes 'the screen is (is going to be) blue' if and only if Bob considers 'the screen is (is going to be) blue' to be true.

A.25. THE SKIN CANCER CASE

For instance one might want to defer judgement as to a condition of one's health (say that one has a skin cancer) by waiting for the results of a particular medical examination. In such cases of withholding or of suspension of judgement, the reason to believe (rather: to withhold or to suspend judgement) are attitude or state-given, but they are clearly of the right kind (Engel, 2013, 26).

This case illustrates that evidence not only works as a reason to form beliefs, but it can also work as a reason to stop developing beliefs. But that does not mean that evidence may work as a non-epistemic reason for belief suspension. Even in the cases in which evidence enhances belief withholding or suspension, evidence works as an epistemic reason: “the patient withholds his judgement about his potential illness awaiting more evidence from the medical tests (...): he suspends judgement because he lacks evidence, for an evidential, and not for a pragmatic reason” (Engel, 2013, 27).

As here the case talks about belief suspension and not about a specific belief, my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true- cannot be applied. Only once the agent forms a belief of the kind 'the agent

¹⁷⁷ Even if the screen is already turned on at the present moment, Bob does not see it and Bob's belief (ii) refers to what he will see once he can check the screen.

believes that she has skin cancer (or that she has not skin cancer)' then the proposal can be considered: the agent believes that she has skin cancer (or that she has not skin cancer) if and only if the agents considers true that she has skin cancer (or that she has not skin cancer).

A.26. THE SPACEWOMAN CASE

Jeanne desires to go to the Moon but she believes she will not be able.

This case shows the differences between beliefs and desires (see section 2.4). Both are automatic, involuntary and context-independent (see section 1.1) but beliefs are transparent while desires are not (see section 1.2). Beliefs are predominantly cognitive -agents reflect the reality as they think it is-, desires are predominantly conative -agents reflect the reality as the want it to be. Jeanne believe that she will not be able to go to the Moon, so she considers that the reality is that she will not be able to go to the moon, but she desires to go to de Moon, so she would like to be in another reality in which she goes to the Moon.

In the same way that acceptances and beliefs do not necessarily coincide, desires and goals to fulfil do not necessarily coincide. But normally beliefs induce acceptances in agents, and in a similar manner, desires induce goals to achieve in agents.

In terms of my proposal -for and agent S and a believe p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true-, if Kate believes that she will not be able to go to the Moon then she considers true that she will not be able to go to the Moon. Consequently, if she considers true that she will not be able to go to the Moon, then she believes that she will

not be able to go to the Moon. Clearly, my proposal does not fit desires: Kate desires to go to the Moon but she does not consider true that she will be able to go to the Moon.

A.27. THE TEACHER CASE

Tom is at class of physics. His teacher tells him and the rest of pupils that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe. So he believes that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe.

Similar to *the Hugo's pig case*, this case shows how beliefs are formed due to evidence (see section 1.3). The difference to *Hugo's pig case* is that Hugo has direct perceptual evidence -i.e. he sees the pig, he smells the pig and he listens to the pig- while Tom has the indirect evidence provided by his teacher. This case shows that there are different kinds of evidence: the given directly by perceptual in-puts, the given by personal experiences, the given by others' testimonies, the given by social behaviours and culture.

The teacher case also illustrates the approach that defends that beliefs provide practical reasoning for further action (see section 4.4): Tom develops his belief about the Earth not being the centre of the Universe and this belief provides him with reasons for further practical action and reasoning -e.g. believing that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe is useful in order to pass the exam.

In terms of my proposal -for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true-, if Tom believes that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe then he considers 'the Earth is not the centre of the Universe' to be true. And if Tom considers 'the Earth is not the centre of the Universe' to be true then he believes that the Earth is not the centre of the Universe.

A.28. THE WENDERS FILM CASE

Suppose that Haley is deciding whether to go to the cinema. She believes that a new Wenders film is showing. But that believing this makes her happy does not show that what she believes has any real consequences for the decision facing her. Alternatively, believing that a new Wenders film is showing on the grounds that it would make her happy to do so is not a way of pursuing the aim to believe only what is a practical reason. Given that aim, Haley cannot take practical considerations to favour or justify believing. In contrast, suppose that Haley has read the current film-listing, according to which a new Wenders film is showing. This indicates that she would not conflict with the aim of believing only what is a practical reason if she were to believe that a new Wenders film is showing. If Haley forms this belief, that the film-listings [evidence] state that a new Wenders film is showing indicates that what she believes has real consequences for deciding whether to go to the cinema (Whiting, 2014, 225).

Whiting (2014) shows this case to illustrate his idea about the relationship between the doxastic aim of belief, the practical reasoning for action and evidentialism (see section 4.4). Whiting (2014) considers that belief aims at truth and that this truth provides practical reasoning for further action¹⁷⁸. But this does not mean that belief directly aims at practical issues: the author refuses a pure pragmatic approach to belief. And the fact that belief aims at truth in order to provide practical reasoning for further action implies a commitment to evidentialism: agents take evidence to develop their beliefs aiming at truth because truth provides practical reasons for further action and reasoning.

In this case, Haley does not develop her belief only due to practical considerations: believing that a new Wenders film is showing makes her happy but this conative issue is not enough to develop the belief and the further action. But once she sees the film-listing and she realizes that a new Wenders film is showing -so once she

178 It must be noted that the practical reasoning provided by beliefs may not be the only one (see section 4.4).

has the evidence that a new Wenders film is showing-, she acquires the correspondent believe aiming at truth, and this truth provides a practical reason to go to the cinema and see the new Wenders film.

Finally, this case accommodates my proposal: for an agent S and a proposition p , S believes p if and only if S considers p to be true. If Haley believes that a new Wenders film is showing, then she considers true that a new Wenders film is showing -regardless of evidence and the practical reasoning that such belief supplies. And if Haley considers true that a new Wenders film is showing, then she believes that a new Wenders film is showing -regardless of evidence and the practical reasoning that such belief supplies.

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